A-3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of Victor Bermudez
Cumberland County,
Department of Corrections

CSC DKT. NO. 2014-716
OAL DKT. NO. CSV 13807-13

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ISSUED: AUGUST 22, 2017 BW

The appeal of Victor Bermudez, County Correction Officer, Cumberland County, Department of Corrections, 10 working day suspension, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Bruce M. Gorman, who rendered his initial decision on June 30, 2017. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellant and a reply to exceptions was filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

Having considered the record and the Administrative Law Judge's initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission, at its meeting on August 16, 2017, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusion as contained in the attached Administrative Law Judge's initial decision.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending the appellant was justified. The Commission therefore affirms that action and dismisses the appeal of Victor Bermudez.

Re: Victor Bermudez

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in a judicial forum.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON
AUGUST 16, 2017



Robert M. Czech, Chairperson
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries
and
Correspondence

Christopher S. Myers
Director
Division of Appeals and Regulatory Affairs
Civil Service Commission
Unit H
P. O. Box 312
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312

Attachment

State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INITIAL DECISION

OAL DKT. NO. CSV 13807-13

AGENCY DKT. NO. 2014-716

IN THE MATTER OF VICTOR BERMUDEZ, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

Stuart J. Alterman, Esq., for appellant, Victor Bermudez (Alterman and Associates, attorneys)

Theodore E. Baker, County Counsel, for respondent Cumberland County, Department of Corrections

Record Closed: May 18, 2017 Decided: June 30, 2017

BEFORE **BRUCE M. GORMAN**, ALJ t/a:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant, Victor Bermudez (Bermudez) appealed the respondent's, Cumberland County, Department of Corrections (CCDOC), action imposing a ten-day suspension for violation of the County Harassment Policy.

The appellant requested a fair hearing and the matter was filed at the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on September 25, 2013, to be heard as a contested case.

N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to 15 and 14F-1 to 13. The matter was heard over the course of three days, August 13, 2015, April 14, 2016, and March 27, 2017. The record closed after the parties filed written summations on May 18, 2017.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

This case emanates from an argument between two corrections officers employed by the CCDOC.

Officer Gregory Glenn (Glenn) testified for the CCDOC. Glenn has been employed as a Corrections Officer by the CCDOC for the past eighteen years. He has been assigned to the Transportation Unit for the past three years.

On September 7, 2012, Glenn was working in the Transportation Unit with his partner, Yolanda Crosley (Crosley). At that time, he was accosted by the appellant, who proceeded to engage in an argument.

The argument had its genesis in a prior conversation among a group of corrections officers. The officers were discussing the condition of a fellow officer, Yobani Marti (Marti). Marti was purportedly suffering from cancer at the time. Appellant expressed the opinion that she did not really have cancer. He stated that he had seen both of his grandparents suffer from cancer and Marti did now show the same symptoms. He noted that Marti liked to avoid work.

Appellant was a delegate for his union and was active in handling employee grievances. Glenn was aware that Marti intended to ask appellant to assist her in proving that she was suffering from cancer. Consequently, he told Marti what appellant had said and recommended that she use the union president to assist her instead of the appellant.

When appellant learned that Glenn had reported his comments to Marti, he was angered. On September 7, 2012, at approximately 8:15 a.m., he confronted Glenn at the rear control area at the back of the jail. According to Glenn, appellant exhibited that

anger when he approached him. Glenn testified that appellant said, "What's wrong with you, you bitch ass nigger?" "Didn't you take your hormone shots?" Glenn commented that appellant may have used the word "nigga" and not "nigger". He stated that the phrase "bitch ass nigger" was street jargon. "Bitch ass" meant coward; "nigger" or "nigga" meant punk. Consequently, when appellant called Glenn a "bitch ass nigger," he was calling him a cowardly punk.

Glenn stated that he did not feel threatened by the outburst, but he felt hurt. This statement was a recurring theme in Glenn's testimony. Glenn appeared under subpoena. He had previously attempted to avoid participation in the proceeding. He had previously asked the administration not to discipline the appellant. During his testimony, he did everything possible to mitigate the significance of appellant's outburst.

However, his conduct on the date of the incident belied his protestations that he did not feel threatened. After the argument was concluded, Glenn immediately went to the office and prepared an Incident/Offense Report. (R-1.) In that report he noted that the outburst occurred in front of Officer Crosley, a secretary named Sandy Fisher, and inmate named T. Mathis. He termed the offense "threatening behavior". He then wrote the following narrative:

> Approx. at 0815 hrs at the gun bay area, Officer Bermudez went off on me, Officer G. Glenn, #68. Bermudez said "Glenn have you took those hormone shots to get the bitch out of you, "you bitch ass nigger." Why did you tell about what I said." Bermudez had made a statement that he believed Mary was faking that she had cancer. Bermudez kept screaming out in front of inmate T. Mathis, Sandy Fisher, and Officer Crosley. He said "you bitch ass nigger this isn't the first time you told on me." When Bermudez was screaming all this, he was approaching me with his fists balled up. He kept calling me, Officer Glenn a bitch ass nigger and get the fuck out of my way! Bermudez scream also don't say another thing to me ever, you bitch ass nigger and went storm off!

Glenn admitted that he wrote this report because he was angry and upset. But he contended that once he calmed down, he realized that appellant's conduct did not make him feel threatened. Glenn stated that appellant should have confronted him in

private and not in front of three witnesses. He admitted that appellant's voice was raised but contended that he was not yelling. He characterized appellant's words as more like "harsh". When confronted with his statement in the Incident Report that appellant was "screaming," he admitted that appellant was screaming, but said he was not shouting louder than normal.

Glenn contended that appellant called him a "bitch ass nigger" only twice. When it was pointed out to him that in the report he stated that the term was used three times, he contended that he had made a mistake in the report.

Glenn admitted that he was not required to file a report. He claimed he did so because he did not want to be teamed with appellant for the next few days until he had calmed down.

Glenn contended he should have written "nigga" instead of "nigger" in his report. He asserted that there was a difference between the two words, but he was upset and angry at the time and not thinking clearly when he wrote the report. He asserted that the term "nigga" was one of endearment, that, "you are my nigga" means "you are my boy". However, he admitted that the term "nigger" could also be a term of endearment.

Glenn asserted that the matter had been blown out of proportion. He stated that appellant's use of the term "nigger" (of "nigga") was "not a racial thing". Glenn reached that conclusion because he felt appellant was also "black". When queried about the fact that appellant is in fact Latino in his heritage, Glenn stated that there are two colors, white and black. He included appellant in the black category.

Glenn stated that the terms "nigger" and "nigga" are "almost similar", but "different". Whether the terms are pejorative in nature depends upon the intent. Glenn was satisfied that appellant did not use the terms in a racial manner. Instead, appellant was attacking Glenn's manhood. Appellant's intent to attack Glenn's manhood was behind appellant's question, "Have you took those hormone shots to get the bitch out of you?"

Glenn stated that he is "from the old school". By "old school", he meant that he is now sixty-years-old and remembers the days of Dr. King and the Civil Rights Movement. In his opinion, the word "nigger" should not be used at all. He went so far as to state that he also does not like the words "negro" and "colored". He considers himself to be "black" or "African American".

Glenn stated that the word "nigger" was offensive. It was a downgrade of a black person, a belittlement, a statement that an African American was worthless trash. It reminded him of the time he could not use the same bathroom as white people. However, in 2015, whether the term was offensive depended upon the context in which it was used. If a black person used the term to him, he would automatically think he was being friendly. Glenn stated that the world is dyed into two colors, black and white. Black people were considered to be a lower form of race by white people. Accordingly, when a white person used the term, it is to discredit the black person.

Despite his antipathy toward the term "nigger", Glenn admitted it has come back into common use in the African American community. As a result, whether it is offensive now depends upon the way in which it is used. If it is used in an antagonistic way, it is offensive, but if it is used in a friendly way, then it is acceptable. He noted that even "white guys" now call each other nigger. In his view, appellant did not utilize the term in a racial manner.

Glenn stated that appellant made his statements out of emotion and did not really mean them. Appellant knew that, and the two reconciled the following day. Thereafter, another officer told him he should not have written the report and urged him to withdraw it. At a later date, he met with the Warden, and told the Warden that the report was a mistake and urged that appellant not be charged. He tried to retract the report, but the Warden advised that he could not do so.

Glenn complained that the unit's Sergeant, Robert Echevarria, (Echevarria) took pleasure in seeing appellant charged. When Glenn filed his report, Echevarria stated, "Good, burn him, burn him, burn him." However, Glenn admitted that he did not speak

with him prior to writing the Incident Report. Glenn confirmed that Echevarria did not place pressure on him to testify. Glenn stated that he had told the truth at trial.

Yolanda Crosley testified for the CCDOC. Crosley has been a Transportation Officer with the CCDOC since 1997 and has served as Glenn's partner for approximately five years. She was working as Glenn's partner on September 7, 2012.

At the outset of her testimony, Crosley claimed to remember virtually nothing about the incident. She claimed only to remember that Glenn and appellant had a discussion in her presence. Her recollection was that they "had some words" and they were done. The discussion occurred at rear control at the back of the jail. Crosley was preparing to transport Inmate T. Mathis. Glenn and the appellant were arguing.

Crosley was confronted with the Incident Report she wrote on September 7, 2012. (R-2.) She acknowledged her signature and admitted that she wrote the report on the day of the incident, but claimed it had been so long, she did not remember what happened. She admitted that the report must be accurate. However, she claimed not to remember the incident.

After reading her report, she conceded that the discussion between appellant and Glenn became loud, but continued to insist she did not know what appellant said. Finally she admitted that appellant called Glenn a "bitch ass nigger".

Crosley quickly attempted to exonerate appellant for his conduct. She testified that, in her words, black people say that to each other all the time. They think of "nigger" as a word they can use. She agreed that "nigger" is a slave word when spoken by a white person, but African Americans use it continuously. Crosley testified that she heard the word repeatedly when she grew up in the projects. She agreed that saying the word was not ok, but said that "that is how we were raised". She agreed that African Americans feel offended if a white person says the word, but if a black person says it to another black person is acceptable. She said that use of the word in the workplace was not acceptable. In fact, she stated that using the word at all was not acceptable.

Crosley contended that she only heard appellant say "bitch ass nigger" one time, but admitted that in her report, she stated that appellant used the words "bitch ass" twice.

Crosley stated that if someone used the word to her while arguing, she might have been offended. She has never heard the term used toward a black female, but if the word was used casually, she would not be offended even if the speaker was white, if the speaker was a friend. The difference was in how the word was utilized. If the word was utilized in an insulting or demeaning context, then she would be offended. If it was utilized in a friendly manner, she would not be offended.

Crosley explained that there is a difference between the terms "nigger" and "nigga". "Nigger" is a much harsher term. She noted that in her report, she stated that appellant used the term "nigga".

Crosley admitted that the confrontation between the appellant and Glenn was not a friendly exchange.

On cross-examination by appellant's counsel, Crosley's memory improved significantly. She testified that appellant called Glenn a "bitch ass nigga". She also noted that appellant asked Glenn if he had taken his female hormones. Crosley concluded that the thrust of the appellant's statement was to question Glenn's manhood. She did not think that appellant's comments were racially motivated. She stated it is not unusual for her colleagues at the jail to call each other "bitch ass niggers."

Glenn told Crosley that he was sorry he wrote the incident report. He told her he only wrote the report because appellant hollered at him in front of other people.

Crosley stated that as an African American female she did not find appellant's words to be racist in nature. Black officers use these words all the time; they even say them in front of their supervisors. Sometimes people of color use this terminology as terms of endearment.

Crosley noted that her view of appellant's words was based partly upon the fact that he is married to an African American woman. However, she agreed that it was not acceptable for appellant to use the word "nigger" just because his wife is African American. She also agreed that the word "nigger" is racist by definition.

Crosley briefly addressed the word "bitch". When asked if the word "bitch" was sexist, she stated that it depended on the intent of the speaker.

Walter T. Wroniuk, Jr. (Wroniuk) testified for the CCDOC. Wroniuk has been employed by the CCDOC for twenty-six years. At the time of his testimony, he held the rank of Lieutenant and served as Commander of the four to twelve shift. In September of 2012, he was a Sergeant assigned to the Internal Affairs (IA) Division.

Wroniuk conducted an investigation of the incident. On direct examination he described his investigation and introduced into evidence his report. (R-4.) His direct testimony concluded at the end of the day, and an additional date was scheduled for his cross examination. Wroniuk failed to appear on that date, and again on subsequent dates scheduled for that purpose. County Counsel explained that Wroniuk had retired, but Counsel believed he could be produced. Ultimately, County Counsel issued a subpoena, but Wroniuk ignored the subpoena. After nearly two years, it was apparent that, short of having him arrested on a bench warrant, a power this tribunal lacks, Wroniuk would never voluntarily appear. At that juncture, on appellant's motion, Wroniuk's testimony was stricken and his report (R-4) was returned to the CCDOC.

Appellant testified on his own behalf. He has served as a Corrections Officer with the CCDOC since 1997. During that time, he has been active in his union. He was his local's State Delegate for nine years, and presently serves as President of PBA Local 231. He has been active on numerous committees dealing with issues affecting corrections officers and has personally assisted in securing the passage of legislation addressing these issues.

Appellant described his ethnic background. Both parents came from Puerto Rico. However, his grandmother on his father's side bore African blood. Additionally, he has been married for twenty-five-years to an African American woman. Accordingly, appellant considers himself to be a "person of color", which he defined as someone descended from slaves.

Appellant has known Glenn since 1997. He had no problem with Glenn prior to the incident of September 7, 2012. At the time of the incident, they worked together as partners in the jail's Transportation Division.

Shortly before September 7, 2012, Captain Ken Lamcken advised appellant that an officer named Marti was being investigated for abuse of sick leave. Specifically, Marti claimed she suffered from stage four cancer. Appellant's grandmother had died of cancer, and he was familiar with the symptoms. Given his knowledge of the illness, petitioner expressed doubt that Marti suffered from stage four cancer. Additionally, Marti's cousin told him Marti was not telling the truth.

Appellant conveyed his belief to his transportation partner. Subsequently, appellant learned that Glenn had told Marti what he had said. Glenn's disclosure caused petitioner a problem with his union.

On September 7, 2012, Glenn was partnered with Crosley instead of appellant. According to appellant, the three met at the weapons box at the rear of the jail. At that time, he asked Glenn if he had taken his hormone pills that morning. When Glenn asked him what he meant, appellant told him he should not have repeated his words to Marti. Glenn then became very emotional and began yelling incoherently. At that juncture, appellant called Glenn a name. When he testified in court, he stated what he called Glenn, sounded like "bitch ass nigger". He quickly corrected himself and changed "nigger" to "nigga". He then insisted that he had said "nigga" in the first place.

Appellant explained that "nigger" and "nigga" were different words. "Nigger" was a racial term; "nigga" was not. To the contrary, "nigga" was a term of endearment

among people of color. Caucasians were not permitted to use either word, but African Americans were.

Appellant stated that the term "bitch ass nigga" expressed a challenge to Glenn's manhood. It suggested that he was gossiping "like a woman". He stated he told Glenn he had a lot of estrogen in him. He had no intent to attack Glenn racially, and did not think Glenn would take the statement as a racial slur.

Appellant did not remember if he wrote a report about the incident. When advised that the exchange had become a problem for him, he went to Glenn and apologized, telling Glenn that he did not mean to hurt him. He also noted that during an unrelated matter, Glenn had called Lieutenant Chareston, an African American officer, a "bitch ass nigger". After appellant apologized, Glenn wrote a letter (P-1) requesting that the charges be dropped. The County declined to drop the charges. During his testimony, appellant repeatedly attempted to deflect questions benoting that Glenn had asked that the charges be dropped.

Appellant stated he did not understand why the charges were filed against him. He was never trained in harassment. During the County's one training session on harassment, he did not attend because he was assigned to special duty away from the jail.

Appellant admitted that since the incident, he has concluded that the use of the word "nigga" is deleterious to people of color. He no longer uses the word, and encourages members of the younger generation to avoid the term.

On cross-examination, appellant argued that a double standard existed over the use of the term "nigga", and that at the time of the incident, he approved of the double standard. People of color could use the term, but Caucasian people could not. Since the incident, he has changed his views and now believes that it's wrong for either race to use the word.

Appellant was asked if he had told the IA investigator that he had used the term "nigga" when addressing Glenn. He asserted he could not remember what he had told the investigator, either about the incident generally or specifically whether he used the word "nigger" or "nigga".

On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that he had intended to insult Glenn's manhood. He agreed that a "bitch" was a contrary woman, and his use of the term was not intended as an endearment. He conceded the same facts with regard to his use of the term "ass". But he insisted the term "nigga" was the equivalent of the term "dude".

Appellant conceded that he was upset when he approached Glenn, but denied that he had raised his fist to Glenn. He acknowledged telling Glenn never to seek his assistance if he needed help from the union. He also conceded he told Glenn never to speak to him again. He agreed that he had intended his words to be offensive. He now believes what he said to Glenn was wrong, and regrets his conduct on September 7, 2012.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

The County's Harassment Policy (R-5) provides in pertinent part:

> In addition to prohibiting sexual harassment, the county prohibits the harassment or intimidation of an individual based on his or her race, creed, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, sex, age, disability, veteran status, gender identity or expression, source of lawful income used for rental or mortgage payments or any other classification protected by federal, state or local law. Harassment can be written, verbal or physical conduct – including but not limited to slurs, remarks, epithets, jokes, intimidating or hostile acts based on an employee's membership in a protected class, when such conduct has the purpose or effect of:

> 1. Substantially interfering with an individual's work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;
> 2. Otherwise adversely affecting an individual's employment opportunities; or
> 3. Unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance.
>
> Such behavior is unacceptable in the workplace and anywhere work is conducted including but not limited to, business trips, conferences, work-related travel and business-related social events. It includes contacts over telephone, voice mail, regular mail, facsimile machine or any other electronic communication device.

The County asserts that appellant violated this policy when he confronted Glenn on September 7, 2012. Appellant denies that he engaged in harassing conduct.

Most of the facts of the case are not in dispute. Appellant conceded that he approached Glenn in a state of upset. He then asked Glenn if he had taken his female hormones that day, berated him for disclosing his comments about Marti, and called him either "bitch ass nigger" or "bitch ass nigga". The only facts in dispute are whether appellant raised his fist to Glenn, which Glenn asserted and appellant denied, and which form of the "N" word appellant utilized.

Appellant's question to Glenn about whether he had taken his hormone, and statement about Glenn's estrogen level clearly amount to slurs against Glenn's sex and gender identity. His use of the terms "bitch" and "ass" constitute epithets within the meaning of the policy. All of these words contributed to the creation of a hostile and offensive work environment, and coming from a high ranking union official, they also created an intimidating environment.

Appellant asserted that he called Glenn "nigga", which he contended was a term of endearment. In his report, R-1, Glenn stated that petitioner used the term "nigger". In her report, R-2, and her testimony, Crosley confirmed that appellant used the term "nigger" and not "nigga". It should be noted that both Glenn and Crosley testified reluctantly and tried their best to protect appellant.

The credibility issue here resolves itself based upon appellant's conduct. Regardless of whether he said "nigger" or "nigga", he clearly did not intend the word as a term of endearment. By his own admission, he was upset, and he delivered the epithet in a threatening manner. If we accept appellant's explanation, then "nigga" was less onerous than "nigger", but given the context of delivery, whatever word he used constituted a slur in violation of the policy. Whatever word he spoke was said in anger.

The appellant argued that the incident constituted no more than a quarrel between colleagues, a quarrel that was personal in nature and should be resolved between the parties. Glenn's reluctance to proceed with prosecution of the matter supports appellant's argument. The problem with appellant's argument lies with the nature of the language he used. Appellant's attack on Glenn's manhood went well beyond the context of a common quarrel. His sexually derogatory language was unacceptable in the public work place.

But worse, appellant's use of the "N" word, regardless of whether he used "nigger" or "nigga", has no place in public work place. Certain words in the English language are so vile that they cannot be countenanced. The so-called "F" word falls into that category, as does the so-called "C" word as applied to women. So too does the "N" word, regardless of the context. That word has been used for generations to degrade. In their efforts to protect appellant, both Glenn and Crosley attempted to minimize the significance of the incident, but both admitted they found the "N" word to be offensive.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects free speech. That amendment affords appellant the right to use the "N" word in the privacy of his home, or elsewhere during his off duty time. But it does not afford him the right to use the "N" word in the work place. Appellant holds his job not as a right, but as a privilege. With that privilege come certain limitations. One of those limitations is that he cannot direct offensive and derogatory language at a fellow employee. The "N" word is perhaps the most extreme example of unacceptable language. His use of that word

causes what might otherwise constitute a common quarrel to rise to the level of harassment.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that appellant violated the harassment policy. The charges must be **SUSTAINED.**

There remains the issue of penalty. Progressive discipline is the law in New Jersey. See West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 523-24. Appellant's disciplinary record is lengthy, but remarkably minimal. He has received six letters of reprimand, but none later than 2001. He received two one-day suspensions, the later in 2000. He received a seven-day suspension for tardiness and neglect of duty in 2001, a three-day suspension for insubordination (cell phone in possession) in 2002, and a thirty-day suspension for neglect of duty (leaving his post) in 2002. But he has received no disciplinary action since 2002, a period of ten years prior to the incident in question and fifteen years prior to the time of trial.

The County now seeks to impose a ten-day suspension, which is a term less than his longest suspension. Appellant's prior thirty-day suspension could have justified the imposition of a significantly harsher penalty. The County showed restraint by only imposing a ten-day suspension.

On the other hand, aside from the incident in question, appellant has a clean disciplinary record since 2002. The victim expressed a desire that the incident be forgotten and the appellant freed of penalty. And in many respects, the matter amounted to a quarrel among colleagues, a personal matter perhaps best left to the participants.

But in the final analysis, appellant's use of the "N" word in any form was unacceptable in the work place. Appellant must be punished for his conduct, and his punishment must constitute a warning to all other public employees that the use of the "N" word in the work place will not be tolerated.

The County's action imposing a ten-day suspension must be **SUSTAINED.**

ORDER

I **ORDER** that respondent's action imposing a ten-day suspension for harassment be **SUSTAINED.**

I hereby **FILE** my initial decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, PO Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

Bruce M. Gorman

June 30, 2017
DATE

BRUCE M. GORMAN, ALJ t/a

Date Received at Agency: June 30, 2017

Date Mailed to Parties: June 30, 2017

/dm

APPENDIX

WITNESSES

For Appellant:

Victor Bermudez

For Respondent:

Gregory Glenn
Yolanda Crosley
Walter T. Wroniuk, Jr.

EXHIBITS

For Appellant:

P-1 Letter to Warden from Officer G. Glenn, dated December 17, 2012

For Respondent:

R-1 Incident/Offense Report completed by Officer G. Glenn, dated September 7, 2012
R-2 Incident/Offense Report completed by Officer Yolanda Crosley, dated September 7, 2012
R-3 Cumberland County Department of Corrections Incident Report completed by Lieutenant R. Morales, dated September 7, 2012
R-4 Stricken from the Record
R-5 Cumberland County Prohibited Discrimination and Harassment Policy
R-6 Memo from Lieutenant Dale Sciore to All Correctional Personnel regarding Harassment in the Workplace, dated June 17, 2010

R-7 Memo from Administrative Lieutenant Dale Sciore to All Correctional Personnel regarding Mandatory Sexual Harassment Training, dated July 14, 2010

R-8 Officer Bermudez Disciplinary Record