

NUCLEAR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FACT SHEET

Communication Upgrades and Enhancements to Emergency Facilities

The DEP is mandated to be prepared for a full scale response to a nuclear emergency and implement the Radiological Emergency Response Plan in a timely and efficient manner. During the past 12 months the NEPS section with assistance from the DEP's Office of Information Resource Management installed new computers, printers, and fax machines in the Emergency Operation Facilities, Forward Command Posts and Emergency News Centers in Salem and Ocean counties. The upgraded equipment will greatly enhance the reliability and effectiveness of the DEP's nuclear emergency response. The aging computer and fax systems were starting to show signs of unreliability and were incapable of managing new hardware and software. This new technology will ensure that our capabilities match the expectations of the public to protect their health and safety. In order to enhance emergency response notification, each nuclear responder has been assigned an individual cell phone with direct connect capability. The new cell phones will enable mass notification through group text messaging and direct connections. Eventually, the system will replace the pager system which has become problematic and unreliable.

Comprehensive Reviews at Artificial Island and Oyster Creek Nuclear Sites

The National Response Plan calls for a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management, across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan was developed to enhance protective security across critical infrastructure sectors, focusing on collaborative partnerships among federal agencies, state/local/tribal governments, industry associations, and private sector owners and operators. To achieve these objectives, the Comprehensive Review Process was initiated in 2005 by the Department of Homeland Security. The Comprehensive Review is a structured, government and private sector analysis of critical infrastructure and key resource facilities. The purpose of each review is to explore the impact of potential terrorist attacks, the consequences of such an attack, and the integrated prevention and response capabilities of the owner /operator, local law enforcement, and emergency response organizations. The assessments will be used to support the overall goal of reducing the nation's vulnerability to terrorism.

The nuclear industry was the first sector to participate in the review process. During 2007, the Bureau of Nuclear Engineering along with NRC, FEMA, DHS, state and local law enforcement agencies, fire, medical, and emergency management agencies participated in a comprehensive review at the Artificial Island nuclear generating site on March 13-15, and at the Oyster Creek nuclear generating site on April 10-12. The individual assessments examined the consequences of a theoretical attack on each facility, and the various planned local, state, and federal responses. Emergency preparedness as well as security was explicitly considered. Evaluations, decisions, and recommendations were based upon candid and proactive dialogue among the review team, licensee staff and key stakeholders.

The inter-agency review team assessment identified gaps or differences between existing security and emergency response capabilities and additional capabilities that may be needed to better address terrorist initiated actions. Potential enhancements or options to be considered for

implementation in closing or reducing gaps were also identified. These gaps and differences included equipment, personnel, training and resource coordination.

Comprehensive Review data will be analyzed for in-sector and cross-sector trends. As the Comprehensive Review program progresses, this information may be used to inform future federal investment decisions, or point to areas where research is required to evolve additional protective measures. In less than a year the Comprehensive Reviews have resulted in numerous benefits in terms of identifying readily adaptable, low-cost protective measures for increased readiness and preparedness in the event of an attack or natural disaster. Stakeholders should receive a review report and associated questionnaire within a year.

Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

During a nuclear event or exercise, engineering staff at BNE Headquarters and at the Emergency Operations Facility perform accident assessment in order to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for the public if necessary. Accident assessment involves dose projection and evaluation of plant systems. Various tools and field data are used in each assessment process. One tool used in engineering assessment is the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). SPDS is a computerized system provided by the licensees that displays real time engineering information on plant systems. The system allows engineers to manually select, monitor and assess various plant systems from a desk top computer. By utilizing the system during exercises and real events, BNE engineering staff can better assess plant systems and expedite the PAR process.

In an effort to increase the efficiency of the BNE's response to emergency situations at the Hope Creek and the Salem nuclear generating station, the BNE is working closely with the PSEG emergency preparedness and information technology personnel to develop the capability to remotely access SPDS. Remote access will allow the BNE to make initial assessment of plant situations from its headquarters in Trenton during the time that emergency responders report to and activate emergency facilities. In addition, the BNE will be able to monitor plant parameters without having to disturb control room personnel.

The remote access to the Hope Creek SPDS was started in August 2007 and completed in December 2007. Local and remote testing of the system was performed by both PSEG and BNE personnel. The BNE can now access from its headquarters approximately 200 Hope Creek plant parameters, arranged in twenty-one groups. Arranging the parameters in groups allows quicker assessment of plant situations as the groupings are identified with specific plant equipment and/or operations. The remote access to the Salem SPDS will be completed in mid-to-late 2008. The Salem remote access will mirror Hope Creek as much as possible in order to maintain consistency between the units. This will allow the BNE to use the same assessment methods for both installations.