0001
 1                  STATE OF NEW JERSEY
          DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
 2                   PUBLIC HEARING
            THE NEW JERSEY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY          
 3                 RESPONSE PLAN FOR
                   NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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 7                     -  -  -
                     July 21, 2009
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 9   
                Public hearing held at the Ocean 
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       County Administration Building, 101 Hooper 
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       Avenue, Room 119, Toms River, New Jersey 08757, 
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       commencing at 7:00 p.m., on the above date, 
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       before Joseph P. Dromgoole, a Professional 
14   
       Reporter and Notary Public in the State of New 
15   
       Jersey.
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                          -  -  -    
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               CLASS ACT REPORTING AGENCY, LLC
20           Registered Professional Reporters
     1420 Walnut Street, St. 1200  133H Gaither Drive
21      Philadelphia, PA 19103    Mt. Laurel, NJ 08054
           (215) 928-9760        (856) 235-5108       
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23   
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0002
 1                 MS. LIPOTI:  Good evening.  My 
 2   name is Jill Lipoti.  I'm the Director of the 
 3   Division of Enviromental Safety and Health at 
 4   the New Jersey Department of Enviromental 
 5   Protection.  I'll will be the Hearing Officer 
 6   this evening.  The purpose of this hearing is 
 7   to receive testimony, comments, questions 
 8   regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of 
 9   the New Jersey Radiological Emergency 
10   Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plants.  In 
11   order that the hearing may be properly 
12   documented, these proceedings are being 
13   recorded by a certified shorthand court 
14   reporter.  
15                 Everyone attending the meeting 
16   is asked to sign the attendance sheet before 
17   leaving.  The attendance sheets for these 
18   hearings are used to update the Bureau of 
19   Nuclear Engineering's mailing list.  
20                 On this front table we have a 
21   number of updates about our program.  And it 
22   appears that we ran out of one of the 
23   booklets and one of the fact sheets.  All of 
24   the booklets are available on our website for 
0003
 1   download, but we can send you a paper copy if 
 2   you'll let me know if you want one.  And the 
 3   fact sheets are not yet up on our website, 
 4   but again, we'll send you a paper copy and 
 5   we'll get them on the website quickly.  
 6                 Public notice of this hearing 
 7   was published in the New Jersey Register on 
 8   May 18th and June 1st, 2009.  In addition, 
 9   public notice was published in the Asbury 
10   Park Press July 14th through July 20th, the 
11   Beach Haven Times on July 8th and 15th, and 
12   the Lacey Beacon on July 9th and 16th, 2009.  
13   Copies of the public notice for the three 
14   hearings were mailed in June to all people 
15   who attended last year's hearings.  That is 
16   why we take your name and address, so we can 
17   send you next year's notice.  
18                 This hearing will proceed as 
19   follows:  I will provide a brief background 
20   on why we're conducting the hearing.  Then 
21   I'll introduce the panel members and ask them 
22   to briefly describe the role of their 
23   organization in nuclear emergency 
24   preparedness and response, and then I'll open 
0004
 1   the hearing for comments and questions from 
 2   the public.
 3                 The New Jersey Radiation 
 4   Accident Response Act requires that the 
 5   Department of Environmental Protection, in 
 6   cooperation with the New Jersey Division of 
 7   State Police, conduct hearings to take 
 8   comments on, and address questions relevant 
 9   to the adequacy and effectiveness of the New 
10   Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
11   for Nuclear Power Plants.  
12                 These hearings are held 
13   annually in each of the three counties 
14   affected by the plan; Ocean County for the 
15   Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, and 
16   Salem and Cumberland Counties for the Salem 
17   Unit 1, Salem Unit 2, and Hope Creek 
18   Generating Stations.  So we're here tonight 
19   to listen to your questions and comments on 
20   New Jersey's emergency response plan.  
21   Comments on more general nuclear power issues 
22   or issues that relate to licensing and 
23   regulatory matters at nuclear power plants 
24   are not within the purview of this meeting 
0005
 1   and hence are not appropriate, and will not 
 2   be addressed.  
 3                 The purpose of the plan is to 
 4   coordinate and implement an immediate and 
 5   comprehensive response at the state, county, 
 6   and municipal levels to a radiological 
 7   emergency associated with any nuclear power 
 8   plant affecting the State of New Jersey.  
 9   Copies of the plan are available for public 
10   inspection at the Salem County Emergency 
11   Management Office in Mannington Township.  
12   The Cumberland County Office of Emergency 
13   Management in Bridgeton, and the Ocean County 
14   Office of Emergency Management in Berkeley 
15   Township, New Jersey, and the New Jersey 
16   Office of Emergency Management in West 
17   Trenton, and in the public libraries in 
18   Salem, Cumberland, and Ocean Counties.  
19                 Now I'd like to introduce the 
20   members of the panel.  Lieutenant Richard 
21   Sensi and Sergeant First Class Thomas 
22   Scardino are representing the New Jersey 
23   Division of State Police.  Lieutenant Sensi 
24   is the Supervisor of the Radiological 
0006
 1   Emergency Response Planning and Technical 
 2   Unit, and Sergeant Scardino is the Assistant 
 3   Supervisor of the Radiological Emergency 
 4   Response Planning and Technical Unit.  
 5   Mr. Paul Baldauf is representing the New 
 6   Jersey Department of Environmental 
 7   Protection.  Mr. Baldauf is Assistant 
 8   Director of the Radiation Protection and 
 9   Release Prevention Program.  And representing 
10   the New Jersey Department of Health and 
11   Senior Services is Mr. Jim Pasqualo.  
12   Mr. Pasqualo is an Emergency Response 
13   Coordinator, so if questions arise involving 
14   the responsibilities of the Department of 
15   Health and Senior Services I'll call on him 
16   for a response.  
17                 So first I'd like to ask 
18   Lieutenant Sensi to briefly describe the role 
19   of the State Police in the plan.
20                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Thank you.  
21   For the record, I'm Lieutenant Richard 
22   Sensi.  I'm representing the State Office of 
23   Emergency Management within the Division of 
24   State Police.  Our office, as you may know, 
0007
 1   has the responsibility for administering and 
 2   implementing the radiological emergency 
 3   response plan for incidents at power plants 
 4   in New Jersey.  
 5                 In addition to the preparation 
 6   of the radiological emergency plans, the New 
 7   Jersey State Police is the lead agency in the 
 8   following functional areas; notification and 
 9   communication, command and coordination, 
10   protective actions, which include evacuation, 
11   shelter, and place, access control, food, 
12   water, and milk control, and parallel actions 
13   that include traffic control, 
14   decontamination, exposure control, mass care, 
15   law enforcement, fire control, public health, 
16   reentry and recovery.  
17                  For the record I'd also like 
18   to introduce Sergeant First Class Thomas 
19   Scardino.  He's the Assistant Supervisor for 
20   the unit.  We also have Gerry Renard who is 
21   the site planner for Ocean County, and Alan 
22   Smith who is also a planner for the New 
23   Jersey State Police.  Thank you.
24                 MS. LIPOTI:  Now I'd like 
0008
 1   Mr. Baldauf to briefly describe the role of 
 2   the Department in the plan.
 3                 MR. BALDAUF:  Good evening.  My 
 4   name is Paul Baldauf.  And as Dr. Lipoti 
 5   said, I'm Assistant Director of Radiation 
 6   Protection and Release Protection, Department 
 7   of Enviromental Protection.  And I'll briefly 
 8   discuss the role of the Department in New 
 9   Jersey's Radiological Emergency Response 
10   Plan.  
11                 The New Jersey Radiological 
12   Emergency Response Plan includes the plan, 
13   standard operating procedures and annexes.  
14   The Plan identifies all responsible state 
15   agencies and outlines their specific roles in 
16   the event of a nuclear emergency.  It is 
17   based on five primary functions that outline 
18   the actions to be performed in the event of a 
19   radiological emergency at one of the four 
20   nuclear power plants in New Jersey or at a 
21   plant in a neighboring state.  These actions 
22   are: Notification and Communication; Accident 
23   Assessment, Command and Coordination; 
24   Protective Actions; and Parallel Actions.  
0009
 1                 Since agency roles and 
 2   responsibilities don't change often, the plan 
 3   essentially does not change.  The Standard 
 4   Operating Procedures are specific 
 5   instructions and guidelines used by each 
 6   agency when performing their specific 
 7   duties.  Procedures are reviewed and tested 
 8   annually, and revised whenever necessary in 
 9   order to enhance emergency response.  The 
10   Annexes, A and B, are the Radiological 
11   Emergency Response Plans for Salem/Hope Creek 
12   and Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Sites.  
13   Respectively, each annex describes the 
14   planning basis and concept of operation for 
15   each of the municipalities within the 
16   ten-mile Emergency Planning Zones around each 
17   site.  
18                 Under the New Jersey Radiation 
19   Accident Response Act, the Department of 
20   Enviromental Protection has the lead role in 
21   Accident Assessment and control of food, 
22   water, and milk following an incident.  
23   Accident Assessment involves two separate 
24   analyses, an engineering analysis of the 
0010
 1   event at the plant as it unfolds, and an 
 2   analysis of the amount of radiation to which 
 3   the public may be exposed in the event of a 
 4   release.  
 5                 Depending on the severity of 
 6   the event, the Department provides Protective 
 7   Action Recommendations to the Governor, who 
 8   will make a final decision on actions to be 
 9   implemented to protect health and safety.  
10   Protective Action Recommendations for the 
11   public may include the administration of 
12   potassium iodide, evacuation, sheltering, and 
13   access control within the affected, or 
14   potentially affected, area.  The Act also 
15   specifies that the Department develop and 
16   implement a comprehensive monitoring strategy 
17   that includes the daily monitoring of levels 
18   of radioactivity in the environment.  The 
19   Department also provides public health, 
20   safety, and technical guidance with respect 
21   to the preparation and implementation of the 
22   Plan.  The Department's final responsibility 
23   under the Act is to conduct, in cooperation 
24   with the State Police, public hearings 
0011
 1   annually in each designated county to 
 2   determine the adequately and effectiveness of 
 3   the Plan.  
 4                 Members of my staff that are 
 5   here tonight from the Department of 
 6   Enviromental Protection are, and they seem to 
 7   be taking over this corner, first is Pat 
 8   Mulligan, who's the Bureau Chief of Nuclear 
 9   Engineering.  Besides him is Nick DePierro, 
10   who's retiring soon, and is very happy this 
11   may be the last time he'll be here, Karen 
12   Sallio, Paul Schwartz, Anne Foth, and in the 
13   back Rich Penney, and up front you may have 
14   met Carol Shepard.  Thank you.
15                 MS. LIPOTI:  Before we get to 
16   the main purpose for our hearing, which is 
17   for us to hear what you have to say, I would 
18   like to briefly highlight some changes that 
19   have taken place in the REP program since 
20   last year.  Mr. Baldauf, would you describe 
21   the improvements that were made by the Bureau 
22   of Nuclear Engineering?  
23                 MR. BALDAUF:  Sure.  You have 
24   one of the handouts that go through the seven 
0012
 1   bullets, but I won't read it word to word, 
 2   but I just want to give you a flavor of some 
 3   highlights over the last year.  
 4                 The first one, the Bureau of 
 5   Nuclear Engineering contracted Vex Nuclear 
 6   Services to perform an independent review of 
 7   the Oyster Creek drywell, three-dimensional 
 8   analysis.  Vex recommended the continued 
 9   measurement of drywell thickness and 
10   evaluation be an ongoing process, and at the 
11   interval of inspections that measurements be 
12   done and evaluated as frequently as practical 
13   in the early years of extended operation.  
14   This is consistent with the State of New 
15   Jersey position that it wouldn't be prudent 
16   to inspect 100 percent of the drywell bays 
17   during the fall fueling outage for sandbed 
18   coating failures.  
19                 The second bullet, during a 
20   planned cable replacement within a nonsite 
21   cable -- cable vault plant workers at the 
22   Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station 
23   discovered water within the vault.  As part 
24   of Exelon's investigation they discovered and 
0013
 1   fixed two active pipe leaks.  Exelon 
 2   continues to sample the onsite ground water 
 3   monitoring wells in the vicinity of the 
 4   underground cable vault to determine whether 
 5   the tritium is migrating towards the property 
 6   boundary and to ensure that the tritium 
 7   levels decrease as would be anticipated if 
 8   the leaks were terminated.  The Department, 
 9   the Bureau of Nuclear Engineering has been 
10   receiving split samples from these wells for 
11   independent analysis of tritium and gamma 
12   emitting radionuclides via our radiological 
13   contract laboratory.  The analytic results of 
14   the split samples, the Department's split 
15   samples may be viewed on the BNE's website.  
16                 The third bullet, which I 
17   believe is the handout that is missing now, 
18   the Department of Homeland Security and 
19   Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 
20   Nuclear Regulatory Commission jointly issued 
21   a Supplement 4 to NUREG, and I won't go 
22   through the number, to provide additional 
23   guidance to development, review, and 
24   evaluation of offsite radiological emergency 
0014
 1   response planning and preparedness 
 2   surrounding the nation's commercial nuclear 
 3   power plants.  The BNE in -- in coordination 
 4   with other state and local response 
 5   organizations are in the process of 
 6   evaluating the document, preparing comments.  
 7   This might be very important to anybody here 
 8   who's interested reviewing the document.  It 
 9   really does fit the scope of why we're here 
10   tonight.  And the public can -- public 
11   comments are being solicited.  And it's very 
12   a simple process.  You can just go on 
13   www.regulations.gov.  You have until October 
14   16th of this year.  I think that's when the 
15   public comment period closes.  But feel free 
16   to take a look at that, and if you're 
17   interested you certainly can go forward and 
18   comment.  
19                 The next piece, the DEP has 
20   contracted with Envitech to provide a new 
21   computer system for the air pollution, 
22   radiation data, and early warning system.  It 
23   is designed with failover capability and 
24   multiple redundancies to ensure maximum 
0015
 1   reliability.  The system also has extensive 
 2   alarm capabilities to notify staff of system 
 3   failures and above normal environmental 
 4   conditions, including ambient radiation 
 5   levels, via text messages and email.  In the 
 6   spring of 2009 two monitoring stations around 
 7   Oyster Creek that had been unable to transmit 
 8   data for an extended period of time due 
 9   failed telephone lines were restored.  These 
10   two sites were converted to wireless 
11   communications.  They're now successfully 
12   transmitting data again.  And as of June 30th 
13   of this year a total of eight monitoring 
14   stations have been upgraded to wireless 
15   communications.  
16                 The environmental group 
17   generated element correction factors, the 
18   acronym ECF, for over 500 TLD badges during 
19   the month of August and September 2008.  This 
20   represents the entire population of TLD 
21   badges available for deployment in the 
22   field.  The positive step here is the 
23   application of ECFs compensates for slight 
24   variations in readings between individual 
0016
 1   badges, thus normalizing TLD performance.  
 2                 And lastly, in July of 2007 
 3   PSEG formed a license renewal project.  
 4   They're seeking 20-year operating license 
 5   renewals from the NCR for units in Salem and 
 6   Hope Creek.  The 40-year operating licenses 
 7   will expire as follows, Salem 1, August 8th 
 8   of 2016, Salem 2, April 4th, 2020, and Hope 
 9   Creek, April 11th, 2026.  The present 
10   schedule for submittal to the NRC of all 
11   three license renewal applications is August 
12   of this year, next month.  Public 
13   participation will be encouraged during the 
14   renewal process via public meetings and 
15   dissemination of information by PSEG and the 
16   NRC.  
17                 And like Dr. Lipoti had said 
18   before, all this information is spelled in 
19   greater detail in all the fact sheets.  If 
20   anything is missing you can get on our 
21   website or give us your card.  Some isn't on 
22   the website right now, but it will be.  If 
23   you give us your card we'll get something to 
24   you right away.  Thank you.
0017
 1                 MS. LIPOTI:  Thanks.  So we'll 
 2   now proceed with the public's questions and 
 3   comments.  Those individuals who wish to 
 4   speak should complete one of these speaker 
 5   registration cards and hand it to Carol.  And 
 6   I will call the speakers' names in the same 
 7   order that I received the registration 
 8   cards.  When I call your name, please come to 
 9   the table and face us, the panel.  I have 
10   eight so far.  Face the panel and make 
11   yourself comfortable.  Before you begin your 
12   comments, please state and spell your name 
13   for the reporter.  We're going to limit 
14   speakers to about five minutes each.  If time 
15   remains after everyone's had a chance to 
16   speak, I'll invite additional comments from 
17   those individuals that have already spoken.  
18   And I just ask that in fairness to the 
19   speaker that everyone refrain from commenting 
20   during their -- their talk.  And so we'll 
21   begin.  And I will call on -- our first 
22   commenter is Edith Gbur.
23                 MS. GBUR:  Is this okay?  
24                 MS. LIPOTI:  That's fine.  If 
0018
 1   you want to have a seat you can.
 2                 MS. GBUR:  Okay.  I'm president 
 3   of Jersey Shore Nuclear Watch.  And we have a 
 4   small delegation here.  And the reason why 
 5   we're here is because we've been coming to 
 6   meetings for eight or nine years, and 
 7   although we come here all the time with the 
 8   same criticism, and that is the excavation 
 9   plan will not work, nevertheless we like the 
10   democracy here and we like -- and -- and the 
11   fact that the DEP has listened to us on other 
12   issues, so someone is listening.  Now there 
13   are not a lot of people here because -- 
14   because the evacuation plan -- the complaints 
15   that people have about the evacuation plan 
16   have not been taken seriously.  In 2004 the 
17   Asbury Park Press wrote a series of 
18   articles.  In one of the articles it said 
19   that given the population growth and the lack 
20   of -- of work on the roads the best 
21   evacuation plan would be if it didn't have to 
22   be implemented.  Now since that time the -- 
23   there's been a lot of criticism of Oyster 
24   Creek.  And I'm glad to hear that the DEP has 
0019
 1   taken into account some of the criticisms -- 
 2   criticism.  The tritium leak and the drywell 
 3   liner, these are more causes for why it's 
 4   good to have an evacuation plan that works 
 5   and that -- and -- and why our criticism 
 6   should be taken seriously.  Now I have a 
 7   question.  What happens if you turn down and 
 8   say an evacuation plan will not work?  And 
 9   I'm talking about the Sheriff's Department 
10   and the DEP.  I'd like to know -- I'd like to 
11   also know what the Governor thinks about the 
12   evacuation plan.  I think that's the most 
13   important thing that we can do here today, is 
14   to find out what happens if we say no.  Thank 
15   you.  
16                 MS. LIPOTI:  Richard, would you 
17   like to address the evacuation plan?  
18                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Every year 
19   we hear the same thing, the plan won't work.  
20   We drill, we run the plan, we test the plan.  
21   We have excavation time estimates for the 
22   plan.  We -- we have planned routes.  We have 
23   alternate route alerting.  We have the siren 
24   system.  Everything we have we believe the 
0020
 1   plan will work, or else we wouldn't have it 
 2   in place and we would change the plan.  We 
 3   feel the plan will work.  I don't know how -- 
 4   other than if there were an actual emergency 
 5   where you would have to run the plan how you 
 6   would know if it actually worked.  You know, 
 7   in our opinion the plan will work.  We have 
 8   it, we test it, we drill it.  We're graded by 
 9   FEMA.  FEMA comes in.  They're -- they 
10   believe that we've shown that -- we've shown 
11   compliance that the plan will work.  I mean I 
12   don't know how to address your question other 
13   than we're ready to run the plan.  We -- we 
14   have it in place.  We drill it.  We believe 
15   the plan will work.  What -- what information 
16   do you have that the plan won't work?  
17                 MS. GBUR:  Well, you ask -- do 
18   you want me to answer it?
19                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Sure.  
20                 MS. GBUR:  Well, there was a 
21   fire in 2002 at Double Trouble State Park.  
22   The police couldn't even get through the -- 
23   to the expressway.  How are they going to get 
24   through if there's an emergency?  Like when 
0021
 1   you had Hurricane Katrina you had sometimes 
 2   five day -- I'm not sure if it was five days' 
 3   notice, five hours' notice.  You don't -- you 
 4   won't have notice like that if there -- if 
 5   there is a nuclear accident here.  And you 
 6   have plumes.  The plumes will travel as fast 
 7   as the wind blows and the wind doesn't -- 
 8   changes directions, so -- so -- so that 
 9   alone -- just history and what's happened 
10   before is -- is -- is an example.  Now you 
11   have drills all the time and that's great.  
12   Things work out well on a piece of paper but 
13   not in real life.
14                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Well, if 
15   they were a plume that wouldn't -- in -- in 
16   fact, we would have an evacuation.  That's 
17   why we have the BNE working.  The BNE 
18   would -- would make a recommendation.  The 
19   plan would make -- make a recommendation.  
20   It's possible that the recommendation could 
21   be shelter and place based on the -- the 
22   plume and the wind speed.  So we can't say 
23   that we would evacuate just because there 
24   were some type of a release or a plume.  
0022
 1   Well, we didn't -- the fire wasn't the 
 2   radiological emergency response plan 
 3   excavation.  That's a totally different 
 4   situation.  We'd have -- we would have 
 5   sirens, we would have excavation routes, 
 6   evacuation plans, we would access control 
 7   points set up.  To -- to excavate the people 
 8   would be a different plan.  That plan was not 
 9   run for the fire.  The fire was different.
10                 MS. ARNONE:  That's -- that's 
11   where the problem comes in.  You -- you have 
12   all these plans, all this, you know, data, 
13   fact sheets, all this stuff, but when that 
14   fire occurred there was no access for even 
15   the firefighters to get through, so --
16                 MS. LIPOTI:  Excuse me, Liz. 
17   This is Liz Arnone, correct?  
18                 MS. ARNONE:  Yes.
19                 MS. LIPOTI:  Let's -- let's try 
20   to keep the order of things.
21                 MS. ARNONE:  Okay.  I'm sorry.
22                 MS. LIPOTI:  I'll be happy to 
23   get to your question later, but we have a 
24   process and we have a court stenographer.
0023
 1                 MS. ARNONE:  I didn't realize I 
 2   was going against -- 
 3                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  That's 
 4   okay.  But I understand your -- your point, 
 5   and your point -- what I'm trying to explain 
 6   to you is you're comparing the radiological 
 7   emergency response plan to an incident that 
 8   happened with the fire.  That is not the 
 9   plan, and the plan is a whole different set 
10   of -- of directions, access -- a whole set 
11   of -- of things that we put into place.  That 
12   wasn't run with the fire.  The fire was a 
13   different situation.  It wasn't run by us for 
14   a radiological emergency response plan 
15   evacuation, so to compare and say because 
16   there were problems with the fire that the -- 
17   the radiological emergency response plan 
18   won't work it's -- that's not fair to say 
19   that, because that's not what happened.  We 
20   did not run that plan for that fire.
21                 MS. ARNONE:  May I speak or do 
22   I have to wait my turn?  
23                 MS. LIPOTI:  I'm just going to 
24   ask if the State Police have anything else 
0024
 1   and then I'm going to -- I'm going to call on 
 2   Jeff Brown and then -- 
 3                 MS. ARNONE:  Yeah.
 4                 MS. LIPOTI:  But, Liz, are you 
 5   one of the people that signed up?  
 6                 MS. ARNONE:  Yes.
 7                 MS. LIPOTI:  Okay.  Good.
 8                 MS. ARNONE:  I'm sorry.
 9                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  So as far as 
10   the plan goes just for that point, no, we did 
11   not run the plan for the fire.  The fire was 
12   a different situation completely.  It had 
13   nothing to do with us, so it's not fair for 
14   you to say our plan won't work because they 
15   had an issue with -- with moving people 
16   around during a fire.  That -- that is 
17   totally two different things.
18                 MS. LIPOTI:  Okay.  I'm going 
19   to call on Jeff Brown next.
20                 MR. BROWN:  Thank you, 
21   Dr. Lipoti, panel.  This is my sixth year, I 
22   believe, of coming to these meetings.  A few 
23   thank-you's to start with.  I'd like to thank 
24   the State Police for providing written 
0025
 1   material.  I believe this is the first time 
 2   that I've collected that.  And I'd also thank 
 3   the DEP for its -- its documents.  I want to 
 4   thank you for the statement about the 100 
 5   percent of the drywell bays being covered for 
 6   the inspection.  We certainly appreciate your 
 7   support on that.  I'm wondering in terms of 
 8   the wireless monitoring stations, what about 
 9   a battery backup yet?  We frequently 
10   requested battery backup to these stations, 
11   but I don't think they've been supplied as 
12   far as I know.  On your BNE improvement 
13   statement, the last point regarding what's 
14   happening at Salem, I'm wondering how the DEP 
15   feels about the -- PSEG coming in so far in 
16   advance for a renewal when a lot of the aging 
17   management problems will happen as the plant 
18   ages.  And the drywell liner was, as you well 
19   know, nothing that came up because of the -- 
20   Exelon, or because the NRC, or even the DEP, 
21   but because of -- of the citizen groups that 
22   brought that to the public's attention.  So 
23   it seems to me that it's a huge mistake to 
24   let Hope Creek get a renewal when its license 
0026
 1   is renew -- is -- is up for 2026 and give 
 2   them a renewal now.  The -- the Catch 22 
 3   logic is outstanding to me.  Regarding the 
 4   purpose of this meeting, however, you said 
 5   it's to deal with the adequacy and the 
 6   effectiveness of the Plan.  I think, 
 7   Lieutenant, that our concern is, what does it 
 8   mean for the plan to work?  Now, as I 
 9   understand, in military campaigns there's a 
10   thing called expendables.  When -- when 
11   planning for D-Day there's an expectation 
12   that so many people are going to die and that 
13   gets evaluated.  Now, I've not -- and having 
14   read the plan a few years ago, I haven't read 
15   updated versions, but I didn't see any 
16   indication of this.  But the reality is we 
17   know if there's a serious problem -- and we 
18   agree with the DEP that terrorism is a 
19   serious problem, a potential threat to this 
20   plant.  I am more worried about a terrorist 
21   attack on that plant that would establish an 
22   ongoing fire that would release radiation 
23   into the atmosphere for days and weeks and 
24   maybe months.  A little -- a burp of 
0027
 1   radioactive gases, that's bad enough, but I 
 2   don't think is the big problem.  The problem 
 3   that we are worried about is that we think we 
 4   could be a target between Washington and New 
 5   York and, therefore, we're concerned with 
 6   ongoing radiation exposure.  There was an 
 7   article in today's paper about the one 
 8   surviving terrorist in the Mumbai attack.  
 9   And he's talking casually about, you know, I 
10   got recruited and what they went into -- to 
11   destroy and to kill people.  So we know these 
12   people are real.  And -- and we're in their 
13   -- their cross hairs.  Now I get back to the 
14   question of the expendables.  As a person who 
15   lives here I think that there's a calculation 
16   someplace or there should be a calculation, 
17   you're shaking your head no, that there 
18   should be a question of anticipated 
19   causalities.  If a plume would travel in -- 
20   in three to four hours -- if it's going to 
21   take nine -- nine-and-a-half hours or 23 
22   hours or whatever it is to get out of here 
23   we're going to be exposed.  Some us are going 
24   to be exposed to radiation.  We know that 
0028
 1   will lead to cancer.  We know that will lead 
 2   to some possible radiation poisoning right on 
 3   the spot.  We know that that could lead to 
 4   genetic abnormalities.  We know that will 
 5   lead to aborted feces.  So the question for 
 6   us is, what's acceptable level of our being 
 7   expendable?  And I think unless you factor 
 8   that into the plan and tell the public 
 9   honestly, okay, if this is the scenario that 
10   happens we anticipate, and maybe it's the 
11   public health people who do the calculations 
12   on this, we anticipate this many fatalities, 
13   this many illnesses, this many cancers.  And 
14   I think it's disingenuous not to tell us what 
15   that number is at -- at best and it's 
16   dishonest at worse, because it seems to me 
17   that it's -- it's a social control plan 
18   that -- to keep us from panicking.  And we 
19   would rather know what are our chances, 
20   what's the risk of this plant, and is it 
21   worth it?  As a person who has lived in Ocean 
22   County for one more year since our last 
23   meeting I am convinced that the plan will not 
24   work in that we will not get out in a timely 
0029
 1   fashion.  We will be all -- we will not all 
 2   be protected from radiation exposure and, 
 3   therefore, to us it's a contradiction.  It's 
 4   an oxymoron to say that this plan can work if 
 5   it means total protection.  Thank you.
 6                 MS. LIPOTI:  So I wrote down 
 7   three issues for us to answer.  The first two 
 8   our DEP questions.  The first one is about 
 9   backup systems for the CREST sites, and the 
10   second one is about how we will treat the 
11   early submittal for license renewal for Salem 
12   and Hope Creek.
13                 MR. BALDAUF:  Okay.  On the 
14   CREST sites, if you take a look at the fact 
15   sheet, we're very exited at the point we are 
16   now with the wireless communication because 
17   of the reliability.  We're not quite there 
18   yet.  We don't have all the sites, but we're 
19   getting there.  It will take some time.  But 
20   as a fail safe we also understood we needed 
21   secondary means of data communication.  And 
22   what that would be is dial-up telephone lines 
23   would provide an alternate means of 
24   communication should wireless become 
0030
 1   unavailable.  And the central computer system 
 2   in Trenton would automatically switch those 
 3   dial-up lines if for some reason the wireless 
 4   lines weren't available.  So considering 
 5   where we've come, and -- well, Ann might 
 6   object, it was a relatively short time frame, 
 7   but where we've come, once we have that fail 
 8   safe we're fairly confident that we won't be 
 9   in a position where it is possible we might 
10   have an outage in a certain area but we'll 
11   always have coverage in each of the 
12   quadrants that we have to have.  The 
13   second -- 
14                 MR. BROWN:  Pardon me.  Can I 
15   just clarify?  So you're saying you don't 
16   need batteries, is what you're saying?
17                 MR. BALDAUF:  Well, we do not 
18   have any battery backups there, do we, Ann?  
19                 MS. FOTH:  We do not.  We've 
20   investigated a potential for some solar, but 
21   there's nothing that I found that will 
22   support our electrical requirements given the 
23   constraints of our sites as they're designed 
24   right now.  It is something that I'm 
0031
 1   certainly keeping in mind and as I 
 2   investigate different technology improvements 
 3   to see if there's something we could do.  But 
 4   we do not currently have battery backup.
 5                 MR. BROWN:  So -- but are you 
 6   suggesting that the telephone lines don't 
 7   need electricity at the site so you're -- 
 8   you're going to get -- I'm not quite clear on 
 9   what you're saying.
10                 MR. BALDAUF:  I think in the 
11   best case scenario you would have battery 
12   backups, but right now we have two -- you 
13   would have a backup dialing phone line.  It 
14   is possible in severe circumstances you could 
15   lose both, but at least we would have the 
16   dial-up backup instead of just solely relying 
17   on the wireless.
18                 MR. BROWN:  Thank you.
19                 MR. BALDAUF:  Your second 
20   question with the early submittal of the PSEG 
21   applications, to be honest, I'm not sure I've 
22   been asked that question, but my answer would 
23   be that I think it's proactive on PSEG's side 
24   because obviously it's extremely complicated, 
0032
 1   the renewal process.  And I'm not sure if 
 2   there's any detriment to them coming in a 
 3   year before or five years before, because you 
 4   can still plan and go through and make 
 5   decisions based upon that time frame, meaning 
 6   that you're not going to go through -- I 
 7   think the last expiration is 2026.  You're 
 8   keeping that in mind and track the whole 
 9   time.  Whether you're doing the study 2012, 
10   or 2015, or 2025 you still know 2026 is 
11   starting another 20 years, so it actually 
12   gives PSEG more time to be able to put 
13   programs in place or modify existing programs 
14   to make sure that at the end of that 20-year 
15   cycle, whether it ends in 2030 or 2050 that 
16   they can reach their goals.  So, no, I don't 
17   think it's a detriment.  I think it gives all 
18   parties -- and as you're probably aware, a 
19   lot of people take a lot of time to do this, 
20   whether it's from the industry side or it's 
21   from NRC or it's the Department's 
22   involvement.  I think it allows much further 
23   extension from you and you very well may end 
24   up with a better product at the end of the 
0033
 1   day than you had if you have a short term to 
 2   make the renewal decision.  
 3                 MR. BROWN:  Can I clarify?  
 4                 MR. BALDAUF:  Yes.
 5                 MR. BROWN:  In our case of the 
 6   thinning of the drywell liner here in Oyster 
 7   Creek, maybe that thinning wasn't so obvious, 
 8   you know, 19 years ago, but if you renew the 
 9   license 19 years before it's up -- okay.  
10   Oyster Creek had about two-and-a-half to 
11   three years for the process, so it was time 
12   to -- for them to do their investigations and 
13   us to raise our concerns, but suppose it was 
14   something like a thinning of the liner that 
15   doesn't show now but it would show up in 2021 
16   or 2022?  You're -- you're going to miss the 
17   problems that are going to come up because 
18   the plant's getting older, or if you give 
19   them a license renewal now.  I'm sure the 
20   assumption is that their ongoing monitoring 
21   is perfect and, therefore, they'll catch 
22   anything else that goes by, but they didn't 
23   catch the drywell liner at Oyster Creek.
24                 MR. BALDAUF:  Yeah.  I mean I 
0034
 1   understand your point, but on the other hand 
 2   it's -- it's not responsible in a way if 
 3   something failed before you're in a position 
 4   to review it.  And there are programs in 
 5   place to catch those things.  Now they're not 
 6   100 percent.  And as you can see in -- in the 
 7   liner situation there were -- there was a 
 8   program in place.  You can argue it wasn't as 
 9   effective as it should have been and needs to 
10   be improved, but the reality is that those 
11   ongoing maintenance and inspection plans can 
12   certainly be augmented, whether it's ten, or 
13   15 years, or closer to the inspection date.  
14   So I mean to be perfectly honest, there's 
15   always going to be possibilities if something 
16   slips through, but I think the more lead time 
17   that you have, whether it's industry or from 
18   a regulatory side I think it benefits.
19                 MS. LIPOTI:  And the last point 
20   that you made had to do with the function of 
21   the emergency response, particularly the 
22   excavation plan and its annexes to 
23   terrorism.  I'm going to send that to the 
24   State Police.
0035
 1                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Last year 
 2   under a new guideline from the NRC we started 
 3   and tested for the first time at Oyster Creek 
 4   a hostile action based drill to be performed 
 5   there.  We got the state, the local, the 
 6   county office of emergency management, first-
 7   aid departments, fire departments, had a 
 8   drill coinciding with the plant security, 
 9   their fire and first-aide, and actually ran a 
10   drill as if a hostile action had taken place 
11   at the plant.  Amounts of radiation leakage, 
12   or whatever type, plume, whatever release, 
13   that's inconsequential to our plan as far as 
14   getting ready for a terrorist attack, some 
15   type of hostile action where we have to 
16   drill.  The amount of the release -- 
17                 MR. BROWN:  Right.
18                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  -- is -- is 
19   not inconsequential -- 
20                 MR. BROWN:  Right.
21                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  -- for -- 
22   for you.  So we have begun to take that into 
23   consideration.  This year we're going to test 
24   Salem/Hope Creek with a hostile action plan.  
0036
 1   And that will become part of our cycle of 
 2   different types of -- whether it's a plume 
 3   release, a non-release, congestion pathway 
 4   exercise that will be cycled through and 
 5   graded also from FEMA.  So we are taking into 
 6   account what would happen in a hostile 
 7   action.  Your next point.  First of all, we 
 8   would never, ever in the State Police 
 9   classify a citizen as an expendable.  That's 
10   just -- that's irresponsible to say that, 
11   number one.  Number two, as far as the State 
12   Police is concerned, there is no acceptable 
13   expendables.  Our job is to get every citizen 
14   safely out of this area if there were an 
15   accident.  We have no factor to lose people.  
16   We're -- we're not in that business.  It's to 
17   save everyone.  It's to get everyone out 
18   safely.  And that's for an accident, an 
19   automobile accident, whatever it might be, a 
20   child.  Everyone gets out safely.  That's 
21   our -- that's -- that's our goal.  There is 
22   no expendables.  There's no number figured 
23   in.  That's plain and simple and -- and 
24   honest.  I can tell you that.  We do not 
0037
 1   factor in anyone getting hurt, killed, what 
 2   -- whatever you might call it, expendables, 
 3   however you classify it.  That's not what we 
 4   would do.  As far as your point of people 
 5   being -- picking up some dose of the -- from 
 6   radiation, that's why we have the d-con 
 7   centers, the reception centers.  Our -- 
 8   again, our goal with access control is to 
 9   guide everyone safely out of the EPZ to some 
10   type of reception center and then have those 
11   people tested to see if they did pick up any 
12   dose of radiation.  If -- if -- if you don't 
13   we would then get you, move you out.  If you 
14   took -- made sure you had the KI if you 
15   needed to take it, then get you out of this 
16   area.  If you did for some reason pick up 
17   some type of dose, your vehicle picked up 
18   some type of dose of radiation of course that 
19   vehicle would have to be then impounded.  You 
20   would then go through a reception center, be 
21   d-con'd.  Hopefully it's just some type of 
22   surface radiation that would be removed 
23   through showering or whatever, if not we 
24   would have a first-aide squad ready to take 
0038
 1   that person to a hospital.  So we're very 
 2   concerned with the safety of everyone.  One 
 3   our planners lives in the EPZ of -- of Oyster 
 4   Creek.  He lives there.  He feels safe with 
 5   this plan.  He feels safe that he would get 
 6   out.  So again, no -- no -- no acceptable 
 7   loss.  There is no acceptable loss.  This 
 8   isn't a war.  This isn't a classification of 
 9   an expendable.  We don't have that.  We don't 
10   -- we don't even consider that, so, you know, 
11   I don't know -- 
12                 MR. BROWN:  May I respond?  
13                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Yes.
14                 MR. BROWN:  I mean I -- I 
15   appreciate your concern and the -- the 
16   thought that's gone into what to do if we get 
17   contaminated and all that type of thing, but 
18   from our standpoint your plan lacks 
19   credibility, because not everybody does 
20   survive accidents on the -- on the Garden 
21   State Park or Route 70.
22                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Correct.
23                 MR. BROWN:  There are deaths.
24                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Yes.
0039
 1                 MR. BROWN:  So if this plan 
 2   ever has to go into effect from our 
 3   perspective there are going to be 
 4   casualties.  I'm not saying you're designing 
 5   the casualties, but I'm saying unless you 
 6   take into account our possible casualty rate 
 7   your plan will lack credibility because it's 
 8   totally idealistic.  Now maybe -- I mean I 
 9   think it's appropriate that you -- you strive 
10   for the perfect and try to protect all of us, 
11   but you can't do it.  So to the extent that 
12   you tell us you're operating on an idealistic 
13   level, and we're here in traffic jams all 
14   night long and can't even get to the grocery 
15   store, we say it doesn't compute.
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Well, 
17   whether it's state, county, or local police 
18   their goal is safety for everyone on every 
19   road every day.  There's no acceptable death 
20   rate on any highway.
21                 MR. BROWN:  But -- but suppose 
22   --
23                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  It's not 
24   acceptable, it's not accounted for.
0040
 1                 MR. BROWN:  Suppose you knew 
 2   that your plan would -- would lead -- would 
 3   create a very large number of deaths in Ocean 
 4   County, suppose you knew that from whatever 
 5   calculations.  This was the prior question 
 6   that Edith was asking.  When does the plan 
 7   fail?  If you -- if -- and that's what we're 
 8   asking for.  Our lives and our deaths are a 
 9   realistic indicator of whether this plan will 
10   succeed.  And if you can say ten percent of 
11   the people may contract a disease or 
12   something, that's too high, we don't accept 
13   that.  It's not that you have no plan.  It's 
14   that you're doing something else to develop a 
15   different way of approaching the problem.
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Sure.  But 
17   based on populations in different areas we 
18   have evacuation time estimates of how long it 
19   will take a certain area to be able to 
20   evacuate from the EPZ.  They're going and 
21   they're given a certain route.  We have 
22   access control to make sure they stay within 
23   those routes.  Each area has a different 
24   excavation route, and we have access control, 
0041
 1   police officers, barricades set up everywhere 
 2   in those areas to get those people out in an 
 3   expeditious manner.  Our estimates, our time 
 4   estimates for each area we feel are safe 
 5   and -- and you'll get out if we needed to get 
 6   you out.  If -- if the fact would be to put 
 7   you -- if we would have to put you in harm's 
 8   way maybe the recommendation between the BNE, 
 9   the plant, between the office of emergency 
10   management would be shelter and place.  The 
11   plume would move over and you would get less 
12   exposure by staying in.  But we would have to 
13   evaluate that during the incident.  We don't 
14   know.  The plume -- the -- the wind could be 
15   blowing south.  Everyone north for safety, 
16   for -- for precautionary action would be 
17   maybe to get everyone out, start -- if the 
18   wind is blowing south everyone north leaves, 
19   everyone south shelter and place.  We take 
20   each incident separately.  And that's why 
21   every year with -- when we have drill we're 
22   not given the drill.  It's not like they hand 
23   you a piece of paper and say this is what's 
24   going to happen, there's going to be a 
0042
 1   release, the wind is going to blow south, get 
 2   everybody ready, tell everyone.  They tell -- 
 3   they start feeding us information.  That's 
 4   how we test our plan.  They want to know that 
 5   we can do it.
 6                 THE WITNESS:  Mm-hmm.
 7                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  By giving 
 8   you an open book test it doesn't work because 
 9   then you do know it.  So they test what we 
10   would do.  They test what the BNE would 
11   suggest, they test what the plant would 
12   suggest, and if they feel that they're 
13   confident that we've proven that our plan 
14   will work they give us a passing grade, if 
15   not they tell us what has to be fixed.  So to 
16   tell you how the plan would work, it would 
17   work different with what was released, the 
18   amount that was released, the size of the 
19   plume, the wind direction, because that also 
20   factors in the population.  If the wind is 
21   blowing towards a higher population at a 
22   faster speed at a larger amount maybe we 
23   would tell you to stay home, shelter and 
24   place.  We're not going to allow mass 
0043
 1   confusion.  We're not -- that's how we're 
 2   going to keep accidents down to a minium.  
 3   Will some -- could something happen?  
 4   Something happens on every roadway every 
 5   day.  And it's not what anybody wants.  Could 
 6   an accident occur?  Sure.  But our job is to 
 7   minimize that and by exercising the plan we 
 8   learn what would work and what wouldn't work.
 9                 MR. BROWN:  Thank you.
10                 MS. LIPOTI:  Thank you.  Paula 
11   Gotsch.  Paula, would you spell your last 
12   name for the court reporter?  
13                 MS. GOTSCH:  Sure.  G, as in 
14   girl, O-T-S-C-H.  I've -- I've been reading, 
15   I forget the name of it, the new NRC 
16   Enhancement to Emergency Preparedness 
17   Regulations.  And this is something the NRC 
18   put out there for us to make comments on.  
19   And in this report they mentioned 12 issues 
20   that they have a problem with at -- at -- at 
21   the way emergency preparedness is operating 
22   in nuclear plants now.  And one of the ones 
23   that -- that hit me especially was the 
24   emergency plan effectiveness can only be as 
0044
 1   good as -- not -- not what you guys do, the 
 2   DEP and the police, but also what's going on 
 3   inside the plant at the same time.  And what 
 4   they found problems with is that though the 
 5   emergency plan might call for a -- what they 
 6   call an STA.  That's a site shift -- let me 
 7   get it.  A shift technical advisor for every 
 8   plant.  And they're supposed to be the person 
 9   who's there to be able to handle an -- an 
10   emergency event that happens inside the 
11   plant.  And -- and that person is supposed to 
12   be free of enough duties so that person can 
13   do that.  And -- and they have them on 24 
14   hours supposedly.  I don't know.  I might ask 
15   that question.  Do we have one at Oyster 
16   Creek?  Then the other thing is that they 
17   find that in -- in five out of the seven 
18   plants that they investigated that person, 
19   that STA person has been given other tasks 
20   like -- quite often they put them on the fire 
21   brigades, okay, because the fire prevention 
22   is very iffy in these plants because of the 
23   thermalite.  We all know that.  And so -- so 
24   then -- these people get loaded up with other 
0045
 1   duties.  That would absolutely keep them 
 2   from -- from performing their emergency 
 3   effectiveness duties.  So I'm -- I'm just 
 4   saying I would appreciate it if the DEP and 
 5   the State Police would find out if they're -- 
 6   if they got people in the plant that are 
 7   doing the effectiveness things to make your 
 8   plan work.  Now, I know a few months ago the 
 9   plant was cited because there was some kind 
10   of a -- a thing that happened that they were 
11   supposed to notify you guys and they didn't 
12   do it for three hours, that they should have 
13   notified you immediately.  And if I remember 
14   right, they didn't notify you until three 
15   hours.  And so -- and -- and they mentioned 
16   that also in -- in these emergency plans.  
17   They're also saying that they're not keeping 
18   up with the population estimates.  There's 
19   about 12 things they're really concerned 
20   about.  And I suggest it might be worthwhile 
21   for you to read these things because I think 
22   you may be getting a false sense of security 
23   about, you know, how your partners are doing 
24   on this.  The -- the other thing I'd like to 
0046
 1   say is that I read this whole plan over and 
 2   it felt like everybody was ignoring the 
 3   elephant in the room.  And for us the 
 4   elephant in the room is the elevated fuel 
 5   pool.  That is our achilles heel here.  
 6   There's enough Censium-137 in that fuel pool 
 7   -- in those fuel rods that could -- after 20 
 8   years of operation there's enough in there -- 
 9   there's more than all the Censium-137 in -- 
10   in some horrendous accident.  I can't 
11   remember the data on that, but it's bad.  And 
12   the way -- that fuel pool was designed to 
13   hold, I think, 24 -- 2,400 fuel assemblies.  
14   There's now over 3,600 fuel assemblies in 
15   there.  And in the process of packing them in 
16   now there's less water in between each one of 
17   those fuel assemblies which makes it more 
18   dangerous, more of a problem.  Now the 
19   problem in terms of the terrorists are that 
20   there is no -- even the NRC admitted in their 
21   report that there is no type of protection at 
22   Oyster Creek, they even mentioned at Oyster 
23   Creek, from an aerial attack.  So here's what 
24   I'd like to know.  In your scenario for a 
0047
 1   hostile act, did you do your drill on an air 
 2   -- aircraft hitting that, or even a missile 
 3   hitting that fuel pool and rapid draining of 
 4   the fuel pool and any fire that would 
 5   happen?  Because these things are too tight 
 6   anyway, because there's your worse -- there's 
 7   your worse nightmare right there.  And -- and 
 8   here I'm reading this whole thing on 
 9   emergency preparedness, oh, we got -- we got 
10   to make sure that the gloves are here and all 
11   these very important things, but the elephant 
12   in the room for these boiling water reactors 
13   with the fuel pools on the top is the fuel 
14   pool.  And you're not going to have time.  
15   And the other thing is in terms of -- you 
16   know, it -- it really strikes me how really 
17   well intentioned you are, and how serious you 
18   take this, and how you're good people, you're 
19   trying to do your job well, but as a nurse 
20   you just can't take a whole bunch of 
21   radioactive people into the hospital and 
22   treat them either.  Now everybody is 
23   radioactive in the hospital.  It's not that 
24   simple, you know, there's things that happen 
0048
 1   with that, too.  And then what was the -- oh, 
 2   I had one more question or point.  Now I'm -- 
 3   oh, I know what it is.  We were told at one 
 4   of the hearings that the NRC held that 
 5   they've hired 200 new workers other there at 
 6   Oyster Creek, 200 new workers I believe it 
 7   was.  Okay?  That's a lot of new people to 
 8   train to get used to their jobs.  And I will 
 9   say this, I'm not going to put workers down 
10   over there.  They must be having a hell of a 
11   time trying to do their job in that old 
12   plant, and they're all doing the best they 
13   can, but the last time they hired new workers 
14   the regional office had a lot of problems in 
15   how the new workers were handling what they 
16   were doing.  It's hard.  It's -- it's -- it's 
17   not easy.  So they had to have oversight 
18   and -- to help them.  And they were warned if 
19   they -- some things kept happening over and 
20   over again at Oyster Creek that shouldn't be 
21   happening, so they were warned.  You got to 
22   get these -- better training for these new 
23   workers.  Okay?  So anyway, I feel like with 
24   the fuel pool and with the -- the bursting 
0049
 1   pipes that shows that this plant has got a 
 2   lot of problems, add that -- that -- and I 
 3   think of Dave Lockbaum who said it's not the 
 4   stuff you're watching and the stuff you know 
 5   that's going to bite you in the you know 
 6   where, it's the stuff you don't -- you 
 7   haven't figured out.  It's the stuff you 
 8   don't know that's -- that's rotting away.  
 9   And those are the kind -- between -- so 
10   there's kind of like a perfect storm with 
11   this plant that scares me because I see 
12   there's a lot of things here to consider and 
13   I don't know if it's being taken care of.  
14   Okay.  One last thing I was going to ask.  
15   Oh, I know what it is.  The State of New 
16   Jersey had a terrific brief.  I remember 
17   reading it and thinking whoever wrote this 
18   brief on the metal fatigue and the terrorist 
19   attack, your contentions from the State of 
20   New Jersey, that was one of the best written 
21   briefs I've ever -- if you're responsible for 
22   it congratulations.  I think it was a lawyer 
23   from the Department of Treasury.  I don't 
24   know who it was, but they did a great job.  I 
0050
 1   mean I've been reading these briefs now -- I 
 2   know a good brief when I read it.  I mean it 
 3   was spectacular.  You should have gotten that 
 4   contention.  The state should have gotten 
 5   those contentions.  And I know that you're 
 6   worried about metal fatigue, you're worried 
 7   about terrorism, you're worried about the 
 8   fuel pool, and I know you're worried about 
 9   the evacuation plan.  I'm trying to remember 
10   exactly.  But when that Southwest Airlines 
11   plane popped that hole in it the other day, 
12   and they said that was metal fatigue.  And 
13   they said why, why would a plane suddenly pop 
14   a hole with metal fatigue, they said it's the 
15   landings and the take-offs, the cycles that 
16   embrittled the metal.  Now recently we've had 
17   three scrams over at Oyster Creek.  You know 
18   what a scram is, right?  That's when they 
19   shut down hot.  And, man, that's like a -- 
20   that's like a freight train hitting a wall.  
21   That old plant just shutters when those 
22   scrams hit.  Okay?  So there's your cycles.  
23   And Ray Shadis who -- who worked hard on 
24   the -- on the Maine Yankee said to me a 
0051
 1   nuclear plant only has so many scrams before 
 2   something pops.  So like I said, I salute all 
 3   you well intentioned people.  I think 
 4   you're -- you know, you're really trying.  
 5   You want to save people, but I don't know if 
 6   you're -- you know, if you're really aware of 
 7   all the things that are feeling like a 
 8   perfect storm to us.  And I think that's all 
 9   I got.  Thank you.
10                 MS. LIPOTI:  So what I have -- 
11   listen carefully.  I have eight issues that I 
12   think came out of your statement, Paula.  And 
13   I'm going to send them various ways, except 
14   one I'm going to answer myself.  The first 
15   one is about the duties of the shift 
16   technical advisor or shift supervisor who 
17   might be called on to have some emergency 
18   planning notification duties and are they 
19   distracted.  So that's issue number one.  
20   Issue number two is the issue of is 
21   notification timely.  And I think that one 
22   I'm probably going to send to the State 
23   Police because we had an issue last Sunday.  
24   The notification was quite timely.
0052
 1                 MS. GOTSCH:  I think they did a 
 2   lessons learned with that one.  You don't 
 3   even have to answer that.  That was a lesson 
 4   learned.
 5                 MS. LIPOTI:  The third one is 
 6   about population estimates.  And that is 
 7   definitely in the State Police camp.  That's 
 8   something that you update periodically.  The 
 9   fourth one was to read the document that you 
10   were referring to.  I can -- that's one I'll 
11   answer.  I can commit us.  We read -- we read 
12   a lot of stuff that comes out of the NRC.  
13   That is one of the ones that we would -- and 
14   Pat Mulligan will be heading that.  The fifth 
15   one is about the elevated spent fuel pool, is 
16   it within tech specs and do we practice with 
17   events such as a problem with the spent fuel 
18   pool leading into an emergency, so that gets 
19   to the types of scenarios that we would use.
20                 MS. GOTSCH:  Yes.
21                 MS. LIPOTI:  And Paul Baldauf 
22   will handle that.  Hospital planning for 
23   contaminated patients.  And I was going to 
24   ask the Department of Health to further 
0053
 1   comment on that because he hasn't answered 
 2   yet.  New workers and their training at 
 3   Oyster Creek.  That's really an NRC issue and 
 4   so that's kind of off the table.  The issue 
 5   of how our brief was written.  That was the 
 6   Deputy Attorney General who wrote that on 
 7   behalf of the State and did do a marvelous 
 8   job, but we still lost.  So that's kind of 
 9   off the table.  So the first, shift technical 
10   advisor.
11                 MR. BALDAUF:  Okay.  I think 
12   early on you had stated our partners with the 
13   plant.  And I think it might be helpful -- I 
14   really think there's two avenues where we're 
15   extremely aware of what goes on inside the 
16   plant in two ways.  One is with our drills.  
17   We are required to have annual drills.  As it 
18   works out, we do more than what's required in 
19   any given year.  Obviously the site itself is 
20   a partner in those drills, so we can see 
21   failures in the drills and learn from them.  
22   So if the failures are with DEP, with the 
23   State Police, or with Exelon we know that.  
24   We learn from that.  The other avenue is real 
0054
 1   life.  And that goes back to the 
 2   notifications.  And there certainly have been 
 3   times where we haven't been perfect with the 
 4   notifications, but we've corrected that.  It 
 5   may happen again, but the last few times that 
 6   come to mind when there have been 
 7   notification, whether there is an actual 
 8   emergency at the plant, or they discovered 
 9   tritium, the notification process and what 
10   follows after that has been successful.  
11   Certainly people might not like the end 
12   result of what actually happened, but the 
13   plan in place was followed as it should have 
14   been.  The appropriate people were reached.  
15   They reached out to who they had to and the 
16   operating procedures were effective.  So the 
17   question as to whether do we know what's 
18   going on inside the plant, I think we know 
19   what's going on very well.  We do on a daily 
20   basis have staff there, engineers there with 
21   their own offices interacting.  But the 
22   purpose is for the BNE to be involved at that 
23   level.  So we do see things that, hey, this 
24   doesn't seem right, or there may be a problem 
0055
 1   during an emergency, or this drill could be 
 2   improved by better communication in this 
 3   area.  I think we have that.  It's a 
 4   continual process.  And all sides come 
 5   together and say the DEP could help us better 
 6   by acting this way and vice-versa.  So I 
 7   think that's there.  We're very aware of 
 8   what's go on inside the plant mainly because 
 9   many times we're there.
10                 MS. GOTSCH:  I think my 
11   question was more specifically focused than 
12   that.  In other words, every nuclear plant is 
13   supposed to have one of these STAs on duty 
14   all the time.  Is there a way of knowing 
15   whether that person is free to be able to do 
16   their function in an emergency?  In other 
17   words, is that -- is there a way -- now the 
18   NRC is so concerned about this in their 
19   report that I read that they are going to -- 
20   they are considering making it a regulation 
21   of what those people can be asked to do other 
22   than their -- their very important emergency 
23   role, because it's called -- what -- what do 
24   you call it?  Responsibility creep gets on 
0056
 1   these guys, you know, they keep giving 
 2   them -- maybe they're standing around too 
 3   much so they give them stuff to do, but 
 4   meanwhile that's interfering with the 
 5   emergency preparedness that you're counting 
 6   on.
 7                 MR. BALDAUF:  Correct.
 8                 MS. GOTSCH:  That you're 
 9   counting on.  So it's not a matter of whether 
10   they performed great once a year on the 
11   drill.  It's a matter of whether that person 
12   is free to do his or her job all the time 
13   because that's -- you know, this isn't -- 
14   this is unforgiving technology.  In fact, one 
15   physician out west wrote a letter to the NRC 
16   recently saying he considers nuclear energy 
17   an act of treason because it threatens every 
18   person living within a nuclear plant, that 
19   is, if any other enemy threatened to kill 
20   people like these nuclear plants could they 
21   would be -- it would be -- well, it would 
22   be -- if they -- he -- I mean that's very 
23   radical, but you see what you -- you get 
24   driven to sometimes when you don't get any 
0057
 1   response, that this is treason to endanger us 
 2   all.  So my specific point was, is that 
 3   person free to do what they want to do, not 
 4   what they have to do?  
 5                 MR. BALDAUF:  It is -- 
 6   obviously NRC is the sole regulatory agency 
 7   here, so it is their responsibility to make 
 8   sure that individuals have appropriate 
 9   duties, they're not overtaxed and they have 
10   the ability to do their primary function.  I 
11   think what I'm trying to make clear is that I 
12   think we would be aware or we would be able 
13   to recognize if there are cases when someone 
14   is stretched beyond their limits, because our 
15   procedures and our processes would break down 
16   if we didn't see that.  We might not 
17   necessarily know who the individual is or 
18   what the problem is, but things wouldn't 
19   work.  But I would suggest that your 
20   concerns -- you can certainly write your 
21   concerns and comment on the NRC rule making.
22                 MS. GOTSCH:  Yeah.  Well -- no, 
23   I intend to.
24                 MR. BALDAUF:  But it certainly 
0058
 1   is that detailed about individuals' job 
 2   responsibilities.  We're aware when things 
 3   don't work.  Certainly it's NRC's 
 4   responsibility to come in and say this is 
 5   incorrect, you need to change it.
 6                 MS. GOTSCH:  I just think when 
 7   you read this report as a -- a lay person 
 8   reading this report -- and I know a lot.  I 
 9   kind of like know a lot about this stuff 
10   after years of this, but still I'm a lay 
11   person.  Reading it you realize that the 
12   effectiveness of what you guys got to do 
13   relies very much on -- on how things are -- 
14   how things are handled in the plant, too.  
15   And in this document the NRC is not happy 
16   with some of this stuff.  So I think maybe 
17   you'll have suggestions for them, too, when 
18   you read them.
19                 MR. BALDAUF:  Oh, absolutely.  
20   I believe we will.
21                 MS. GOTSCH:  Okay.
22                 MS. LIPOTI:  Notification and 
23   population estimate updates.  
24                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  The NRC sets 
0059
 1   -- and I think this is what happened, the NRC 
 2   sets regulations on how quickly and for what 
 3   type of incidents the plant has to make 
 4   notification.  And I think the one you're 
 5   talking about was not that there was no 
 6   notification, I think the timeliness of the 
 7   notification.
 8                 MS. GOTSCH:  It was the 
 9   timeliness.  It was three hours.
10                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Outside of 
11   the time limit.  
12                 MS. GOTSCH:  Right.
13                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  And I think 
14   that's what it was.  The last one we had was 
15   very timely, because I got that call at 
16   quarter to three in the morning.  As far as 
17   time estimates, time estimates -- 2010 there 
18   will be a new census.  At that time the 
19   plants are required to do new excavation time 
20   estimates based on the new census.  So there 
21   will be a census next year and then they will 
22   have to give us the new excavation time 
23   estimates based on the census.  Now what FEMA 
24   is recommending is that they go to a -- if 
0060
 1   it's every ten years they want a more 
 2   shortened time for the -- for the census 
 3   evacuation time estimates.  So they're -- 
 4   they're recommending that they even shorten 
 5   the time.  So maybe it might go to a lesser 
 6   time than ten years before the next one.  But 
 7   there will be one next year.  
 8                 MS. GOTSCH:  Okay.  So as of 
 9   now the plan is built on the ten -- the 
10   census from ten years ago?  Is that --  
11                 LIEUTENANT SENSI: 2000.
12                 MS. GOTSCH:  Yeah.
13                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Now next 
14   year they'll have the 2010 census.
15                 MS. GOTSCH:  Right.  But -- but 
16   we're going on the numbers from -- from the 
17   census -- when was the last census?  I'm 
18   sorry.  
19                 MS. LIPOTI:  2000.
20                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  2000.
21                 MS. GOTSCH:  It was 2000?  
22   Yeah.  Okay.  So -- and they're saying that 
23   if there's a ten percent, at least a 10 
24   percent growth they -- they cut off the ten 
0061
 1   percent line as making a problem for what you 
 2   guys got to do.  If the population grows any 
 3   more than ten percent, starts to creep up, 
 4   now your evacuation plan is no longer valid 
 5   because the traffic -- the safety people 
 6   calculated that over ten percent of what 
 7   you're estimating people on the road is going 
 8   to shut down roads that you weren't even 
 9   aware of.  So depending on whether in the 
10   last ten years we have grown 15 or -- ten 
11   percent or 15 or 20 percent we're already in 
12   a mess.  In other words, this is not going to 
13   work already, that's what I'm saying, 
14   according to the traffic safety people who 
15   did a study on -- on this thing.
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Next year we 
17   will get new excavation time estimates.  
18                 MS. GOTSCH:  Right.  I'm 
19   certainly happy.  Meanwhile --  
20                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Maybe 
21   they'll shorten it or they'll increase the 
22   percentage.
23                 MS. GOTSCH:  Well, that -- 
24   that's another -- this report is great 
0062
 1   because they -- they are looking into a lot 
 2   of this stuff.  They're saying we -- we've 
 3   got to update especially in areas like -- 
 4   like Ocean County that grew so 
 5   exponentially.  Where areas have rapid 
 6   growth, ten years is too long.  We're -- 
 7   already now the plan is not working.  The 
 8   roads won't hold, your roads that the traffic 
 9   safety people said over a ten percent growth 
10   and -- your roads are not going to support 
11   your excavation plan.
12                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  What study 
13   are you citing, ma'am?  
14                 MS. GOTSCH:  It's in -- it's in 
15   that report.  It's in the NRC10CFR5052, 
16   Enhancement to Emergency Preparedness 
17   Regulations.  And they cite the traffic 
18   report in there.
19                 MS. LIPOTI:  Elevated spent 
20   fuel pool.
21                 MR. BALDAUF:  I got to see if I 
22   remember the question.
23                 MS. GOTSCH:  The elephant in 
24   the room.
0063
 1                 MR. BALDAUF:  I think the 
 2   question rested around scenarios, did we look 
 3   at scenarios when that could possibly 
 4   happen.  We made a special effort, or I 
 5   wouldn't say a special effort, but we 
 6   attempted to be as transparent as possible.  
 7   So you're obviously very -- you understand 
 8   our contentions and our concerns as they have 
 9   evolved over the years.  There's no question 
10   that we could have an exercise and could have 
11   had exercises in the past where the problem 
12   came from that area of the plan.  Now was the 
13   scenario a plane hitting it?  In years past 
14   it probably was not.  The hostile action 
15   drills that are coming out now are new.  It 
16   is very possible that things could evolve 
17   into planes being part of it, but I think 
18   it's -- it's -- the actual what causes it may 
19   not be that important.  For instance, if you 
20   have the same type of release from that fuel 
21   pool, whether it's just from some mechanical 
22   type breakdown versus a plane the response is 
23   still the same.  
24                 MS. GOTSCH:  Right.
0064
 1                 MR. BALDAUF:  But I think, and 
 2   this is going to take sometime to evolve, but 
 3   the hostile based drill is going to bring 
 4   realism in at least from a terrorist type 
 5   standpoint that you may have not had in the 
 6   past.  And if you look at the proposal that 
 7   you were talking about, one of the guidance 
 8   they talked about is enhancing scenario 
 9   realism.
10                 MS. GOTSCH:  Yes.
11                 MR. BALDAUF:  And reducing 
12   negative training and preconditioned 
13   responses.
14                 MS. GOTSCH:  Exactly, yes.  
15                 MR. BALDAUF:  And that's -- I 
16   think even the focus is going to be there.  
17   It may have nothing to do with an airplane, 
18   but it's going to be things that I believe 
19   aren't going to be -- a scenario you haven't 
20   had in the past.  They aren't going to be 
21   routine.  They're going to be unexpected.  
22   Your response may be very similar to things 
23   you drilled in the past, but the initiating 
24   action, the idea with this will change, is to 
0065
 1   try to evolve.  So, A, players can't predict 
 2   what the drill is going to be about, and, B, 
 3   it brings in some realism that could possibly 
 4   happen.  However highly unlikely a plane 
 5   would be to practice it would serve a great 
 6   purpose.
 7                 MS. GOTSCH:  After September 
 8   11th there is no highly unlikely.  Let's face 
 9   it.
10                 MR. BALDAUF:  That's true.  
11   I'll give you that.
12                 MS. LIPOTI:  And the last one 
13   is about hospital planning for receiving 
14   contaminated patients.  And I had -- the 
15   State Police offered to answer that one and I 
16   was going to throw it Joe Pasqualo, but -- 
17                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Either way?  
18                 MS. LIPOTI:  Either way.
19                 MR. PASQUALO:  I'll take it.
20                 MS. LIPOTI:  Okay.  Go head, 
21   Joe.
22                 MR. PASQUALO:  Since 2002 a 
23   great deal of resources have been put into 
24   the New Jersey hospitals with respect to 
0066
 1   increasing chemical radiological emergency 
 2   search capacity, meaning would they be able 
 3   to handle an increased number of patients 
 4   that were suffering either from chemical 
 5   weapons or from exposure to radiation, 
 6   whether it was a nuclear generating station, 
 7   a dirty bomb, or a nuclear detonation.  In 
 8   years gone by these issues really weren't 
 9   primary and the hospitals hadn't had to deal 
10   with these issues, but as you say, since 
11   2001, you know, things have changed.  So the 
12   Department of Health has shepherded a great 
13   deal of federal resources and state resources 
14   into every hospital in the state to enable 
15   them to -- to deal with such emergencies.  
16   Now specifically for radiological we've given 
17   them survey equipment or, you know, helped 
18   them acquire it, and also decontamination 
19   materials that would be necessary to 
20   ascertain the status of the patients and to 
21   treat them, also making some arrangements for 
22   increased beds.  Obviously as you said 
23   before, you can't just wheel in a hot patient 
24   into the emergency room and -- and compromise 
0067
 1   the staff and other patients there.  So these 
 2   types of issues represent some very 
 3   significant challenges to the hospital 
 4   system.  And we've been working pretty much 
 5   around the clock to address that.  I can tell 
 6   you that they all go through yearly exercises 
 7   in terms of using decontamination equipment 
 8   and survey equipment and patient management.  
 9   So each hospital has a different set of 
10   problems in terms of, you know, their 
11   hospital group, their beds and that sort of 
12   thing, but all of them I can tell you are 
13   aware of the -- of the issue and -- and made 
14   significant strides in being able to deal 
15   with patients that are compromised either 
16   chemically or through radiological 
17   contamination.  I think that addresses the 
18   issue.
19                 MS. GOTSCH:  A friend of mine 
20   was an emergency room nurse over at Toms 
21   River Hospital and they said they dread the 
22   thought of them hauling radioactive victims 
23   in, because they said there will be hell to 
24   pay because they're hot.
0068
 1                 MR. PASQUALO:  Well, that's -- 
 2   that's true.
 3                 MS. GOTSCH:  The whole hospital 
 4   will be hot.  And so the thing of it is are 
 5   we -- we don't like to think about those 
 6   things.  We like to say, oh, well, you know, 
 7   we don't want to think about that, that's too 
 8   crazy.  Well, the thing of it is this is what 
 9   we're dealing with.
10                 MR. PASQUALO:  Well, a lot of 
11   people are thinking about it.
12                 MS. GOTSCH:  That's good.
13                 MR. PASQUALO:  As I said, 
14   they've made some very significant 
15   improvements in the ability to deal with 
16   patients that are compromised, you know, in 
17   such a way.  You know, are we 100 percent 
18   happy with where we are?  No.  But I can tell 
19   you honestly as compared to where we were 
20   several years ago we've made great strides in 
21   being able to deal with that side of the 
22   equation.
23                 MS. GOTSCH:  There must be a 
24   better way to get energy, right?  All right.  
0069
 1   Thank you very much for all your answers.  I 
 2   appreciate it.
 3                 MS. CLEMENTE:  My name is 
 4   Maryanne Clemente.  I'm from Barnegat.  I'm 
 5   very close proximity to Oyster Creek, 
 6   probably three miles from it.  And I mean the 
 7   Lieutenant spoke very in -- not too much 
 8   detail really about excavation.  I -- I -- 
 9   Edith had mentioned something about fire at 
10   Double Creek, but we had a fire in Barnegat 
11   where there was excavation involved.  And it 
12   was a diaster.  This was only maybe two years 
13   ago.  And there's -- they say that a fire is 
14   different than what your plan is -- is going 
15   to -- to encounter, but the fact still 
16   remains that you're dealing with people in 
17   cars trying to get away on a two-lane road on 
18   Route 9 or the Parkway, four-lanes whether -- 
19   actually it's only two lanes, you're either 
20   going to go one direction or the other 
21   probably, or have all four going the same 
22   direction, I guess.  That -- that experience 
23   reference was a diaster.  I mean the -- the 
24   Parkway was closed, granted some of it was -- 
0070
 1   the probably -- the right hand didn't know 
 2   what the left hand was doing and that may 
 3   have -- you may have something on that in 
 4   terms of your preparedness in terms of 
 5   planning, but I still think that it is a good 
 6   indication of what we facing in the limited 
 7   roadways that we have to -- to get out of the 
 8   area.  Now, I would like to know from you 
 9   what -- what does your -- your -- your 
10   testing involve?  How do you get the volume 
11   test in -- in place?  Is all on paper, or is 
12   only some of it on paper and, you know, the 
13   rest of it you do actively?  What is the 
14   active part of your test in terms of an 
15   excavation plan?  
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  The 
17   excavation plan is based on excavation time 
18   estimates where they have a volume how -- how 
19   big a vehicle is, how fast the vehicle will 
20   be going, how many vehicles are in that area.
21                 MS. CLEMENTE:  It's all on 
22   paper?  
23                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  No.  
24                 MS. CLEMENTE:  You don't have a 
0071
 1   drill?  Do you have a drill?  
 2                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  It's 
 3   actually done by tests.  They test how 
 4   long -- how long a vehicle takes to travel on 
 5   a certain road, how fast those vehicles will 
 6   be going base on congestion and then the 
 7   distance they'll have to go, so -- 
 8                 MS. CLEMENTE:  So it's all on 
 9   paper basically?  Calculations, a model?  
10                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  No, 
11   calculations are done on an vehicle traveling 
12   a certain distance.  It's not -- they didn't 
13   write it down as a formula.  In order for 
14   them to get an evacuation time estimate they 
15   need to know how big a vehicle is by getting 
16   in the vehicle, driving it this route, what 
17   the speed will be, and of course the speed 
18   will be diminished because of the volume, how 
19   many vehicles are in that area based on 
20   census, and then by figuring out that 
21   calculation you figure out how long it's 
22   going to take to get that last vehicle out of 
23   that area.
24                 MS. CLEMENTE:  Okay.  To me 
0072
 1   that's a paper -- a paper computer.  That -- 
 2   that's something that's not practical.  It's 
 3   not real.  It's not like a fire drill where 
 4   you actually -- you know, a very small 
 5   example.  But wouldn't it make more sense to 
 6   have a practical kind of test where you had 
 7   certain -- let's say you gathered a couple of 
 8   thousand people or several thousand people -- 
 9                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Let -- let 
10   me go back again and ask you this, if I have 
11   a vehicle, any car travel and drive that 
12   vehicle two mile an hours through a certain 
13   route how is that a paper estimate?  
14                 MS. CLEMENTE:  Because you're 
15   using -- your calculating it.
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  No.
17                 MS. CLEMENTE:  It's a math 
18   problem.
19                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  You drive 
20   it.  No, actually get in it.
21                 MS. CLEMENTE:  So you take one 
22   car and drive it.  You don't --  
23                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Two miles an 
24   hour, but -- but no matter -- and now I have 
0073
 1   to have 100 cars -- 
 2                 MS. CLEMENTE:  No, we have cars 
 3   coming from this direction, cars coming from 
 4   that direction and all -- all of the -- all 
 5   of the things that come into play.
 6                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Let me 
 7   answer that.  That's what happened with the 
 8   fire, because they had people coming back, 
 9   people coming, over people coming from 
10   different directions.  What we have -- what 
11   we have in our plan is access control.  You 
12   won't be allowed to go the opposite way.
13                 MS. CLEMENTE:  Except you 
14   can't -- you don't -- you don't practice it.  
15   How do you practice that?  
16                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Yes, we 
17   practice.  And we have -- people have 
18   preassigned locations.  They go out.  We'll 
19   do a route and we'll send everyone out to 
20   their post.  They'll go out and man all those 
21   posts.
22                 MS. CLEMENTE:  With no cars?  
23                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  Well, there 
24   will be vehicles there.  If we were to say to 
0074
 1   you we want you for a drill -- first of all, 
 2   the liability issue would be a nightmare.  
 3   But if we asked you -- if we have all of you 
 4   participate, if we asked for help in a drill, 
 5   but how about the people out there now that 
 6   are at Joey's baseball game or Sally's 
 7   softball game or mom's for dinner.  You know 
 8   that they're going to tell us?  We got things 
 9   to do.  I got to work.  I got things to do 
10   after work.  People aren't going to all sit 
11   here and come and get -- all right.  There's 
12   2,000 of us.  We're all going to go down the 
13   road.  They're not going to do it.  But what 
14   you can do is you see -- if you get in a 
15   vehicle that's going two miles an hour and 
16   you drive from point A to point B you know 
17   how long it's going to take.  It's not going 
18   to take any longer.  You have to get 1,000 
19   vehicles that far.  It's not going to take 
20   any longer.
21                 MS. CLEMENTE:  But it's the -- 
22   it's not the -- it's not to -- to my mind 
23   it's not -- it's not only the vehicle 
24   traveling at a certain speed, it's the 
0075
 1   coordination that's involved from your 
 2   responders.  
 3                 LIEUTENANT SENSI:  But we do 
 4   actually test the coordination of the 
 5   responders.  We send them to their points on 
 6   the route.  So we know also, actually how 
 7   long it's going to take each person to get to 
 8   their access point, so we know that from this 
 9   time to this time everyone will be in place.  
10   At that point we start our estimate.  
11   Everything is closed off.  Everyone is going 
12   one direction around.  We do not allow flow 
13   back in towards the plant.  When the fire 
14   started you had people that were going 
15   towards their house, people that were coming 
16   in other routes, people that were getting off 
17   different ways.  Everyone will be funneled.  
18   They're going to be controlled.  The route is 
19   going to be controlled.  
20                 (Whereupon, court reporter's 
21   transcript ends at 8:25 p.m.)
22                 
23                 
24   
0076
 1                 C E R T I F I C A T I O N
 2   
 3                         I, Joseph P. 
 4   Dromgoole, Professional Reporter and Notary 
 5   Public, do hereby certify that I reported the 
 6   hearing in the above-captioned matter; that 
 7   the foregoing is a true and correct 
 8   transcript of the stenographic notes of the 
 9   testimony taken by me in the above-captioned 
10   matter.
11                         I FURTHER CERTIFY that 
12   I am not an attorney or counsel of any of the 
13   parties, nor a relative or employee of any 
14   attorney or counsel inconnection with the 
15   action, nor financially interested in the 
16   action.
17   
18                 ____________________
19                 Joseph P. Dromgoole
20                 Professional Court Reporter
21   
22   
23   
24                 DATED: __________________