FINAL DECISION

February 28, 2012 Government Records Council Meeting

Jesse Wolosky
Complainant

v.

Township of Randolph (Morris)
Custodian of Record

At the February 28, 2012 public meeting, the Government Records Council (“Council”) considered the February 21, 2012 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that:


2. Pursuant to Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the Custodian’s conduct. Additionally, pursuant to Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Specifically, the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify with reasonable clarity the recipients and/or senders of the e-mails sought. See Elcavage v. West Milford Twp., GRC Complaint Nos. 2009-07 and 2009-08 (March 2010). Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, supra, and Mason, supra.

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s
Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.

Final Decision Rendered by the
Government Records Council
On The 28th Day of February, 2012

Robin Berg Tabakin, Esq., Chair
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Denise Parkinson Vetti, Esq., Secretary
Government Records Council

Decision Distribution Date: March 1, 2012
Jesse Wolosky1 v. Township of Randolph (Morris)2

Records Relevant to Complaint: Copies of every e-mail sent or received by the Municipal Clerk’s office to or from every other Municipal Clerk in Morris County regarding the Complainant, his OPRA request and/or other OPRA matters from June 29, 2010 through August 23, 2010.

Request Made: August 23, 2010
Response Made: August 30, 2010
Custodian: Donna M. Brady
GRC Complaint Filed: September 15, 20103

Background

August 23, 2010
Complainant’s Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request. The Complainant requests the records relevant to this complaint listed above in an e-mail referencing OPRA. The Complainant indicates that the preferred method of delivery is via e-mail.

August 24, 2010
E-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant. The Custodian acknowledges receipt of the Complainant’s OPRA request and states that she will provide the responsive records as soon as they are ready.

August 30, 2010
Custodian’s response to the OPRA request. The Custodian responds in writing via e-mail to the Complainant’s OPRA request on the third (3rd) business day following receipt of such request.4 The Custodian states that attached are 78 pages of records responsive to the Complainant’s OPRA request.

1 Represented by Walter M. Luers, Esq., of the Law Offices of Walter M. Luers, Esq., LLC (Clinton, NJ).
2 Represented by Tiena M. Cofoni, Esq., of The Buzak Law Group, LLC (Montville, NJ).
3 The GRC received the Denial of Access Complaint on said date.
4 The Custodian certifies in the Statement of Information that she received the Complainant’s OPRA request on August 24, 2010.
September 15, 2010

Denial of Access Complaint filed with the Government Records Council (“GRC”) with the following attachments:

- Complainant’s OPRA request dated August 23, 2010.
- E-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant dated August 24, 2010.
- E-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant dated August 30, 2010 (with attachments).
- E-mails disclosed by the Township of Randolph’s (“Township”) Custodian.
- E-mails disclosed by the Borough of Florham Park’s Custodian.
- E-mails disclosed by the Township of Chatham’s Custodian.

The Complainant’s Counsel states that the Complainant submitted an OPRA request to the Custodian on August 23, 2010. Counsel states that the Custodian responded in writing on August 30, 2010 providing access to records.

Counsel contends that the Complainant acquired evidence that at least eight (8) additional e-mails (three (3) of which include attachments) were not provided to the Complainant. Counsel states that the Complainant acquired this evidence by submitting a similar request to the Borough of Florham Park and the Township of Chatham. Counsel states that the eight (8) missing e-mails were provided by either the Borough Florham Park or the Township of Chatham. Counsel states that the Custodian is listed as a recipient or sender of the e-mails. Counsel states that in one e-mail from the Custodian to the Florham Park Custodian discussing posting the Complainant’s name and amount of time it takes to fulfill his OPRA requests on Morris County Municipal websites. Counsel asserts that he believes the Custodian did not disclose this e-mail because posting these types of lists on municipal websites discourages OPRA requests.


Counsel states that the custodian of record must bear the burden of proof in any proceeding under OPRA. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and Paff v. Township of Lawnside (Camden), GRC Complaint No. 2009-155 (October 2010). Counsel contends that there is no doubt that the records requested by the Complainant are government records as defined under OPRA. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.
Counsel contends that because the Custodian failed to provide the eight (8) e-mails (three (3) with attachments) included in the Borough of Florham Park’s or Township of Chatham’s response, the Custodian has unlawfully denied access to same. Counsel further contends that the Custodian could have also denied access to additional e-mails not copied to the Township of Chatham. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.i. (requiring custodians to provide copies of records that are not archived or in storage within seven (7) business days after receiving an OPRA request).

Counsel requests the following:

1. A determination ordering the Custodian to disclose all e-mails and attachments that were not previously provided to the Complainant.
2. A determination that the Complainant is a prevailing party entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

The Complainant does not agree to mediate this complaint.

**September 15, 2010**

Request for the Statement of Information (“SOI”) sent to the Custodian.

**September 20, 2010**

Custodian’s SOI with the following attachments:

- Complainant’s OPRA request dated August 23, 2010.
- E-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant dated August 24, 2010.
- E-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant dated August 30, 2010 (with attachments).

The Custodian certifies that her search for the requested records included attaching the OPRA request to a memorandum and referring it to every department within the Township advising to provide any responsive records. The Custodian certifies that no records were returned to her as a result of the memorandum. The Custodian certifies that all records provided were maintained in her e-mail account.

The Custodian also certifies that no records responsive to the request were destroyed in accordance with the Records Destruction Schedule established and approved by New Jersey Department of State, Division of Archives and Records Management.

The Custodian certifies that she received the Complainant’s OPRA request on August 24, 2010. The Custodian certifies that she e-mailed the Complainant on the same day advising that she received his OPRA request and that she would provide any responsive records as soon as they are prepared for disclosure.

The Custodian certifies that she understood the Complainant’s OPRA request to be seeking e-mails between Morris County Clerks regarding his OPRA requests. The Custodian certifies that she confirmed this in her response e-mail wherein the subject line was “[c]opies of [e-mails] to and from Clerks concerning [the Complainant’s] OPRA requests.” The Custodian certifies that she did not provide five (5) of the eight (8) e-mails
because she determined they were not responsive. The Custodian certifies inadvertently did not provide the remaining three (3) e-mails. The Custodian certifies that a review of the remaining three (3) e-mails shows that two (2) were not responsive to the Complainant’s OPRA request. The Custodian further certifies she provided to the Complainant 44 separate e-mails consisting of 78 pages at no cost. The Custodian certifies that no additional e-mails responsive to the Complainant’s OPRA request exist.

The Custodian asserts that the inadvertent exclusion of three (3) e-mails was not intentional. The Custodian asserts that she makes a good faith effort to fulfill every OPRA request received by the Township in a satisfactory manner. The Custodian contends that the lengths her office went to in order to accurately respond to the Complainant’s OPRA request demonstrates this effort. The Custodian asserts that the exclusion of three (3) e-mails is not evidence that she knowingly and willfully violated OPRA. The Custodian thus requests that the Complainant’s request for prevailing party attorney’s fees be denied.

Analysis

Whether the Complainant’s records request is valid under OPRA?

OPRA provides that:

“…government records shall be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination by the citizens of this State, with certain exceptions…” (Emphasis added.) N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

Additionally, OPRA defines a government record as:

“… any paper, written or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording or in a similar device, or any copy thereof, that has been made, maintained or kept on file … or that has been received in the course of his or its official business …” (Emphasis added.) N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

OPRA places the onus on the Custodian to prove that a denial of access is lawful. Specifically, OPRA states:

“…[t]he public agency shall have the burden of proving that the denial of access is authorized by law…” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

OPRA provides that government records made, maintained, kept on file, or received by a public agency in the course of its official business are subject to public access unless otherwise exempt. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. A custodian must release all records responsive to an OPRA request “with certain exceptions.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Additionally, OPRA places the burden on a custodian to prove that a denial of access to records is lawful pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.
In the instant complaint, of issue is whether the Complainant’s request for a “[c]opies of every e-mail sent or received by the Municipal Clerk’s office to or from every other Municipal Clerk in Morris County regarding the Complainant, his OPRA request and/or other OPRA matters from June 29, 2010 through August 23, 2010” is a valid request under OPRA. Here, the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it requires the Custodian to perform research to locate and identify responsive records.

The New Jersey Superior Court has held that "[w]hile OPRA provides an alternative means of access to government documents not otherwise exempted from its reach, it is not intended as a research tool litigants may use to force government officials to identify and siphon useful information. Rather, OPRA simply operates to make identifiable government records ‘readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination.’ N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.” (Emphasis added.) MAG Entertainment, LLC v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 375 N.J. Super. 534, 546 (App. Div. 2005). As the court noted in invalidating MAG’s request under OPRA:

“Most significantly, the request failed to identify with any specificity or particularity the governmental records sought. MAG provided neither names nor any identifiers other than a broad generic description of a brand or type of case prosecuted by the agency in the past. Such an open-ended demand required the Division's records custodian to manually search through all of the agency's files, analyze, compile and collate the information contained therein, and identify for MAG the cases relative to its selective enforcement defense in the OAL litigation. Further, once the cases were identified, the records custodian would then be required to evaluate, sort out, and determine the documents to be produced and those otherwise exempted.” Id. at 549.

The Court further held that "[u]nder OPRA, agencies are required to disclose only ‘identifiable’ government records not otherwise exempt ... In short, OPRA does not countenance open-ended searches of an agency’s files.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

Further, in Bent v. Stafford Police Department, 381 N.J. Super. 30, 37 (App. Div. 2005), the Superior Court references MAG in that the Court held that a requestor must specifically describe the document sought because OPRA operates to make identifiable government records “accessible.” “As such, a proper request under OPRA must identify with reasonable clarity those documents that are desired, and a party cannot satisfy this requirement by simply requesting all of an agency's documents.”

Additionally, in New Jersey Builders Association v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 390 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (App. Div. 2007), the Court enumerated the responsibilities of a custodian and a requestor as follows:

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5 Affirmed on appeal regarding Bent v. Stafford Police Department, GRC Case No. 2004-78 (October 2004).
6 As stated in Bent, supra.
“OPRA identifies the responsibilities of the requestor and the agency relevant to the prompt access the law is designed to provide. The custodian, who is the person designated by the director of the agency, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, must adopt forms for requests, locate and redact documents, isolate exempt documents, assess fees and means of production, identify requests that require ‘extraordinary expenditure of time and effort’ and warrant assessment of a ‘service charge,’ and, when unable to comply with a request, ‘indicate the specific basis.’ N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(a)-(j). The requestor must pay the costs of reproduction and submit the request with information that is essential to permit the custodian to comply with its obligations. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(f), (g), (i).

Research is not among the custodian's responsibilities.” (Emphasis added.) NJ Builders, 390 N.J. Super. at 177.

Moreover, the Court cited MAG by stating that “…when a request is ‘complex’ because it fails to specifically identify the documents sought, then that request is not ‘encompassed’ by OPRA…” The Court also quoted N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5.g in that “‘[i]f a request for access to a government record would substantially disrupt agency operations, the custodian may deny access to the record after attempting to reach a reasonable solution with the requestor that accommodates the interests of the requestor and the agency.’” The Court further stated that “…the Legislature would not expect or want courts to require more persuasive proof of the substantiality of a disruption to agency operations than the agency’s need to…generate new records…”

Furthermore, in Schuler v. Borough of Bloomsbury, GRC Complaint No. 2007-151 (February 2009), the Council held that “[b]ecause the Complainant’s OPRA requests # 2-5 are not requests for identifiable government records, the requests are invalid and the Custodian has not unlawfully denied access to the requested records pursuant to [MAG] and [Bent].”

The test under MAG then, is whether a requested record is a specifically identifiable government record. If so, the record is disclosable, barring any exemptions to disclosure contained in OPRA. The GRC established the criteria deemed necessary to specifically identify an e-mail communication in Sandoval v. NJ State Parole Board, GRC Complaint No. 2006-167 (October 2008). In Sandoval, the Complainant requested “e-mail…between [two individuals] from April 1, 2005 through June 23, 2006 [using seventeen (17) different keywords].” The Custodian denied the request, claiming that it was overly broad. The Council determined:

“The Complainant in the complaint now before the GRC requested specific e-mails by recipient, by date range and by content. Based on that information, the Custodian has identified [numerous] e-mails which fit the specific recipient and date range criteria Complainant requested.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

Moreover, in Elcavage v. West Milford Twp., GRC Complaint Nos. 2009-07 and 2009-08 (March 2010), the Council examined what constitutes a valid request for e-mails under OPRA. The Council determined that:
“In accord with MAG, supra, and its progeny, in order to specifically identify an e-mail, OPRA requests must contain (1) the content and/or subject of the e-mail, (2) the specific date or range of dates during which the e-mail was transmitted or the e-mails were transmitted, and (3) a valid e-mail request must identify the sender and/or the recipient thereof.” (Emphasis in original). Id.

In the instant matter, although the Complainant’s request provided a specific range of dates in which the requested e-mails were transmitted, the request failed to name a specific identifiable sender and recipient: the request seeks e-mails from and to a specific class of employee (specifically, Morris County Municipal Clerks) and not individually named senders and recipients. See Elcavage, supra. In order for the Custodian to respond to this request, the Custodian would be required to evaluate all e-mails in their database which contained the particular key words sought by the Complainant in order to determine whether the named recipients of such communications were Morris County Municipal Clerks. Such a request is not feasible, as Morris County itself has thirty-nine (39) municipalities and no specific employees were named in the Complainant’s request.

Pursuant to Elcavage and MAG, it is not the Custodian’s duty to discern which e-mails in her database have been received by or sent to a Morris County Municipal Clerk. A search for the individual employees’ names and related e-mail addresses would constitute research that is not the statutory duty of a Custodian. Such a request is not in accordance with the requirements of MAG. Accordingly, the Complainant’s request is invalid.

Therefore, the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it fails to specifically name identifiable individual senders and recipients and because the request requires research beyond the scope of a custodian’s duties pursuant to MAG, supra; Bent, supra; New Jersey Builders, supra; Schuler, supra. See also Elcavage, supra and Wolosky v. Township of Dover (Morris), GRC Complaint No. 2010-206 (October 25, 2011).

Whether the Complainant is a “prevailing party” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees?

OPRA provides that:

“[a] person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may:

- institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian’s decision by filing an action in Superior Court…; or
- in lieu of filing an action in Superior Court, file a complaint with the Government Records Council…

A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.
In Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Court held that a complainant is a “prevailing party” if he/she achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Id. at 432. Additionally, the Court held that attorney’s fees may be awarded when the requestor is successful (or partially successful) via a judicial decree, a quasi-judicial determination, or a settlement of the parties that indicates access was improperly denied and the requested records are disclosed. Id.

In Teeters, the complainant appealed from a final decision of the Government Records Council which denied an award for attorney's fees incurred in seeking access to certain public records via two complaints she filed under the OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7.f., against the Division of Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”). The records sought involved an adoption agency having falsely advertised that it was licensed in New Jersey. DYFS eventually determined that the adoption agency violated the licensing rules and reported the results of its investigation to the complainant. The complainant received the records she requested upon entering into a settlement with DYFS. The Court found that the complainant engaged in reasonable efforts to pursue her access rights to the records in question and sought attorney assistance only after her self-filed complaints and personal efforts were unavailing. Id. at 432. With that assistance, she achieved a favorable result that reflected an alteration of position and behavior on DYFS’s part. Id. As a result, the complainant was a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee. Accordingly, the Court remanded the determination of reasonable attorney’s fees to the GRC for adjudication.

Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of “prevailing party” attorney’s fees. In Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), the Court discussed the catalyst theory, “which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Mason, supra, at 71, (quoting Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 131 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001)). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court stated that the phrase “prevailing party” is a legal term of art that refers to a “party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party attorney fees, in part because “[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 605, 121 S. Ct. at 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 863, but also over concern that the catalyst theory would spawn extra litigation over attorney's fees. Id. at 609, 121 S. Ct. at 1843, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 866.

As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Mason, Buckhannon is binding only when counsel fee provisions under federal statutes are at issue. 196 N.J. at 72, citing Teeters, supra, 387 N.J. Super. at 429; see, e.g., Baer v. Klagholz, 346 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). “But in interpreting New Jersey law, we look to state law precedent and the specific state statute before us. When appropriate,
we depart from the reasoning of federal cases that interpret comparable federal statutes.” 196 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).

The Mason Court then examined the catalyst theory within the context of New Jersey law, stating that:

“New Jersey law has long recognized the catalyst theory. In 1984, this Court considered the term "prevailing party" within the meaning of the federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert. denied, New Jersey v. Singer, 469 U.S. 832, 105 S. Ct. 121, 83 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1984). The Court adopted a two-part test espousing the catalyst theory, consistent with federal law at the time: (1) there must be "a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved;" in other words, plaintiff's efforts must be a "necessary and important factor in obtaining the relief," Id. at 494-95, 472 A.2d 138 (internal quotations and citations omitted); and (2) "it must be shown that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law," Id. at 495. See also North Bergen Rex Transport v. TLC, 158 N.J. 561, 570-71 (1999)(applying Singer fee-shifting test to commercial contract).

Also prior to Buckhannon, the Appellate Division applied the catalyst doctrine in the context of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213. Warrington v. Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 410 (App. Div. 2000). The Appellate Division explained that "[a] plaintiff is considered a prevailing party 'when actual relief on the merits of [the] claim materially alters the relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.'" Id. at 420 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503 (1992)); see also Szczepanski v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., 141 N.J. 346, 355 (1995) (noting that Hensley v. Eckerhart "generously" defines "a prevailing party [as] one who succeeds 'on any significant issue in litigation [that] achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit" (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1938, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40, 50 (1983))). The panel noted that the "form of the judgment is not entitled to conclusive weight"; rather, courts must look to whether a plaintiff's lawsuit acted as a catalyst that prompted defendant to take action and correct an unlawful practice. Warrington, supra, 328 N.J. Super. at 421. A settlement that confers the relief sought may still entitle plaintiff to attorney's fees in fee-shifting matters. Id. at 422.

This Court affirmed the catalyst theory again in 2001 when it applied the test to an attorney misconduct matter. Packard-Bamberger, supra, 167 N.J. at 444. In an OPRA matter several years later, New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 185 N.J. 137, 143-44 (2005)(NJDPM), this Court directed the Department of
Corrections to disclose records beyond those it had produced voluntarily. In ordering attorney's fees, the Court acknowledged the rationale underlying various fee-shifting statutes: to insure that plaintiffs are able to find lawyers to represent them; to attract competent counsel to seek redress of statutory rights; and to "even the fight" when citizens challenge a public entity. *Id.* at 153.

After *Buckhannon*, and after the trial court's decision in this case, the Appellate Division decided *Teeters*. The plaintiff in *Teeters* requested records from the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), which DYFS declined to release. 387 N.J. Super. at 424. After the GRC preliminarily found in plaintiff's favor, the parties reached a settlement agreement leaving open whether plaintiff was a "prevailing party" under OPRA. *Id.* at 426-27.

The Appellate Division declined to follow *Buckhannon* and held that plaintiff was a "prevailing party" entitled to reasonable attorney's fees; in line with the catalyst theory, plaintiff's complaint brought about an alteration in DYFS's position, and she received a favorable result through the settlement reached. *Id.* at 431-34. In rejecting *Buckhannon*, the panel noted that "New Jersey statutes have a different tone and flavor" than federal fee-shifting laws. *Id.* at 430. "Both the language of our statutes and the terms of court decisions in this State dealing with the issue of counsel fee entitlements support a more indulgent view of petitioner's claim for an attorney's fee award than was allowed by the majority in *Buckhannon* ... " *Id.* at 431, 904 A.2d 747. As support for this proposition, the panel surveyed OPRA, Packard-Bamberger, Warrington, and other cases.

OPRA itself contains broader language on attorney's fees than the former RTKL did. OPRA provides that "[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Under the prior RTKL, "[a] plaintiff in whose favor such an order [requiring access to public records] issues ... may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed $ 500.00." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-4 (repealed 2002). The Legislature's revisions therefore: (1) mandate, rather than permit, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party; and (2) eliminate the $500 cap on fees and permit a reasonable, and quite likely higher, fee award. Those changes expand counsel fee awards under OPRA.” (Footnote omitted.) Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 73-76 (2008).

The Court in Mason, *supra*, at 76, held that "requestors are entitled to attorney's fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate (1) 'a factual causal nexus between plaintiff's litigation and the relief ultimately achieved'; and (2) 'that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.' Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert denied (1984).”
The Complainant filed this complaint requesting that the GRC order the Custodian to disclose eight (8) e-mails and any other e-mails the Custodian failed to provide to him. However, the GRC has determined that the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it failed to identify with reasonable clarity the individual senders and/or recipients of the e-mail’s sought. See Elcavage and Wolosky. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

Pursuant to Teeters, supra, the Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the Custodian’s conduct. Additionally, pursuant to Mason, supra, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Specifically, the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify with reasonable clarity the recipients and/or senders of the e-mails sought. See Elcavage. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, supra, and Mason, supra.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that:


2. Pursuant to Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the Custodian’s conduct. Additionally, pursuant to Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Specifically, the Complainant’s request is invalid under OPRA because it fails to identify with reasonable clarity the recipients and/or senders of the e-mails sought. See Elcavage v. West Milford Twp., GRC Complaint Nos. 2009-07 and 2009-08 (March 2010). Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, supra, and Mason, supra.
Prepared By:  Frank F. Caruso
           Senior Case Manager

Approved By:  Catherine Starghill, Esq.
            Executive Director

    February 21, 2012