May 23, 2017 Government Records Council Meeting

Robert A. Verry
Complainant
v.
Franklin Township Fire District No. 1 (Somerset)
Custodian of Record

At the May 23, 2017 public meeting, the Government Records Council ("Council") considered the May 16, 2017 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that the Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that the Complainant has failed to establish in his request for reconsideration of the Council’s October 27, 2015 Final Decision that either: 1) the Council's decision is based upon a “palpably incorrect or irrational basis;” or 2) it is obvious that the Council did not consider the significance of probative, competent evidence. The Complainant failed to establish that the complaint should be reconsidered based on mistake and/or new evidence. The Complainant has also failed to show that the Council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Thus, the Complainant’s request for reconsideration should be denied. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996); D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990); In The Matter Of The Petition Of Comcast Cablevision Of S. Jersey, Inc. For A Renewal Certificate Of Approval To Continue To Construct, Operate And Maintain A Cable Tel. Sys. In The City Of Atl. City, Cnty. Of Atl., State Of N.J., 2003 N.J. PUC LEXIS 438, 5-6 (N.J. PUC 2003).

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.
Final Decision Rendered by the
Government Records Council
On The 23rd Day of May, 2017

Robin Berg Tabakin, Esq., Chair
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Steven Ritardi, Esq., Secretary
Government Records Council

Decision Distribution Date: May 30, 2017
STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL  

Reconsideration  
Supplemental Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director  
May 23, 2016 Council Meeting  

Robert A. Verry  
Complainant  

v.  
Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset)  
Custodial Agency  

Records Relevant to Complaint: Electronic copies of any and all e-mails and/or correspondence between the Franklin Fire District No. 1 (“FFD”) Commissioners, administrative aides, and Custodian’s Counsel related to the hiring of Counsel and/or his law firm from July 30, 2014, to noon on August 11, 2014.  

Custodian of Record: Tim Szymborski  
Request Received by Custodian: September 15, 2014  
Response Made by Custodian: September 24, 2014  
GRC Complaint Received: September 23, 2014  

Background  

October 27, 2015 Council Meeting:  

At its October 27, 2015 public meeting, the Council considered the October 20, 2015 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, found that:  

1. The Complainant’s cause of action was not ripe at the time of the filing of this Denial of Access Complaint: the Custodian had not denied access to any records responsive to the Complainant’s September 10, 2014 OPRA request, because the Custodian did not receive the Complainant’s request until September 15, 2014. Thus, the statutorily mandated seven (7) business day time frame for the Custodian to respond had not expired. The instant complaint is therefore materially defective and should be dismissed. See Sallie v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., GRC Complaint No. 2007-226 (April 2009); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i); Kohn v. Twp. of Livingston (Essex), GRC Complaint No. 2009-289 (May 2011).  

1 Represented by John A. Bermingham, Jr., Esq. (Mount Bethel, PA).  
2. The Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, a factual causal nexus does not exist between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008). Specifically, this complaint was not ripe for adjudication because the Complainant filed same prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated time frame and absent a response from the Custodian. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. 51.

Procedural History:

On October 29, 2015, the Council distributed its Final Decision to all parties. On November 12, 2015, the eighth (8th) business day following distribution of the Decision, the Complainant requested an extension of ten (10) business days to submit a request for reconsideration. On the same day, the Government Records Council (“GRC”) granted the Complainant’s request for an extension, and set the due date for December 1, 2015.

On December 1, 2015, the Complainant filed a request for reconsideration of the Council’s Final Decision based on a mistake and new evidence.

Analysis

Reconsideration

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.10, parties may file a request for a reconsideration of any decision rendered by the Council within ten (10) business days following receipt of a Council decision. Requests must be in writing, delivered to the Council and served on all parties. Parties must file any objection to the request for reconsideration within ten (10) business days following receipt of the request. The Council will provide all parties with written notification of its determination regarding the request for reconsideration. N.J.A.C. 5:105-2.10(a) – (e).

In the matter before the Council, the Complainant filed the request for reconsideration of the Council’s Final Order dated October 27, 2015 on December 1, 2015, which was the extended due date for submission of the request. Therefore, the request for reconsideration was filed in a timely manner.

Applicable case law holds that:

3 In the request for reconsideration, the Complainant states that the date of the Final Decision is October 30, 2015. The Complainant’s Counsel in his letter brief states that the date of the Final Decision is October 20, 2015. The Complainant and his Counsel are both incorrect. The date of the Final Decision for the instant complaint is October 27, 2015.
“A party should not seek reconsideration merely based upon dissatisfaction with a decision.” D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990). Rather, reconsideration is reserved for those cases where (1) the decision is based upon a “palpably incorrect or irrational basis;” or (2) it is obvious that the finder of fact did not consider, or failed to appreciate, the significance of probative, competent evidence. E.g., Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996). The moving party must show that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner. D’Atria, . . . 242 N.J. Super. at 401. “Although it is an overstatement to say that a decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable whenever a court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw or involuntary gasp, it is not much of an overstatement.” Ibid.


The Complainant seeks reconsideration of the October 27, 2015 Final Order determining that the complaint was not ripe at the time of filing. The Custodian received the Complainant’s OPRA request on September 15, 2014. The Denial of Access Complaint was filed with the GRC on September 23, 2014. The Custodian responded to the request on September 24, 2014.

The Complainant’s Counsel (“Counsel”) submitted a twelve (12) page letter brief (“brief”), exclusive of exhibits, as the Complainant’s principal argument for reconsideration. Counsel begins his brief by stating “it is not surprising nor unexpected that Frank Caruso . . . ingeniously manufactured an analysis absolving Franklin Fire District No. 1’s Custodian . . . of his lawful responsibilities [under OPRA].”

Counsel next moves on to Section I of the brief, wherein he states that the Custodian “attended the GRC’s September 30, 2014 Public Meeting—Open Session demanding Mr. Caruso and the GRC manage private citizen’s [sic] [Complainant] and another client of mine, Dr. Jeff Carter . . . at that meeting [the Custodian] strategically and purposefully handed Mr. Caruso and the GRC’s Board members a total of 53 pages of records.” Counsel states that the records contained, inter alia, the instant Denial of Access Complaint. Counsel states that the instant complaint was, therefore, the complaint that the Custodian “sought help from the Council in managing.” Counsel asserts that the Complainant, via other OPRA requests, including one for the documents the Custodian distributed during the Council’s September 30, 2014 meeting, determined that the Custodian withheld responsive records. Counsel states that the Complainant then filed another complaint captioned Verry v. Franklin Twp. Fire Dist. No. 1 (Somerset), GRC Complaint No. 2015-61.

Counsel argues that because Verry, GRC 2015-61, and the instant complaint are interrelated, it is “rationally impossible for the GRC to decide one without simultaneously deciding the other unless Mr. Caruso’s only goal was to absolve [the Custodian], like [the

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4 Quoting from the Council’s September 30, 2014 open session meeting minutes.

Robert A. Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset), 2014-325 – Supplemental Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director
Custodian] demanded Mr. Caruso and the GRC Board do.” Counsel contends that, therefore, the GRC “grossly erred” by: (1) not consolidating the two matters; (2) rendering a decision without even considering Verry, GRC 2015-61; and/or (3) not referring the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) for a fact-finding hearing. Counsel argues that Mr. Caruso’s attendance at the September 30, 2014 Council meeting, and the fact that he is the custodian for the GRC, makes him a fact witness in Verry, GRC 2015-61. As such, Counsel argues, “Mr. Caruso’s analysis manipulatively absolving [the Custodian] was intended to, at a minimum, distance Mr. Caruso from Verry, 2015-61, supra, because Verry, 2015-61, clearly pits one Custodian of Records (Mr. Szymborski) against another Custodian of Records (Mr. Caruso).

In Section II of the brief, Counsel states that Mr. Caruso is the custodian for the GRC and uses out-of-office messages. Counsel supplemented his brief with a hypothetical chart comparing the OPRA-mandated seven business day period from receipt of a request with a twelve business day period created by application of what Counsel terms Caruso’s Law. (Emphasis in original.) Counsel states that “[p]ursuant to the statute, the seventh (7) business day is December 9, 2014, but according to Caruso’s Law the seventh (7) business day would fall on December 14, 2014. Under Caruso’s Law the first business day would not begin until December 8, 2014 because Mr. Caruso (according to Caruso’s Law) did not read the requestor’s delivered November 27, 2014 OPRA request until he returned from being away on December 5, 2014.” Counsel contends that “nothing, under Caruso’s Law, stops a Custodian of Records to assert a read date days, weeks, and even months after receiving it . . . .”

In Section III of the brief, Counsel states that “Mr. Caruso supports his findings in the instant complaint by citing Kohn v. Twp. of Livingston (Essex), GRC Complaint No. 2009-289 (May 2011) by writing, ‘[t]he GRC’s case law consistently supports that the statutorily mandate response time frame begins the day after the custodian’s receipt of an OPRA request’ (emphasis added).” Counsel argues that in the instant complaint “Mr. Caruso held” that the evidence indicates the Custodian did not receive the request until September 15, 2014. Counsel asserts that the evidence disproves such findings. Counsel supports his conclusion by stating: (1) the Complainant received an out-of-office message from the Custodian on September 10, 2014, which confirms the request was received on September 10, 2014; (2) the Custodian’s Counsel confirmed in writing that the Complainant’s request was e-mailed to the Custodian on September 10, 2014, but not opened and read until September 15, 2014; (3) a printout obtained by the Complainant in 2015 revealed that the Custodian received the e-mail request on September 10, 2014.

Counsel subsequently argues in Section V of his brief that “Mr. Caruso was obligated to recuse himself from the instant matter, but he did not.” Counsel cites Newark v. Mendham, an unpublished Appellate Division decision, in support of his argument.

Counsel attached to his brief a screen shot of an e-mail revealing that Mr. Caruso does indeed use out-of-office messages. The screen shot is of an e-mail out-of-office automatic reply in which Mr. Caruso states that he will be out of the office beginning November 27, 2014, and returning on December 5, 2014. Mr. Caruso also provides a GRC telephone number, which the recipient can call for assistance. Counsel also attached this same e-mail to the brief as Exhibit A.

Caruso’s Law is a euphemism for a time period commencing after a custodian reads a request. It was made up by Counsel with no legitimate purpose, perhaps other than apparently to belittle the GRC’s case manager.

Counsel attached the printout to his brief as Exhibit C. The printout format lists e-mails as “Sent” and “Received.”
In Section IV of the brief, Counsel asserts that the words chosen by the Legislature in enacting OPRA are clear and unambiguous and must be interpreted according to their plain meaning. Counsel cites Muñoz v. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 145 N.J. 377 (1996) in support of his assertion. Counsel argues that the Legislature’s use of the word “receiving” is not the same as “Mr. Caruso’s ill placed interpretation of when the custodian read the OPRA request.” (Emphasis in original). Counsel contends that “case law (Kohn, supra) was clearly done for the purpose of satisfying Mr. Szymborski’s demand to Mr. Caruso to ‘manage’ Mr. Verry on this instant Complaint.” Counsel argues that it is “not the function of Mr. Caruso and/or the GRC to rewrite or impose their baseless interpretation from the plain language of the statute . . .” (Emphasis in original).

Counsel concludes in Section VI by asserting that “Mr. Caruso conveniently places all the burden on [the Complainant] and absolves [the Custodian] . . . because he also does not include any information in his Out-of-Office messages to requestor’s [sic] when the [sic] submit OPRA requests . . . thus, by absolving [the Custodian] he in-turn absolves his own insufficient Out-of-Office automatic reply.”

Counsel asks the Council to: (1) reconsider the findings based upon the evidence of record and the new evidence presented in the request for reconsideration; (2) remove Mr. Caruso from the instant complaint; (3) examine the instant complaint anew; (4) find that the Custodian knowingly and willfully violated OPRA by unreasonably denying access to the requested records; and (5) further relief as deemed proper.

Here, the Complainant seeks reconsideration based upon alleged mistake and new evidence. However, rather than presenting a cogent, well-reasoned legal argument justifying reconsideration, the Complainant’s Counsel launches into an ad hominem attack upon GRC Case Manager Frank Caruso. Counsel’s redundant, sarcasm-laced argument seems to suggest that the Council’s Final Decision in this matter was influenced by the Custodian’s comments at the September 30, 2014 Council meeting and Case Manager Caruso’s efforts somehow to expiate his alleged transgressions in using out-of-office auto replies to notify e-mail recipients of his availability.

With respect to mistake as grounds for reconsideration, Counsel states that the Council made a mistake by: (1) not consolidating the instant complaint with Verry, GRC 2015-61; (2) rendering a decision without even considering Verry, GRC 2015-61; and/or (3) not referring the matter to OAL for a fact-finding hearing (brief at 3). Points numbered 1 and 3 are procedural decisions, not errors. Regarding point number 2, Verry, GRC 2015-61 was filed almost one-half year after the instant complaint was filed and the issues in the two complaints are dissimilar. As such, it was not a mistake for the Council to not consider Verry, GRC 2015-61 when deciding the instant complaint.9

With respect to the Complainant’s assertion that new evidence was presented requiring reconsideration, the GRC finds that there was no new relevant evidence marshalled in Counsel’s

9 Although Counsel argues that Mr. Caruso “participat[ed]” in Verry, GRC 2015-61, Counsel is mistaken. In fact, Verry, GRC 2015-61, was assigned to former Case Manager Husna Kazmir, and she prepared the Findings and Recommendations for submission to the Council.
Counsel lists three items of evidence in the brief. First, he cites the September 10, 2014 auto reply e-mail from the Custodian to the Complainant (brief at 5). Second, he cites the communication from the Custodian’s Counsel that confirmed the Complainant’s request was e-mailed to the Custodian on September 10, 2014, but not opened and read until September 15, 2014. Neither of these items are new evidence, as both were mentioned in the Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director that were adopted by the Council in their October 27, 2015 Final Decision. Counsel’s third item of evidence is a printout obtained by the Complainant in 2015, which listed e-mails as “Sent” and “Received.” One of the e-mails received was the September 10, 2014 e-mail, which generated the out-of-office reply from the Custodian (brief at 6). This is not new evidence. The parties do not dispute that an out-of-office auto reply was sent to the Complainant on September 10, 2014.

Although Counsel does not numerically list other evidence, he vociferously argues that Case Manager Caruso manufactured an analysis absolving the Custodian of his statutorily-imposed duties. Counsel goes so far as to imply that Mr. Caruso fashioned his own mechanism for responding to OPRA requests, in derogation of the law, which Counsel sarcastically terms Caruso’s Law. From this, he proposed a hypothetical timeliness issue that he alleged justifies a deviation from the provisions of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) for Mr. Caruso as the GRC custodian, and also for the Custodian in the instant complaint, since Mr. Caruso prepared those Findings and Recommendations. This allegation is not supported by any of the evidence of record, and Mr. Caruso’s performance as the GRC’s custodian is not relevant to the instant complaint. Moreover, as an attorney who holds himself out as having represented different clients in actions before the Council (brief at 2), Counsel has demonstrated a misunderstanding with respect to the GRC’s regulations, because he should know that it is the Council that adjudicates complaints, not GRC staff members. See N.J.A.C. 5:104-1.4, N.J.A.C. 5:104-1.5, and N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7 generally.

Furthermore, Counsel’s implication that the Council members simply “rubber stamp” the recommendations of GRC staff members when adjudicating complaints is a denigrating characterization of their solemn duties. Moreover, Counsel’s unsubstantiated insinuation that the Council’s members might be in collusion with others to improperly excuse the Custodian from his obligation under the law (brief at 2, 3 and 9) is both disrespectful and shameful. Indeed, R.P.C. 3.2 requires an attorney to “treat with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.” See In re Breen, 113 N.J. 522 (1989), wherein the court adopted the report of the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board recommending that an attorney, inter alia, violated R.P.C. 3.2 because he “failed to make reasonable efforts to treat the court and other attorneys with reasonable courtesy and consideration.” Id. at 530.

As the moving party, the Complainant was required to establish either of the necessary criteria set forth above: either 1) the Council’s decision is based upon a "palpably incorrect or irrational basis;" or 2) it is obvious that the Council did not consider the significance of probative, competent evidence. See Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384. The Complainant failed to establish that the complaint should be reconsidered based on mistake and/or new evidence. The Complainant has also failed to show that the Council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or

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10 New evidence is evidence that could not have been provided prior to the Council’s Decision because the evidence did not exist at that time.
unreasonably. See D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401. Thus, the Complainant’s request for reconsideration should be denied. Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384; D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401; Comcast, 2003 N.J. PUC at 5-6.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that the Complainant has failed to establish in his request for reconsideration of the Council’s October 27, 2015 Final Decision that either: 1) the Council's decision is based upon a “palpably incorrect or irrational basis;” or 2) it is obvious that the Council did not consider the significance of probative, competent evidence. The Complainant failed to establish that the complaint should be reconsidered based on mistake and/or new evidence. The Complainant has also failed to show that the Council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Thus, the Complainant’s request for reconsideration should be denied. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374 (App. Div. 1996); D’Atria v. D’Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392 (Ch. Div. 1990); In The Matter Of The Petition Of Comcast Cablevision Of S. Jersey, Inc. For A Renewal Certificate Of Approval To Continue To Construct, Operate And Maintain A Cable Tel. Sys. In The City Of Atl. City, Cnty. Of Atl., State Of N.J., 2003 N.J. PUC LEXIS 438, 5-6 (N.J. PUC 2003).

Prepared By: John E. Stewart
May 16, 2016
At the October 27, 2015 public meeting, the Government Records Council (“Council”) considered the October 20, 2015 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that:

1. The Complainant’s cause of action was not ripe at the time of the filing of this Denial of Access Complaint: the Custodian had not denied access to any records responsive to the Complainant’s September 10, 2014, OPRA request, because the Custodian did not receive the Complainant’s request until September 15, 2014. Thus, the statutorily mandated seven (7) business day time frame for the Custodian to respond had not expired. The instant complaint is therefore materially defective and should be dismissed. See Sallie v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., GRC Complaint No. 2007-226 (April 2009); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i); Kohn v. Twp. of Livingston (Essex), GRC Complaint No. 2009-289 (May 2011).

2. The Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, a factual causal nexus does not exist between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008). Specifically, this complaint was not ripe for adjudication because the Complainant filed same prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated time frame and absent a response from the Custodian. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. 51.

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the
Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.

Final Decision Rendered by the
Government Records Council
On The 27th Day of October, 2015

Robin Berg Tabakin, Esq., Chair
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Steven Ritardi, Esq., Secretary
Government Records Council

Decision Distribution Date: October 29, 2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL
Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director
October 27, 2015 Council Meeting

Robert A. Verry\(^1\) Complainant

v.

Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset)\(^2\) Custodial Agency

Records Relevant to Complaint: Electronic copies of any and all e-mails and/or correspondence between the Franklin Fire District No. 1 (“FFD”) Commissioners, administrative aides, and Custodian’s Counsel related to the hiring of Counsel and/or his law firm from July 30, 2014, to noon on August 11, 2014.

Custodian of Record: Tim Szymborski
Request Received by Custodian: September 15, 2014
Response Made by Custodian: September 24, 2014
GRC Complaint Received: September 23, 2014

Background\(^3\)

Request and Response:

On September 10, 2014, the Complainant submitted an Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request to the Custodian seeking the above-mentioned records. On the same day, the Complainant received an automatic reply alerting him to the Custodian’s absence until after September 14, 2014.

Denial of Access Complaint:

On September 23, 2014, the Complainant filed a Denial of Access Complaint with the Government Records Council (“GRC”). The Complainant asserted that he never received a response to his OPRA request. The Complainant thus requested that the GRC: 1) determine that the Custodian violated OPRA by failing to provide all responsive records within seven (7) business days; 2) order immediate disclosure of all responsive records; 3) determine that the Custodian knowingly and willfully violated OPRA, thereby warranting an assessment of the civil

\(^1\) Represented by John A. Bermingham, Jr., Esq. (Mount Bethel, PA).
\(^3\) The parties may have submitted additional correspondence or made additional statements/assertions in the submissions identified herein. However, the Council includes in the Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director the submissions necessary and relevant for the adjudication of this complaint.
Supplemental Submissions:

On September 23, 2014, the Custodian’s Counsel e-mailed the Complainant, advising that he is aware that the Complainant filed this complaint. The Custodian’s Counsel stated that the subject request, dated September 10, 2014, was not received until September 15, 2014. The Custodian’s Counsel stated that the statutorily mandated time frame had not yet expired at the time of the filing of this complaint. The Custodian’s Counsel therefore demanded that the Complainant withdraw the complaint and further put the Complainant on notice that the FFD will seek reimbursement for fees associated with defending itself.

The Complainant’s Counsel responded, asserting that the Complainant submitted his OPRA request on September 10, 2014, and had until September 19, 2014, to respond. The Complainant’s Counsel stated that for this reason, the complaint would stand as submitted.

On September 24, 2014, the seventh (7th) business day after the Custodian’s alleged receipt of the OPRA request, the Custodian’s Counsel responded in writing on behalf of the Custodian by providing access to responsive records. Additionally, the Custodian’s Counsel addressed Complainant’s Counsel’s timeliness argument (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i); Alexander v. NJ Dep’t of Corrections, GRC Complaint No. 2014-70 (April 2014)(administratively disposing of the complaint as unripe for adjudication)). The Custodian’s Counsel also noted that the GRC’s training material provides that the time frame does not begin until a custodian receives the request. The Custodian’s Counsel stated that the Complainant received an out-of-office message and was well aware of the Custodian’s absence through September 14, 2014. Consequently, the Custodian’s Counsel again requested that the Complainant withdraw the complaint, contending that defending a clearly unripe case where the FFD had timely complied would be a waste of taxpayer money.

Statement of Information:

On October 3, 2014, the Custodian filed a Statement of Information (“SOI”). The Custodian certified that he received the Complainant’s OPRA request on September 15, 2014, upon his return from a convention in Wildwood. The Custodian certified that he utilized the FFD’s information technology (“IT”) vendor to retrieve responsive e-mails, contacted the individuals identified in the request, and searched the FFD’s office records. The Custodian certified that Custodian’s Counsel responded in writing on his behalf on September 23, 2014, and again on September 24, 2014, providing access to the responsive records.

The Custodian argued that the complaint was unripe for adjudication at the time of filing, contending that the statutorily mandated time frame had not yet expired and that no denial of access had occurred. The Complainant certified that he submitted his OPRA request via e-mail to only the Custodian and received the automatic reply, advising that he would be away until after September 14, 2014. The Custodian certified that he received the OPRA request on September 15, 2014, and believed the last day to respond was September 24, 2014. At that time, the
Custodian endeavored to coordinate a search for responsive records. The Custodian argued that notwithstanding the foregoing, the Complainant filed the instant complaint. The Custodian noted that the FFD provided the Complainant two (2) opportunities to withdraw the complaint, claiming that the complaint is both unripe and frivolous. However, the Complainant refused. The Custodian argued that he believes the FFD acted properly under OPRA and requested that the GRC award the FFD attorney’s fees.4

The Custodian’s Counsel submitted a legal certification to corroborate the Custodian’s statements about the calculation of the statutory time frame. Additionally, the Custodian’s Counsel certified that the Custodian contacted him upon receipt of the OPRA request to discuss same. Additionally, the Custodian’s Counsel certified that the Custodian forwarded him the instant complaint soon after receipt for advice and a response. The Custodian’s Counsel noted that both OPRA and the GRC’s training materials support that the time frame does not start until the custodian receives the OPRA request.

Additional Submissions:

By letter dated October 18, 2014, the Complainant’s Counsel argued that the issues presented here are straightforward: the Custodian was away and did not make provisions to have the FFD’s officially designated sub-custodian handle requests in his absence. The Complainant’s Counsel also contended that the Custodian’s SOI certifications prove that the “deemed” denial was deliberate and intentional.

Regarding the Custodian’s failure to assign a sub-custodian in his absence, the Complainant’s Counsel asserted that the GRC has held that custodians are obligated to designate someone to handle OPRA requests when they are out of the office or otherwise unable to respond to same. See Colasante v. Cnty. of Bergen, GRC Complaint No. 2010-18 (July 2012). The Complainant’s Counsel also noted that the GRC previously determined that an OPRA request was “deemed” denied, notwithstanding the custodian’s absence due to a vacation. Halper v. Twp. of Piscataway, GRC Complaint No. 2004-130 (December 2004).

The Complainant’s Counsel argued that the Custodian unreasonably hampered access by way of his automatic reply and by his failure to provide instructions on contacting the sub-custodian. The Complainant’s Counsel contended that the FFD relied on GRC training material to argue that the time begins upon a custodian’s receipt of an OPRA request. However, Complainant’s Counsel asserted that the FFD ignored the fact that the material also notes that another employee should be designated to receive and respond to OPRA requests in a custodian’s absence. The Complainant’s Counsel contended that the delivery and receipt of the OPRA request occurred at the moment the Complainant received the automatic reply and that all material and case law supports that the Custodian violated OPRA by failing to respond by close of business on September 19, 2014.

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4 The GRC notes that the prevailing party provision in OPRA only applies to a complainant represented by an attorney. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6; Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 71 (2008). For that reason, the GRC has no authority to award fees to public agencies. However, the public agency might have recourse in the Superior Court.
The Complainant’s Counsel argued that the Custodian’s actions and SOI arguments are problematic, given that he knew he would be away and never designated another employee to handle OPRA requests. The Complainant’s Counsel then argued that the FFD designated (by resolution) Commissioner James Wickman as its sub-custodian on March 4, 2014.\(^5\) The Complainant’s Counsel noted that the automatic reply, however, did not include instructions on how to submit the request to a sub-custodian. See Rader v. Twp. of Willingboro (Burlington), GRC Complaint No. 2007-239 (July 2008)(holding that the custodian’s failure to indicate the specific lawful basis for not disclosing records was insufficient).

Further, the Complainant’s Counsel argued that the Custodian was attending a fire district convention in Wildwood, which establishes that the Custodian was on official business. The Complainant’s Counsel argued that the GRC could easily determine whether the Custodian received and or responded to any e-mails by requiring him to submit for in camera review any e-mails from September 10, 2014, to September 15, 2014. The Complainant’s Counsel contended that the Custodian’s official phone records prove he used his FFD issued smartphone on numerous occasions during that time frame.

Regarding the Custodian’s “deliberate” denial here, the Complainant’s Counsel argued that the GRC has continuously found violations of OPRA in previous complaints against the FFD. The Complainant’s Counsel thus argued that the Custodian could not claim ignorance of his legal obligations under OPRA. The Complainant’s Counsel contended that the Custodian’s violation here should be viewed in light of past cases. See Blanchard v. Rahway Bd. of Educ., GRC Complaint No. 2003-75 (October 2003).\(^6\)

The Complainant’s Counsel next asserted that the Custodian failed to address whether he conducted a search for any correspondence (i.e., text messages, letters, faxes, etc.). The Complainant’s Counsel contended that, given his past “well-documented” denials of access to records, the Custodian deliberately failed to inquire with the identified individuals about other types of correspondence. The Complainant’s Counsel further argued that the Custodian provided no evidence supporting when and how he contacted the individuals, nor did he provide supporting evidence as to the individuals’ responses.\(^7\)

The Complainant’s Counsel thus requested that the GRC: 1) determine as a matter of policy that a custodian’s out-of-office message is an insufficient response to an OPRA request; 2) require a custodian to include in an out-of-office reply the identity of a sub or interim custodian; 3) order the Custodian to certify to the actual search he conducted to locate and obtain

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\(^5\) As part of arguments submitted in an earlier matter, the Complainant’s Counsel also acknowledged the Complainant’s awareness that the FFD had previously designated Don Bell as “Deputy Custodian.” See Verry v. Franklin Fire Dist. No. 1 (Somerset), GRC Complaint No. 2013-287 (Interim Order dated July 20, 2014), at 6.

\(^6\) The Council previously addressed this issue in Verry v. Borough of South Bound Brook (Somerset), GRC Complaint No. 2011-158 et seq. There, the complainant’s counsel sought reconsideration, arguing that the Council should have taken into account the custodian’s past actions when determining whether he knowingly and willfully violated OPRA. Although the GRC initially employed a tool to track such actions (the “Matrix”), the Council discontinued its use at its November 10, 2005, meeting. Thus, the GRC will not address the issue.

\(^7\) The Complainant’s Counsel also argued that the Custodian failed to provide “immediate access” records immediately. However, the Complainant’s OPRA request did not seek “immediate access” records, as identified in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(e); therefore, the GRC will not address the issue.

Robert A. Verry v. Franklin Fire District No. 1 (Somerset), 2014-325 – Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director
records from the individuals identified in the OPRA request; 4) order an *in camera* review of any e-mails sent and received from the Custodian’s e-mail account during his absence from the FFD and up until September 15, 2014; 5) refer this complaint to the Office of Administrative Law for a knowing and willful hearing; and 6) order any further relief it deems to be reasonable.

On September 8, 2015, the GRC sought additional information from the Custodian. Specifically, the GRC advised that it was unclear from the evidence of record whether the Custodian attended convention in Wildwood on a personal basis or on official business as a representative of the FFD. Thus, the GRC requested that the Custodian submit a legal certification answering the following:

1. Did the Custodian attend the convention in Wildwood on official FFD business?

The GRC required the Custodian to submit his legal certification and any supporting documentation by close of business on September 11, 2015.

On September 10, 2015, the Custodian certified that his attendance at the convention was considered official business. The Custodian certified that, as one (1) of the five (5) FFD Commissioners empowered with a vote to make decisions on behalf of same, the annual convention allows him to network with various equipment vendors and inform the other Commissioners of his findings. Additionally, the Custodian certified that attendance expenses for the convention were budgeted and approved by the FFD through its annual budget process.

On October 19, 2015, the GRC sought additional information from the Custodian based on his September 10, 2015, legal certification. Specifically, the GRC advised that it was unclear from the evidence of record whether the Custodian linked his e-mail account to his smartphone and, if so, whether he actively checked his e-mail while at the convention. Thus, the GRC requested that the Custodian submit a legal certification answering the following:

1. Is the Custodian’s FFD e-mail account linked to his smartphone?
2. Is so, did the Custodian view the Complainant’s OPRA request on his smartphone while attending the convention in Wildwood, NJ?

The GRC required the Custodian to submit his legal certification and any supporting documentation by close of business on October 22, 2015. On October 19, 2015, the Custodian responded to the GRC’s request for additional information by certifying that his FFD e-mail account is not linked to his smartphone; therefore, the Custodian had no way of viewing the Complainant’s OPRA request from the convention.

**Analysis**

**Unripe Cause of Action**

OPRA provides that “a custodian of a government record shall grant access to a government record or deny access to a government record as soon as possible, but not later than seven business days after receiving the request . . .” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i) (emphasis added). OPRA further states that “[a] person who is denied access to a government record by the
custodian of the record . . . may institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian’s decision by filing . . . a complaint with the Government Records Council . . .” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

In Sallie v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., GRC Complaint No. 2007-226 (April 2009), the complainant forwarded a complaint to the GRC asserting that he had not received a response from the custodian, and seven (7) business days would have passed by the time the GRC received the Denial of Access Complaint. The custodian argued in the SOI that the complainant filed the complaint prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated seven (7) business day time frame set forth in N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i). The Council held that:

[B]ecause the Complainant’s cause of action was not ripe at the time he verified his Denial of Access Complaint; to wit, the Custodian had not at that time denied the Complainant access to a government record, the complaint is materially defective and therefore should be dismissed.

Id.; see also Herron v. Borough of Red Bank (Monmouth), GRC Complaint No. 2012-113 (April 2012).

Prior to making a determination as to whether the Custodian unlawfully denied access to any records, the GRC must review and determine whether this complaint is ripe for adjudication. Specifically, there is a question of whether the Complainant filed this complaint prior to the expiration of the statutorily-mandated response time without the Custodian responding to the subject OPRA request.

In the instant matter, the Complainant argued that the Custodian violated OPRA by failing to respond within seven (7) business days from the date he submitted same via e-mail. Thereafter, in an October 18, 2014, letter brief, the Complainant’s Counsel asserted that the Council previously determined that custodians were obligated to designate sub-custodians in their absence (citing Halper, GRC 2004-130, and Colasante, GRC 2010-18). Counsel also argued that the Custodian’s away message unreasonably delayed access because it failed to direct the Complainant to the designated sub-custodian. The Complainant’s Counsel thus requested that the GRC determine that replies from out-of-office messages are insufficient. Yet, Custodian’s Counsel also asks the GRC to require out-of-office messages to include instructions on contacting the sub-custodian. The Complainant’s Counsel also noted that the Custodian utilized his smartphone during the convention many times. Counsel asserted that the Council could easily determine whether he actually read the Complainant’s OPRA request for the first time on September 15, 2014, by reviewing in camera all e-mails the Custodian sent and/or received from the moment he set up his out-of-office message until he claimed to have received the subject OPRA request.

Conversely, the Custodian certified in the SOI that he was away at a convention and did not receive the Complainant’s OPRA request until he returned on September 15, 2014. The Custodian asserted that this complaint was not ripe for adjudication because the last day to respond was September 24, 2014. However, the Custodian subsequently certified that he attended the convention on official FFD business.
The GRC’s case law consistently supports that the statutorily mandated response time frame begins the day after the custodian’s receipt of an OPRA request. See Kohn v. Twp. of Livingston (Essex), GRC Complaint No. 2009-289 (May 2011). The GRC has memorialized this calculation in its training material, which is available on the GRC’s website. See “A Citizen’s Guide to [OPRA]” (2nd Edition – July 2011); “Handbook for Records Custodians” (5th Edition – January 2011).

Based on the evidence presented here, the threshold issue is whether the Custodian, while at the convention on official FFD business, viewed the subject OPRA request on his smartphone prior to returning to the FFD on September 15, 2014. The evidence of record supports that the Custodian used his smartphone to make and receive telephone calls while he was in Wildwood on FFD business. However, the Custodian also certified that his FFD account is not linked to his smartphone. Based on the foregoing, the evidence supports that the Custodian did not actually receive the Complainant’s OPRA request until September 15, 2014.

Accordingly, the Complainant’s cause of action was not ripe at the time of the filing of this Denial of Access Complaint: the Custodian had not denied access to any records responsive to the Complainant’s September 10, 2014, OPRA request, because the Custodian did not receive the Complainant’s request until September 15, 2014. Thus, the statutorily mandated seven (7) business day time frame for the Custodian to respond had not expired. Based on the foregoing, the instant complaint is materially defective and should therefore be dismissed. See Sallie, GRC 2007-226; N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i); Kohn, GRC 2009-289.

Finally, the GRC will briefly address the remaining issues raised by the Complainant’s Counsel.

Designation of a Sub-Custodian

The Council previously reviewed this issue in Paff v. NJ Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, NJ State Police, GRC Complaint No. 2010-126 (September 2011). There, the Council noted that the facts highlighted a public agency’s obligation to continue responding to OPRA requests in the absence of the custodian. The Council noted that OPRA does not address situations where custodians are unavailable; “[t]hus, best practices dictates that if a custodian is to be unavailable for an extended amount of time, another employee should be designated to accept and respond to OPRA requests in his/her stead for the duration of his/her absence.” Id. at 9. However, the Council declined to determine that the custodian violated OPRA.

Here, the Complainant’s Counsel cited to Halper, GRC 2004-130, and Colasante, GRC 2010-18, in arguing that the Custodian violated OPRA in this regard. However, the custodian in Halper, 2004-130, received the complainant’s OPRA request, which included an item for “immediate access” records, prior to departing for vacation. Further, in Colasante, GRC 2010-18, the Council determined that the custodian failed to comply with an interim order because he did not respond in a timely manner. Nearly two (2) months later, custodian’s counsel advised the GRC that both the custodian and he were unavailable upon receipt of the Council’s order. However, at no point did the GRC determine that the custodian had an obligation to designate a sub-custodian in his/her absence.
Additionally, even had the Council considered the custodian’s failure to designate a sub-custodian to act in his absence, the evidence of record indicates that the Complainant and Complainant’s Counsel both had at least some knowledge that the FFD designated Mr. Wickman as sub-custodian in March 2014, months prior to the subject OPRA request. Although the GRC agrees that best practices would dictate that the Custodian should have included some direction in his out-of-office message, the Complainant’s Counsel was somewhat disingenuous in arguing that the Custodian “never designated another employee to receive/fulfill incoming OPRA requests . . .” See Complainant Counsel’s letter brief, dated October 18, 2014, at 4.

Out-of-Office Messages

Regarding the out-of-office message, because same was nothing more than a general notification to any persons e-mailing the Custodian, it is clear on its face that such an e-mail would not be a sufficient response under OPRA. However, as noted above, best practices would dictate that a custodian include some additional information on submitting OPRA requests in his/her absence. Based on the facts of the instant complaint, the GRC declines to address whether the Custodian’s out-of-office message resulted in an insufficient response.

In Camera Reviews

Regarding the Complainant’s Counsel’s request that the GRC perform an in camera review of e-mails not otherwise responsive to the request at issue here, Paff v. NJ Dep’t of Labor, Bd. of Review, 379 N.J. Super. 346 (App. Div. 2005) controls. Specifically, the Appellate Division required the GRC to conduct an in camera review of records that a custodian “asserts are protected when such review is necessary to a determination of the validity of a claimed exemption.” Id. at 355. Further, “the GRC has and should exercise its discretion to conduct in camera review when necessary to resolution of the appeal.” Id.

The Custodian’s e-mails, from the moment he set up his out-of-office message until he claimed to have received the subject OPRA request on September 15, 2014, are not at issue here. Further, the Custodian could not have asserted that any of the e-mails were exempt because they were not sought as part of the subject OPRA request. Moreover, said e-mails are not necessary for the Council to make a determination in the instant complaint. The Custodian’s response to the Interim Order will more than suffice in determining whether this complaint was ripe upon filing. Thus, the GRC declines to order an in camera review of those e-mails because they are not the subject of this complaint, the Custodian has not cited to any exemptions, and the e-mails are not necessary to the resolution of this appeal.

Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees

OPRA provides that:

A person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may: institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in Superior Court . . . ; or in lieu of filing
an action in Superior Court, file a complaint with the Government Records Council . . A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee.

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

In Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Court held that a complainant is a “prevailing party” if he achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Id. at 432. Additionally, the Court held that attorney’s fees may be awarded when the requestor is successful (or partially successful) via a judicial decree, a quasi-judicial determination, or a settlement of the parties that indicates access was improperly denied and the requested records are disclosed. Id.

Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of “prevailing party” attorney’s fees. In Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008), the Supreme Court discussed the catalyst theory, “which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” Mason, 196 N.J. at 71, (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 131 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001)). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court stated that the phrase “prevailing party” is a legal term of art that refers to a “party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party attorney fees, in part because “[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, Id. at 605, 121 S. Ct. at 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 863, but also over concern that the catalyst theory would spawn extra litigation over attorney's fees. Id. at 609, 121 S. Ct. at 1843, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 866.”

However, the Court noted in Mason that Buckhannon is binding only when counsel fee provisions under federal statutes are at issue. 196 N.J. at 72, citing Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 429; see, e.g., Baer v. Klagholz, 346 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). “But in interpreting New Jersey law, we look to state law precedent and the specific state statute before us. When appropriate, we depart from the reasoning of federal cases that interpret comparable federal statutes.” 196 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).

The Mason Court accepted the application of the catalyst theory within the context of OPRA, stating that:

OPRA itself contains broader language on attorney’s fees than the former RTKL did. OPRA provides that “[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Under the prior RTKL, “[a] plaintiff in whose favor such an order [requiring access to public records] issues . . . may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed $500.00.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-4 (repealed 2002). The Legislature's revisions therefore: (1) mandate, rather than permit, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party; and
(2) eliminate the $500 cap on fees and permit a reasonable, and quite likely higher, fee award. Those changes expand counsel fee awards under OPRA.

Mason at 73-76 (2008).

The Court in Mason further held that:

[R]equestors are entitled to attorney’s fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate (1) ‘a factual causal nexus between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately achieved’; and (2) ‘that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.’ Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert denied (1984).

Id. at 76.

The Complainant filed this Denial of Access Complaint, arguing that the Custodian failed to respond. However, the Custodian certified in the SOI that he did not receive the Complainant’s OPRA request until September 15, 2014 (or the sixth business day after receipt of the request); thus, the statutorily mandated time frame had not expired at the time of the filing. The GRC subsequently determined that this complaint is not ripe for adjudication; thus, the Complainant has not achieved the relief sought.

Therefore, the Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. 432. Additionally, a factual causal nexus does not exist between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason, 196 N.J. 51. Specifically, this complaint was not ripe for adjudication because the Complainant filed same prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated time frame and absent a response from the Custodian. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. 51.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that:

1. The Complainant’s cause of action was not ripe at the time of the filing of this Denial of Access Complaint: the Custodian had not denied access to any records responsive to the Complainant’s September 10, 2014, OPRA request, because the Custodian did not receive the Complainant’s request until September 15, 2014. Thus, the statutorily mandated seven (7) business day time frame for the Custodian to respond had not expired. The instant complaint is therefore materially defective and should be dismissed. See Sallie v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., GRC Complaint No. 2007-226 (April 2009); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(i); Kohn v. Twp. of Livingston (Essex), GRC Complaint No. 2009-289 (May 2011).
2. The Complainant has not achieved “the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct.” Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, a factual causal nexus does not exist between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (2008). Specifically, this complaint was not ripe for adjudication because the Complainant filed same prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated time frame and absent a response from the Custodian. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. 51.

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