



State of New Jersey

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Lieutenant Governor

KIMBERLY K. HOLMES
Acting Commissioner

FINAL DECISION

August 29, 2023 Government Records Council Meeting

Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (o/b/o African American
Data & Research Institute)
Complainant

Complaint No. 2021-286

v.

Green Brook Police Department (Somerset)
Custodian of Record

At the August 29, 2023 public meeting, the Government Records Council (“Council”) considered the August 22, 2023 Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director and all related documentation submitted by the parties. The Council voted unanimously to adopt the entirety of said findings and recommendations. The Council, therefore, finds that:

1. The Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant’s October 14, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Township of Green Brook provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010).
2. The Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 76 (2008). Specifically, the Custodian certified that she provided the Complainant with all responsive records in the Township of Green Brook’s possession. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 76.

This is the final administrative determination in this matter. Any further review should be pursued in the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey within forty-five (45) days. Information about the appeals process can be obtained from the Appellate Division Clerk’s Office, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market St., PO Box 006, Trenton, NJ 08625-0006. Proper service of submissions pursuant to any appeal is to be made to the Council in care of the Executive Director at the State of New Jersey Government Records Council, 101 South Broad Street, PO Box 819, Trenton, NJ 08625-0819.



Final Decision Rendered by the
Government Records Council
On The 29th Day of August 2023

Robin Berg Tabakin, Esq., Chair
Government Records Council

I attest the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the Government Records Council.

Steven Ritardi, Esq., Secretary
Government Records Council

Decision Distribution Date: September 5, 2023

**STATE OF NEW JERSEY
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL**

**Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director
August 29, 2023 Council Meeting**

**Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (on behalf of African American
Data & Research Institute)¹
Complainant**

GRC Complaint No. 2021-286

v.

**Green Brook Police Department (Somerset)²
Custodial Agency**

Records Relevant to Complaint: Electronic copies via e-mail of: Names, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary, payroll record, amount and type of pension of individuals who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise separated from 2014 to present. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

- a. This request includes any agreement entered with each one of the separated police officer(s).
- b. When stating the reason for separation, please note that some police officers separate due to plea deal, criminal convictions, criminal charges, sentences, and or other court agreement or court proceedings that require officers to be separated from your police department and or law enforcement jobs.
- c. Some police officers separate due to internal affairs investigations within the police departments.

Custodian of Record: Kelly Cupit

Request Received by Custodian: October 14, 2021

Response Made by Custodian: October 25, 2021

GRC Complaint Received: November 10, 2021

Background³

Request and Response:

On October 14, 2021, the Complainant submitted an Open Public Records Act (“OPRA”) request to the Custodian seeking the above-mentioned records. On October 25, 2021, Anthony Buontempo responded in writing on behalf of the Custodian providing a spreadsheet containing the requested information, as well as a settlement agreement for one of the officers.

¹ The Complainant represents the African American Data & Research Institute.

² Represented by William J. Willard, Esq. of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Leher & Flaum, P.C.

³ The parties may have submitted additional correspondence or made additional statements/assertions in the submissions identified herein. However, the Council includes in the Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director the submissions necessary and relevant for the adjudication of this complaint.

Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (on behalf of African American Data & Research Institute) v. Green Brook Police Department (Somerset), 2021-286 – Findings and Recommendations of the Executive Director

Denial of Access Complaint:

On November 10, 2021, the Complainant filed a Denial of Access Complaint with the Government Records Council (“GRC”). The Complainant asserted that the records did not provide the reasons for separation. The Complainant contended that simply stating “terminated”, “resigned”, or “retired,” was insufficient under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

The Complainant requested that the GRC compel the Custodian to comply fully with the OPRA request and award counsel fees.

Statement of Information:

On December 16, 2021, the Custodian filed a Statement of Information (“SOI”). The Custodian certified that she received the Complainant’s OPRA request on October 14, 2021. The Custodian certified that the search included reviewing the Township of Green Brook (“Township”) Police Department’s personnel and internal affairs records, as well the Township’s Human Resources records. The Custodian certified Mr. Buontempo responded in writing on October 25, 2021, providing a spreadsheet containing the requested information along with the settlement agreement.

The Custodian maintained that the Complainant’s OPRA request was not denied. The Custodian asserted that the Township’s personnel and Human Resources files were reviewed, and the available information was provided. The Custodian also asserted that one agreement was located pertaining to an officer who filed suit against the Township, and said agreement was also provided. The Custodian asserted that those officers listed as “retired” were those who put in their years of service and elected to retire. Those listed as “resigned” left for other employment opportunities, apart from the officer who filed suit. The Custodian further asserted that one other officer was terminated by the Township. The Custodian contended that none of the officers were separated from the Township for the reasons described by the Complainant in his OPRA request.

Additional Submissions:

On January 12, 2022, the Complainant submitted a brief in response to the Custodian’s SOI. The Complainant asserted that the Custodian failed to provide the “real reasons” for separation in response to his OPRA request.

The Complainant initially argued that the terms “terminated”, “retired”, or “resigned,” did not sufficiently provide the “reason for separation” because they were merely types of employment separations and did not adequately describe the underlying basis thereof. The Complainant argued that the “reason” for separation was likely located within a separate document constituting a government record, and the Custodian was obligated to retrieve that record, rather than create a spreadsheet or list containing the words “terminated”, “retired”, or “resigned.”

The Complainant next asserted that in many instances where a police officer is charged for crimes, they may enter a plea agreement which may require them to leave the police department or be removed from employment because of a conviction. The Complainant argued that it was

insufficient for the Custodian to merely state the terms “retired”, “resigned”, or “terminated” as the reason for separation if the “real reason” was that the officer was compelled to separate as part of a plea agreement or sentence. The Complainant thus argued that the Custodian violated OPRA by not providing the “real reasons” for any of the separations listed.

The Complainant asserted that a guilty plea agreement between an officer and prosecutor is akin to a settlement agreement normally entered into in civil proceedings. Libertarians for Transparent Gov’t v. Cumberland Cnty., 465 N.J. Super. 11 (App. Div. 2020). The Complainant argued that civil settlement agreements are subject to OPRA, and therefore guilty plea agreements should also be subject to OPRA in accordance with Libertarians.

The Complainant contended the Township did not want to provide the “real reasons” for separation due to the pervasive culture and predisposition to protect officers convicted of misconduct. The Complainant argued that providing single word descriptions was only partially truthful and did not promote OPRA’s goal of transparency.

The Complainant asserted that as an example of police departments’ culture, he noted that in response to a similar OPRA request, Millville Police Department stated that two (2) officers “resigned” from the department. The Complainant asserted that in fact the officers pleaded guilty to criminal charges and as part of the agreement and sentencing they were required to be separated from the department.

The Complainant requested that the GRC compel the Custodian to comply fully and truthfully with the OPRA request. The Complainant also requested the GRC declare the Complainant a prevailing party and award counsel fees.⁴

On January 26, 2022, Custodian’s Counsel e-mailed the GRC. Counsel first asserted that the Complainant’s position was directly contrary to that in Libertarians. The Custodian asserted the court rejected the Complainant’s argument, in that N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10 requires a custodian to disclose personnel and/or pension records which provide the reasons for separation of a law enforcement officer. The Custodian noted that the court found that disciplinary agreements and agreements resolving internal disciplinary charges remain exempt from disclosure as personnel records even if they contain information subject to disclosure under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

Counsel contended that the Complainant’s remaining arguments were no applicable to the instant matter as the Custodian provided the reasons for separation in the response as well as the SOI. Counsel noted that none of the reasons were similar to those described in the Complainant’s OPRA request.

⁴ The Complainant further noted that access to the records should have been granted under the “common law ‘right to access public records’.” However, the GRC does not have the authority to address a requestor’s common law right to access records. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7(b); Rowan, Jr. v. Warren Hills Reg’l Sch. Dist. (Warren), GRC Complaint No. 2011-347 (January 2013); Kelly v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., GRC Complaint No. 2010-215 (November 2011). Thus, the GRC cannot address any common law right of access to the requested records.

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Analysis

Unlawful Denial of Access

OPRA provides that government records made, maintained, kept on file, or received by a public agency in the course of its official business are subject to public access unless otherwise exempt. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. A custodian must release all records responsive to an OPRA request “with certain exceptions.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. Additionally, OPRA places the burden on a custodian to prove that a denial of access to records is lawful pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

In Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010), the Council found that the custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the requested records based on the custodian’s certification that all such records were provided to the complainant. The Council held that the custodian’s certification, in addition to the lack of refuting evidence from the complainant, was sufficient to meet the custodian’s burden of proof. See also Burns v. Borough of Collingswood, GRC Complaint No. 2005-68 (September 2005); Holland v. Rowan Univ., GRC Complaint No. 2014-63, *et seq.* (March 2015).

Here, the Complainant’s OPRA request sought the “[n]ames, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary, payroll record, amount and type of pension of individuals who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise separated from 2014 to present.” The Complainant also requested any “agreement” between the Township and any separated officer that would provide the “reason for separation,” and included examples of such agreements within subparts (b) and (c) of the request.

Mr. Buontempo responded on the Custodian’s behalf on October 25, 2021, providing the Complainant with a spreadsheet containing the requested information for all separated officers, which included the “reason for separation.” Mr. Buontempo also provided a settlement agreement between the Township and one of the separated officers. In the SOI, the Custodian certified that she timely provided the Complainant with the requested information, inclusive of any agreements between the Township and the separated officers. Although the Complainant identified instances where other municipalities possessed records elaborating on the “reason for separation,” he failed to present any evidence that the Township possessed same at the time of the request.

Accordingly, the Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant’s October 14, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Township provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis, GRC 2009-156, *et seq.*

Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees

OPRA provides that:

A person who is denied access to a government record by the custodian of the record, at the option of the requestor, may: institute a proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in Superior Court . . .; or in lieu of filing an

action in Superior Court, file a complaint with the Government Records Council . . .
. A requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.]

In Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the Appellate Division held that a complainant is a “prevailing party” if he achieves the desired result because the complaint brought about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Id. at 432. Additionally, the court held that attorney’s fees may be awarded when the requestor is successful (or partially successful) via a judicial decree, a quasi-judicial determination, or a settlement of the parties that indicates access was improperly denied and the requested records are disclosed. Id.

Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of “prevailing party” attorney’s fees. In Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 71 (2008), the Court discussed the catalyst theory, “which posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct” (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 131 S. Ct. 1835, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001)). In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “prevailing party” is a legal term of art that refers to a “party in whose favor a judgment is rendered.” Id. at 603 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed. 1999)). The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for prevailing party attorney fees, in part because “[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties . . .” Id. at 605, 121 S. Ct. at 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 863. Further, the Supreme Court expressed concern that the catalyst theory would spawn extra litigation over attorney's fees. Id. at 609, 121 S. Ct. at 1843, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 866.

However, the Court noted in Mason that Buckhannon is binding only when counsel fee provisions under federal statutes are at issue. 196 N.J. at 72, citing Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 429; see, e.g., Baer v. Klagholz, 346 N.J. Super. 79 (App. Div. 2001) (applying Buckhannon to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002). “But in interpreting New Jersey law, we look to state law precedent and the specific state statute before us. When appropriate, we depart from the reasoning of federal cases that interpret comparable federal statutes.” 196 N.J. at 73 (citations omitted).

The Mason Court accepted the application of the catalyst theory within the context of OPRA, stating that:

OPRA itself contains broader language on attorney's fees than the former RTKL did. OPRA provides that “[a] requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Under the prior RTKL, “[a] plaintiff in whose favor such an order [requiring access to public records] issues . . . may be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee not to exceed \$500.00.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-4 (repealed 2002). The Legislature's revisions therefore: (1) mandate, rather than permit, an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party; and (2) eliminate the \$500 cap on fees and permit a reasonable, and quite likely higher,

fee award. Those changes expand counsel fee awards under OPRA.

[196 N.J. at 73-76.]

The Court in Mason, further held that:

[R]equestors are entitled to attorney’s fees under OPRA, absent a judgment or an enforceable consent decree, when they can demonstrate (1) “a factual causal nexus between plaintiff’s litigation and the relief ultimately achieved”; and (2) “that the relief ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.” Singer v. State, 95 N.J. 487, 495, cert. denied, New Jersey v. Singer, 469 U.S. 832 (1984).

[Id. at 76.]

Here, the Complainant sought [n]ames, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation, salary, payroll record, amount and type of pension of individuals who either resigned or retired or terminated or otherwise separated from 2014 to present,” as well as any “agreement” providing the “reason for separation.” Mr. Buontempo provided a list containing the requested personnel information, along with one settlement agreement. The Complainant then filed the instant complaint on November 10, 2021, asserting the Custodian failed to provide the “real reason” for the officers’ separations. However, the Custodian responded and certified in the SOI that the Township provided all available records in its possession. Thus, the Complainant has not achieved the desired result and is not a prevailing party in this complaint.

Therefore, the Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432. Additionally, no factual causal nexus exists between the Complainant’s filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason, 196 N.J. at 76. Specifically, the Custodian certified that she provided the Complainant with all responsive records in the Township’s possession. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 76.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Executive Director respectfully recommends the Council find that:

1. The Custodian did not unlawfully deny access to the Complainant’s October 14, 2021 OPRA request. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. Specifically, the Custodian certified, and the record reflects, that the Township of Green Brook provided all responsive records containing the requested information. See Danis v. Garfield Bd. of Educ. (Bergen), GRC Complaint No. 2009-156, *et seq.* (Interim Order dated April 28, 2010).
2. The Complainant has not achieved the desired result because the complaint did not bring about a change (voluntary or otherwise) in the custodian’s conduct. Teeters v. DYFS, 387 N.J. Super. 423, 432 (App. Div. 2006). Additionally, no factual causal

nexus exists between the Complainant's filing of a Denial of Access Complaint and the relief ultimately achieved. Mason v. City of Hoboken and City Clerk of the City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 76 (2008). Specifically, the Custodian certified that she provided the Complainant with all responsive records in the Township of Green Brook's possession. Therefore, the Complainant is not a prevailing party entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6, Teeters, 387 N.J. Super. at 432, and Mason, 196 N.J. at 76.

Prepared By: Samuel A. Rosado
Staff Attorney

August 22, 2023