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    VOTING MEDIA EXAMINATION COMMITTEE
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    JOHN FLEMING, Member
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                            LICENSE NO. XIO1854
    Voting Machine Hearing $\quad$ P E X $\quad$ PAGE
(The time is approximately 10:10
a.m.)

MR. ORLANDO: Thank you all for
coming for this hearing for the public examination of the voting machines or the VVPRS that is up for certification. Special thanks to NJIT for doing the testing for this which is unprecedented by the state.

Without further ado, I'd like to introduce the Attorney General, Ms. Anne Milgram.

MS. MILGRAM: Thank you very much.
Good morning, welcome to -- I think Jason said it right, it is unprecedented for the State of New Jersey. It is a pleasure to be here.

I want to start by thanking the committee members who are giving us their entire week to basically go through this very important process to see and to test and basically take testimony on whether or not the voter verified paper attachment that has been submitted by Sequoia should be certified.

They will make recommendations and the determination will be made to certify these
devices.
I wanted to say a couple words because I think if you sit here today or the next three or four days, if you look around you are going to see something pretty incredible and something you don't often get to see which is democracy in action. This is what it is about. Voting is the most integral part of democracy. It's one of most important things that the State of New Jersey and the Attorney General's office, the Division of Elections does is to protect the right to vote. It is our sincere and profound obligation just as people of the state have a right to vote, it's our duty to make sure that we protect the integrity of the vote, show that every single voter that walks into the machine knows that when they cast a vote, that the vote that they cast is going to be counted and that they have full comfort that the election will be fair and the machines will work and that the results as they come out at the end of the day will be consistent with how the people have voted. That is democracy.

What you are going to see in the next three or four days is a very open and
transparent process. For the first time, the State of New Jersey has issued criteria for the voter verified paper attachments. This is something that legislature has, which I strongly agree with to basically say we need to have voter verified paper attachments on our electronic machines so that the public can have confidence and we can have confidence that the votes we cast are actually being counted the way that we have cast them. So that if $I$ am voting for someone, $I$ can look up at that piece of paper and confirm that is the vote $I$ have cast. What the legislature did is they required that the voter verified paper attachment be in effect January 2008. So the State of New Jersey and the Attorney General's Office stepped back and we looked at what other states were doing. We looked at what the Federal Election Systems Commission was recommending and the Federal Election Systems Commission was recommending voluntary guidelines, not mandatory, recommended nationally, they are voluntary and go into affect in 2008.

Those are the guidelines that we
use when we come up with our criteria. We are going to follow the national standard and we not only follow it, but actually go beyond it in a number of areas. The State Division of Elections felt we could and should do more to protect the right to vote. That is where we started.

We issued those criteria, we held the criteria open for public comment and then they were publicly released. That is the point in which we took a second unprecedented step. We went out and contracted, Attorney General Rabner, contracted with the New Jersey Institute of Technology for the first time in the history of the State. We went out and we basically got an independent group of computer experts to kick the tires to basically take these machines through the tests to say are they going to be able to stand up to the criteria that the state of New Jersey requires.

How are we going to find that out, the answer was basically asking NJIT, the computer experts in the back of the room to spend weeks upon weeks testing the machines, voting them to make sure the machines are safe,
to make sure the machines are secure, to make sure that the machines work. You will actually see the reports. Those reports have been issued publicly. There will be testimony about the process NJIT followed today.

You will hear from the vendors who will talk a little bit about their products and their machines and then $I$ hope very much that we also get to hear from all of you sitting in the audience, the public, the people who actually vote. We want to hear your comments.

Again, this is democracy in
action. This is a very important part of the process which is finding out what voters think about these machines which are here for you to try out and to test today.

So the hearing will be conducted and -- actually, let me step back and make one other comment about the machines in general. Because I have gotten a number of questions about that. The question is can voters have confidence in the electronic machines. I believe the answer is yes. Without the verified paper trail, the State looked at a number of different machines and we come away with full
confidence that the DRE the State is using works and are accurate and the voters can have confidence.

What we are doing today is doing belt and suspenders. The voter verified paper trail is important because if there is any question about whether or not your vote is being counted when you cast your vote, that question will be gone because you will be able to look up and see who it is. You will be able to push a button on the electronic machine, know who you voted for, look up and then see on that paper trail whether or not that is the vote that is being cast and then counted in a recount. That is critically important because it will let voters have confidence when they cast a ballot that is the actual vote that will be counted. Now, that is belt and suspenders. What the State would like to do and, again, it is an ongoing process is belt, suspenders and shoelaces which is to say we want and believe that there have to be mandatory random audits in addition to these two other pieces.

In addition to have electronic
machines and in addition to having the voter
verified paper attachments, we are going to need to have an audit process that is random and mandatory in a certain percentage of our machines. That way, again, the voter will know and it will cast the vote on the electronic machine, the paper will come out, the paper will be the official ballot for the recount and then what the State will do is take responsibility to randomly audit to make sure that the votes that are being cast, the paper ballots are consistent with the electronic ballots and that is a way to make sure we can have absolute and complete confidence in our voting machines.

So I believe this is an important part of the process. Again, this is an important step. These hearings are just on the voter verified paper attachment. These are on the criteria the State issued. I recognize there will be people here who want to talk about other things. I will tell you for the purpose of this committee and the purposes of the certification, the only comments that we are actually going to use and incorporate and the committee will take under advisement will be those that relate to the voter verified paper
attachment because that is the subject of today's hearing, but again, I want to thank you for being here. It is democracy in action.

I am going to ask you to basically honor the great traditions of democracy which is to get involved publicly. Obviously, we expect and know that you will be professional and courteous. I want everyone here to engage and I think it is a critical part of the process we hold these hearings publicly and we have these public conversations about one of the most important things we do in the State which this is.

So I want to thank everyone for being here. I want to thank NJIT and thank the committee and without further ado, I want to turn it over for the important work to happen. Thank you very much.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you, Anne, and congratulations again on a perfect introduction to what we do.

Let me start off with a few
preliminary things. First of all, I would like to thank the Attorney General's Office who has been a tremendous support and assistance to us
including Jason Orlando, Donna Kelly, Karen Dumars, Donna Barber and Maria Koch. Without their help it will be very difficult to do our job. So I publicly want to thank you and I'd like to thank the Attorney General and I'd like to thank NJIT.

This is a new dimension for us and we've always felt that it would be useful to have some technological background and assistance and we are delighted to have you all with us today. Especially pleased to see a significant turn out for today's hearings.

Just a little bit of background for those of you who may not be familiar with the State procedure. Item nineteen is what dictates the election with the laws and our election machines and have a rather unique part to it that requires a three person committee, namely us, to make a recommendation to, in this case, the Attorney General's Office concerning whether or not a machine meets the criteria that the State should set forth.

It does have the unique and rather odd characteristic of requiring that a patent attorney be on that committee and that's what I
do. My background is computers and electronics.
I have been in electrical engineering for Princeton University. I have been in the computer business for over forty years and been on this committee off and on since 1982. Not always chairing it. I think the only reason I chair it is because the chair gets asked to write the report so that is why $I$ am here.

So I'd like to start off by introducing the two other members of the committee. On my left is John Fleming who is in charge of the management information and the Department of Law and Public Safety and, John, you might want to say a few comments about yourself.

MR. FLEMING: I have been employed with the State of New Jersey for nineteen years. I have been in computer systems in the office and $I$ have been on this committee since about 2000 .

MR. WOODBRIDGE: On my right, your left, is Daryl Mahoney who is the assistant director of Bergen County voting machines division. If you want to say a few comments.

MR. MAHONEY: Yes, my name is

Daryl Mahoney. I have been employed with Bergen County for fourteen years as a technician and then I became the assistant director of voting machines. I am also a member of the New Jersey State Election Officials Association.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you, Daryl.
This particular hearing is really quite unique to us. This is the first VVPAT, the voter verified paper trail hearing we've had. The criteria that we have as the Attorney General explained is actually rather long. It is longer and more detailed than this committee has had to deal with in the past.

The hearings today will probably
go longer than we traditionally have gone because we have the extra dimension of the NJIT people here too. So I think we are going to insist on fairly tight ground rules so that everybody has an opportunity to speak and to be heard. Basic procedure is we are going to start off with a vendor overview of the machine describing what it is, how it operates.

Then we are going to ask NJIT to come up and present, first of all, their general criteria and scope of work and ultimately some
of what they refer to as exceptions with regard to the Sequoia Advantage machine we are looking at.

After that the committee will walk through the criteria a piece at a time. It is a fairly laborious process, but the only way we can guarantee, in fact, we are getting the information we need. We also have a checklist that we will go through after that point to make sure we don't miss anything.

Because it is going to be a long meeting and we have to go through the criteria so much longer, I am going to try to keep this fairly tight. Basic ground rules are that you have to understand, first of all, the sole job of the committee is only to make recommendations to the Attorney General's Office. We do not certify voting machines.

The object of our committee here is basically to take a look at the machines and paper trail devices added on to it. Basically, the suspenders which go with the belt to see if, in fact, it meets the criteria that we have been given.

To keep the process moving
smoothly, the vendor will not be taking questions. There won't be any public questions until after the vendor has made the presentation, after NJIT had made the presentation and after this committee has had an opportunity to ask its questions. After that point, we will open it up to public comment.

We probably won't make any
determination today simply because $I$ doubt there is going to be enough time to do that. We welcome public comment at the end. We take public comment in consideration in fairness to everybody and to the short attention span of some of us on the committee, we would appreciate it, as the Attorney General suggested, to keep your comments directed towards the materials the committee has to deal with, namely, does the machine we take a look at meet the criteria of the State statute. That is our only job up here and if you keep your comments focused on that aspect, you will be doing us a big favor.

I also should remind people that if you do want to speak, please there is a sign-up sheet. I'm not quite sure where it is -- in the back there. So if you want to
speak, please sign up ahead of time.
Lastly, very importantly, I am reminded that not only are you not supposed to smoke in the building, but you are not supposed to smoke in the front of the building either. So if you are going to smoke, I guess there is a place in the back.

Without further ado, I am going to start off with a vendor and ask the vendor to give us an overview of the machine and after that I'm going to ask NJIT to make its presentation.

Mr. Smith, are you ready to go on, sir? Why don't you take the microphone. Thank you for coming today.

MR. SMITH: Thank you for having us and good morning. Once again, my name is Ed Smith. I'm vice-president of compliance, quality and certification of Sequoia Voting Systems.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, representatives from the Attorney General's Office and the voters of New Jersey, good morning.

We are pleased to be here today to
address any concerns and questions the committee may have concerning Sequoia's addition to the voter verifiable paper audit trail or VVPRS in the regulations for use with the Sequoia Advantage and the Sequoia Edge machines that you see to my left.

The following representatives of Sequoia are pleased to be present today. I guess it is speak softly and carry a big microphone. I will just start over again. Once again, good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, representatives from the New Jersey Attorney General's Office and the New Jersey voters here present. At Sequoia Voting Systems we are pleased to be here this morning.

With me to discuss and respond to any questions or concerns from the committee are several folks from Sequoia. Once again, my name is Ed Smith and I am vice-president of compliance, quality and certification. We have Mr. Howard Cramer, who is our vice-president of sales. Mr. David Allen, who is vice-president of our E Voting Solutions development.

Ms. Sandy Green, who is director of
certification and Mr. Joseph McIntyre, who many of you know is a senior project account manager and Ms. Christine Valeriano, who is also with sales and will provide a demonstration of the equipment shortly.

Sequoia is an American company. It was originally founded as the Automatic Voting Machine Corporation in Jamestown, New York in 1896. In the over one hundred ten years that Sequoia has been in business its products have ranged from some of the original lever voting machines through paper ballots and now to the DRE or direct recording electronic machines that we have before us today for certification.

In fact, Sequoia's Advantage electronic voting machine has been in use in New Jersey since 1994 and has established an excellent track record for reliability and accuracy.

Throughout its history, Sequoia
has been a proponent of transparent and verifiable voting. This commitment led Sequoia to be the first manufacturer in the electronic voting machine industry to come out with the VVPAT. In fact, in 2004 the State of Nevada was
the first user and had great success with it. The VVPAT began in a statewide election, in fact, in both the primary and presidential elections. Since then we have brought the VVPAT to several of our customers in numerous jurisdictions, sixteen different states including the District of Columbia. That included twenty-one counties in the State of California, the City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Colorado and, of course, Nevada as I mentioned earlier and the first use of the VVPAT in the United States election.

All that being said, Sequoia recognizes the heightened public concern over the past decade with openness and verified voting process. We commend the State of New Jersey and Attorney General's Office, the New Jersey Institute of Technology for the thorough and rigorous review and testing conducted in anticipation of the use of the Sequoia VVPAT here in the State of New Jersey. Sequoia embarked on the certification process with confidence in the equipment and we know that confidence is justified by the results of the tests from NJIT.

One thing to keep in mind as we go
forward that the successful elections are a result not just of accurate equipment, but trained personnel and established practiced procedures. Of the items discussed in the NJIT report you will find only a few pertain to the equipment itself and most of those are easily addressed. In fact, many of the solutions are already in place.

Any testing as thorough as NJIT
almost inevitably invites questions and
comments. We welcome those and we note that those exceptions contained in the reports relate primarily to the election process itself and not to any impaired use of the VVPAT.

We appreciate and understand the desire of this committee to conduct a thorough review of the report and any concerns and we remain at your service to respond to those questions and to continue to prove our leadership in the VVPAT area and anticipation of using our VVPAT here in the State of New Jersey to benefit the New Jersey voters and their confidence in the elections.

Thank you.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Smith, a question. The issue is which machine will you describe today? Which machine are we taking a look at? Maybe give us a brief demonstration of it.

MR. SMITH: The machine is a Sequoia Advantage which is a full face voting machine. Full face means at any time the voter can see which selections they have made and what selections they have yet to make and then as the voter verifiable paper audit trail or VVPAT so they can see it and verify their selections are accurately recorded.

So Christine is going to give a short demonstration. I will bring her the microphone.

MS. VALERIANO: Hello, my name is Christine Valeriano. I am from Sequoia Voting Systems and I am going to give a demonstration of our AVC Advantage voting machines voter verifiable paper audit trail.

The poll worker activates the voting machine for the voter. The voter will step inside the voting machine as they currently do. They would choose their selections. Once
they have made a final first round of selection, they press the cast vote switch. When that is pressed, the AVC Advantage will dispense a voter verifiable paper audit trail for the voter to review. The voter reviews the ballot to make sure it matches their selection on the face of the machine. If the voter would like to change their mind if they deselect their choice, their ballot is voided. They are then able to go back to the Advantage, make their new selections, press the cast vote switch again. The machine then is going to print another voter verifiable paper audit trail for the voter to review.

Again, I verified the ballot, make sure it matches my selection on the machine. I then again decide $I$ want to change my mind. I would deselect a selection. It will void my ballot for a second time. I have a third opportunity to cast my ballot. On this third opportunity the AVC Advantage reads this is your final chance to change your ballot. The voter has to acknowledge that they understand this is their third time and final opportunity to cast their ballot. I press okay, I make my final selections, press the cast vote button and it's
automatically going to cast my ballot.
On the first two ballots it will
show that my selections were voided and on the third ballot it shows the barcode and also shows the serial number of the machine. The reason for the barcode is in the event of a recount, we would hand count the ballot images, but you could also use a third party off-the-shelf barcode scanner to make sure your ballots match.

Just to let you know, on election
day you are not going to be able to have your ballots. The reason $I$ took them out is to pass around for demonstration. There is a bag attached to the voter verified paper audit sealed on by lock and key.

I had one question to show how to change the paper on the machine. I'm going to turn it around so you can see. The printer has a clear cover on it where the poll worker can see when the paper is running low. It also has a paper low sensor. In the event that the paper needs to be changed, you would uninsert these little pins in the side of the machine that holds the cover on. You would then lift the plastic cover up off of the machine and then
there is instructions that says open press down, open push. So you open it, press it down. The machine then will allow you to add paper. There is approximately five hundred sheets to a ream of paper. So if you take the paper, put it in the cradle, make sure the black line is facing up. You would then snap this back into place, take the paper and it has an automatic feed that will pull paper through. You put the cover back on, put the pins back on and then you continue the voting process.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith, do you have any other comments to make at this stage?

MR. SMITH: No, sir, not at this time.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: At this point I am going to ask Mitch and your crew from NJIT to come forward. Mitch, if you would introduce yourself. Those microphones should be hot. Thank you for coming here, otherwise you'd be on vacation.

MR. DARER: Good morning. This mic's working, great.

First of all, I'd like to thank the committee, of course, for this opportunity to discuss our project and report. My name is Mitchell Darer, Executive Director of NJIT Center for Information Technology.

I will provide an overview of the project, of the environment and the testing process. Following my statement, Professor Aridaman Jain, one of the key project leaders will describe the types of tests including sample sizes of ballot scenarios and, finally, professor Yun-Qing Shi, another key project leader, will discuss the exceptions to the criteria found for the Sequoia Advantage machine under examination today.

In May 2007, the Attorney General's Office issued, as discussed already, the criteria for voter verified paper records for the paper record for the electronic voting machine. It requested NJIT to develop and retest and evaluate certain machines against this criteria.

The thirteen page criteria
document includes design requirements, procedural and usability requirements, security
reliability targets each with specific subelements that form the performance criteria used in our test.

The criteria includes qualitative subjective items such as allow the voter to easily review his or her paper record. As well as quantitative items, matters of fact to be determined such as shall not externally communicate with any system or machine. Each of over seventy individual requirements in the criteria was subjected to up to four different types of tests.

Throughout the entire project after all the testing we found that two core requirements were satisfied by all machines. First of all, voters were able to verify their votes on the paper records and, secondly, the vote tallies derived from four different sources, paper records, barcodes on the paper, closed poll reports and electronic records all matched.
On the other hand, exceptions
defined as a situation where in testing against the criteria did not completely or clearly yield required or expected results were reported for
each machine. The project team included senior faculty and staff with extensive experience in information technology, cyber security and statistical analysis.

A secure lab was established and designed to perform the testing and to house all vendor items. Each vendor supplied three machines, for example, the Advantage of a particular model as well as public and internal documentation and other peripheral equipment such as barcode scanners, barcode readers and audio components. Vendor staff explained the machine operations and answered technical questions although they were not present or involved in the actual testing.

Furthermore, the Attorney
General's Office did not influence or participate in the testing.

Our team spent thousands of hours over two months on this project scientifically and objectively evaluating and documenting the machine's performance against the criteria. Four different types of test procedures were designed and used to evaluate different elements of the performance criteria and they were used
for different reasons.
These four tests are the single
test and three types of volume tests. The three types of volume tests are called the twelve hundred vote test, the fourteen hour test and the fifty-six vote test.

The single test is a one time examination or inspection or review of equipment and in vendor documentation. The twelve hundred vote test is a volume test involving mock voting casting twelve hundred votes either manually or through electronic programming of the machine. The fourteen hour test emulates real voting situation replicating a typical election day. A long ballot was used completely balanced in terms of the votes and included election questions, write-ins, undervotes and voided votes.

Lastly, the fifty-two vote test is designed to force the paper ballot to extent for multiple pages by looking at a long ballot in conjunction with a large font size. Furthermore, to support these volume tests, sample ballot scenarios were developed. The results have been tabulated and documented on
the reports to the Attorney General's Office.
Now, I would like to introduce Professor Aridaman Jain who will discuss the test, the sample sizes and ballot scenarios and various tallies.

MR. JAIN: Thanks, good morning. I'm Aridaman Jain, in the division of mathematical sciences at NJIT and $I$ will be describing in more detail than he did the test procedures. These are the procedures that the Attorney General referenced in the opening remarks.

So we had four type of tests, the single test is a one time examination, inspection or review of equipment operations and vendor documentation. It includes a physical inspection of various components of the DRE and the voter verified systems as well as examination and comparison of paper records with other records, electronic records and scanned records.

The basic operations and configuration of the voter verified system are examined by conducting a mock election by using one or more voters.

Lastly, the vendor documentation is examined to include certain items that are required for how people in the polling booths will be using the equipment.

There are three types of volume tests. The fourteen hour test emulates the actual physical voting situation over a fourteen hour period that you would run into in a typical election in real life. Mock voters are recruited to cast various types of voting scenarios. Each voter votes for about an hour, they take a couple minutes break and then votes again. So we had several mock voters go through this process. This test procedure adopts -- the fourteen hour test adopts the long ballot where we had twelve different voting scenarios that represent the different types of scenarios that actual voters will run into. Each voter is presented with a shuffle set of cards. We want to randomize the sequence in which the different types of scenarios were voting on.

This fourteen hour test resulted in about six hundred votes being cast manually by the voters. After each set of voting scenarios, the mock voter was asked some
questions about were they able to verify their choices and other questions in terms of doing the voting itself to understand what a real voter would experience. So that is the fourteen hour test.

The twelve hundred vote simulated test generates about twelve hundred votes continuously based on a short ballot. That's the ballot that was demonstrated to you a few minutes ago. This is done through a script the program set up electronically for two minutes and manually for one type of machine. So here the votes are not cast by people, but electronically. The number of votes, twelve hundred, was chosen to exceed the guidelines of seven hundred fifty voters and also to meet other statistical criteria. The way the twelve hundred votes were generated electronically was that we generated the long ballot which had nineteen voting slots, hundred and twenty-five times and the supplemental ballot, the other kind of ballot, fifty times. So we had long ballot and hundred twenty-five and long ballot fifty times resulting in twelve hundred votes. So these tests generated the paper records that
we saw earlier. The electronic records and the barcode records, the one that are scanned with the barcode and we compared all of them and the same kind of thing was done for the fourteen hour voting.

The third kind of volume test that we did was fifty-two vote test. We conducted fifty-two votes. The main focus was to be able to test out multiple page ballot. But in addition to the multiple page, we also wanted to test out the capability to change votes. You vote and you change your vote up to two times and those machines where it is feasible, we also tested the fleeing voter scenario. Somebody doesn't complete the voting process and walks away, what happens.

To support these three types of testing we developed two types of ballots, the short ballot that you see on these Advantage machines with nine slots and then the long ballots which you run in some elections with nineteen items. The eight scenarios were completely balanced in terms of whether you vote for Republican or Democrat, whether you answer yes or no to a question. In that respect they
were completely balanced and they were designed to represent millions of possible choices that a voter can have with nineteen slots.

Then we had four hour voting
scenarios which captured the write-in votes and other scenarios that we used the ballots. After doing all these three types of volume tests, we generate four types of categories. Paper records that are there, take them out, put back and counting them, how many votes were cast for each position. The scanned barcode paper records counts of those and then the voting machine itself had a tally of how many votes had been cast for each position and finally the electronic votes. We compared all those four types of tallies for the fourteen hour test and they matched perfectly hundred percent agreement.

Now, for one of the machines there was a paper jam which resulted in a loss of some paper ballots. So in that case we were able to compare the paper records with the scanned records and they matched perfectly. We could compare these to the other two which are the tallying of the machine and the electronic
record and those two matched perfectly so we did not find any errors in terms of these four types of counts.

Thank you.
MR. SMITH: Thank you. I'd like to introduce Professor Yun-Qing Shi who will discuss the exceptions and will cycle the criteria for the machine under examination for the Sequoia Advantage.

MR. SHI: My name is Yun-Qing Shi. Professor of electrical at NJIT. As they already mentioned in general, our testing found that the AVC Advantage machine complied with most of the criteria mainly, basically, with some problem, but basically voter can verify their sheet on the paper record.

Secondly, the electronic records compared with the paper records match each other so after you compile it. There are twelve exceptions we would like to present here. Some representing some problems including some additional reports.

So exception number one, one of the criteria by the AG's office is the VVPRS may be designed in various configurations. In all
configurations, prior to casting the ballot, the voter shall have the ability to verify his or her selections on a paper record in a private and independent manner.

Exception number one says if an
observer is six feet or even closer is allowed to stand directly next to the left or right side of the curtain, he or she may be able to look in and see the section on the voter panel. If on the left side, this observer may also be able to see the paper record in the display unit so that's exception number one.

Exception number two. On one hand the criteria says, the paper record shall be printed and the voter shall have the opportunity to verify the paper record in its totality prior to the final electronic record being recorded.

Our finding is that the voter does not have an opportunity to verify the contents of the paper record corresponding to the third vote which is the last vote and they deposit it into the storage bag immediately after print. So in general the voter will be able to verify his selection, but the last one which the voter does not have a chance to change anymore, but
that is the last one, this one the voter cannot have enough time to view it again because that one is dropping into the bag.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is it the voter doesn't have enough time or the voter doesn't see it at all?

MR. SHI: That is because the machine is designed in such a way that is the first one you have enough time to review it, second time same. The third time, that's the last one, you do not have more choice and this one goes quickly into the bag.

The third exception according to the criteria is voter privacy should be preserved during the process of the recording, verifying and auditing ballot selections. This includes a voter who uses an audio voting device. Voters using an audio voting device should also be able to verify votes privately and independently.

What we found is that for audio assisted voting if the paper record is printed in multiple pages, otherwise there is no problem, but if the paper record occupied more than one page, then the voter is prompted to
print to the next page after the first page on that screen rather than slow the audio message. So this one may violate privacy of the visually impaired voters by exposing the paper record to the poll worker.

The exception number four, the criteria says an electronic ballot image record should have a corresponding paper record and another criteria is the electronic ballot image record and paper records should be linked by including unique identifiers so that an individual paper record can be identified with its corresponding electronic record.

What we found is that the only identifier of the paper record that can link to the associated electronic ballot image is the ballot index contained in the barcode that is printed on the paper record. If there are one or more paper records missing, then that is a circumstance the electronic ballot image records cannot be correctly linked with their corresponding paper ballots.

The exception number five,
according to the criteria, the printer should be designed to have a sufficient amount of paper,
ink, toner, ribbon or like supplies for use in an election, taking into account an election district should have at least one voting machine per seven hundred fifty registered voters.

We found that paper replacement is expected after about five hundred votes.

The exception number six criteria is that the printer should be secured by security seals or locking mechanisms to prevent tampering. The printer should be accessed only by those election officials authorized by the county commissioner of registration.

What we found is that the printer is not secured by any security seals or locking mechanism and it may be vulnerable for tampering. That's number six.

Number seven, the criteria asks, the paper record should include identification of the particular election, the election district and the voting machine.

What we found is the particular election name, namely primary election or general election is not printed on the paper record.

Exception number eight, the
criteria is asking for -- says the DRE should generate and store a digital signature for each electronic record.

What we found is that the DRE does not generate for each electronic record. Another criteria reads, the records should be exported with a digital signature which should be calculated on the entire set of electronic records and their associated digital signatures.

What we found that because for each individual electronic record there is no signature so this second criteria does not hundred percent satisfied.

Exception number nine, the criteria reads the DRE should detect and notify the election officials at the polling place of any errors and malfunctions. Another criteria also reads if a mechanical error or malfunction occurs, such as, but not limited to, a paper jam or running out of paper, the DRE and VVPRS should suspend voting operations, not record votes and present a clear indication of the malfunction to the voter and the election officials.

What we found is that indication is not clear enough and the details are listed in the table as to those two paragraphs.

Exception number ten, the criteria
reads if the connection between the voting machine and the printer has been broken, the voting machine should detect and provide notice of this event and record it in the DRE's internal audit log.

What we found that the printer connection/disconnection is not recorded in the DRE internal audit log.

Exception eleven we mark it as serious. It reads if the voter leaves without finishing the vote, there is no audio or visual signal to alert the poll worker.

Number twelve is another serious, reads during the electronic verification vote test which is the pretest mentioned by two previous speakers. We found paper jam resulted in fifty-six paper records not being printed.

So I think those are it.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The last item, the jam, would you explain the situation in which that jam occurred versus how that differs
from regular election operations?
MR. SHI: Yes, this is the
pretest, this is not official election and those twelve hundred votes are electronically
continuously running so that would not happen in real election and we have random here. In real election this will not happen because if paper jam and the next vote or poll worker would not be a real problem, but we think that one should be reported.

MR. MAHONEY: Was that during the manual voting this occurred or was this done in some other way?

MR. SHI: Electronic.namely twelve hundred voting is a program electronically executed so continuously going.

MR. MAHONEY: That wouldn't necessarily happen during regular voting?

MR. SHI: During regular votes
this will not happen because it will not automatically continuously run.

MR. MAHONEY: Thank you.
MR. FLEMING: For testing down the
line, are you going to be able to have tests directed so when there is a jam, it stops and it
continues on?
MR. DARER: I think when we set up the twelve hundred vote test, we will re-examine each time you do it and if appropriate we will.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I have a couple questions. First of all, I'd like to preface by saying you have done a thorough job and thousands of hours worth of work. I think New Jersey is in appreciation.

Overall, what is your impression of the machine?

MR. DARER: Well, as I summed up in the beginning, $I$ think there are two core requirements that were met. The voter does have a chance to review and verify his or her vote on the paper record. And the tallies from the four different sources, the paper record, the barcode on the paper record, the electronic record and the tallies in the closing of the poll, they all match.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Also had a couple specific questions if $I$ could. Maybe Dr. Shi can demonstrate. I am not clear exactly with regard to number one, could you show us maybe on the machine with regard to the privacy question.

MR. SHI: Number one, there's a curtain surrounding the machine during the election, but that curtain is not tall enough such that perhaps a poll worker if he or she is tall then he or she may be able to see the voting and that minor privacy issue.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that something
that could be fixed?
MR. SHI: All of those
exceptions --
MR. DARER: It's not a question
for us.
MR. SHI: It's not a question for us.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am trying to get some clarification. Let me ask you one or two issues if I could.

The exception number four stated that the only identifier of the paper record electronic ballot machine is the index containing the barcode except on the paper ballot if there are one or more missing paper records in the electronic ballot, the image may not be linked with the corresponding paper record. Would that be you're suggesting that
perhaps each of the ballots that are not cast should have a barcode on it?

MR. SHI: Number four. On one hand they have correspondence, yes, on the other hand there is some potential problem. As we found that if we stamp bar codes then each barcode has a certain ballot index. Then you list the ballot image index so all the paper records can be listed. Then electronic records already been there and then you can find a correspondence so no problem. We listed it because of the following.

Namely, you need to have all paper ballots listed in the scanner listed in this way then you can find the correspondence. So that means if a human error take place during the scan, then the correspondence we may possibly lose one or two paper ballots. Then the correspondence will be not be reliable to be found.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let me ask you
one last question for clarification. The machines have all been tested with regard to the seven hundred fifty registered voters. Is seven hundred fifty a realistic number?

MR. DARER: We got seven hundred fifty from the guideline from the state that the district is supposed to have one machine per seven hundred fifty registered voters. Whether that is the right number, $I$ don't know.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Also, lastly with
regard to exception eight, you talk about generating a signature for each electronic record so each electronic record that is cast or not cast, is that correct, should have a unique identifier to it?

MR. SHI: It should, but namely suggested if each paper vote were corresponded with a signature with the electronic ballot, that would make the thing secure because nobody can change. Then for all the ballot imaging when you export the data, you generate another digital signature for the whole group and is also secure. That is what this criteria. What the Advantage do, they have for each one there is no digital signature, but for a group they do have.

## MR. WOODBRIDGE: Group being

defined as like fifty or a hundred or group being one, two or three?

MR. SHI: Depends on the actual situation. If in the election there is five hundred votes or seven hundred fifty votes, then those would be it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: This five hundred votes might have of the same signature, is that correct?

MR. SHI: Each has individual, then grouping five hundred have another one. In this way the transmission to export the data will become very secure, very reliable because anything wrong we will be able to locate.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are saying it doesn't have that?

MR. SHI: Now, it doesn't have.
For group they have.
MR. MAHONEY: If you have five hundred, was five hundred based on having the voter having multiple chances as well as multiple pages?

MR. DARER: I think as demoed the ream is five hundred pages so that is five hundred pages and if there were multiple page votes, there might be fewer than five hundred votes.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thanks for a wonderful job.

MR. DARER: In addition to the
VVPAT, I'd like to echo what Ed Smith said before the two very important components, crucial components to ensure security elections are trained personnel and best practices and procedures regardless of what happens with the machines. So we described our project and procedures and our findings and hope the committee finds it helpful and thank you for your time.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very much.

These comments are available on the Attorney General's election website. Also available are the rebuttal comments from Sequoia. So those documents are of public record if anybody would care to see them.

Moving along at a reasonable clip
so far. What $I$ think we will do is start walking through the criteria with a view towards maybe taking an hour break around 12:15 or 12:30. We will make sure you have plenty of time.

Mr. Smith, are you ready to go
through the criteria?
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The Attorney
General's Office has put together a version of the statute which correlates to the various questions people asked and since we have now have a fully correlated version of that, what we will do is basically go through the checklist rather than go through the entire criteria. We are not going to leave any substance out, but $I$ think it will be easier to follow.

So I am going to start by asking some of the questions. Most of it. comes out of the statute. First question is the VVPRS, does it contain any -- does the VVPRS contain any undisclosed hardware or software?

MR. SMITH: No, sir, it does not.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The cryptographic software in the voting system is approved by the U.S. Government's Cryptographic Module Validation Program, CMVP?

MR. SMITH: Yes, the SHA-256
algorithm is approved by the program.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Which algorithm?

MR. SMITH: SHA-256.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Can the VVPRS
components be integrated into the existing local logic and accuracy testing requirements?

MR. SMITH: Yes, they do.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does the VVPRS
draw power from the DRE or the same electrical circuit from which the DRE draws its power?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it does.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does the DRE
provide a standard, publicly documented printer port or the equivalent using a standard communication protocol?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it does.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: For every DRE or electronic ballot image there is a corresponding paper record with a unique identifier?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it can be.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Now, that
question actually came up during the course of our discussions and $I$ would ask if you would respond to the comment that there weren't identifiers with each ballot.

MR. SMITH: Sir, we are not saying there aren't unique identifiers. In the records
for -- the electronic record, however, if you're missing a paper record, then it becomes more difficult.

I submit to you on the other hand if you're missing paper records that the process for any verification to be passed is hard to follow regardless and the correspondence of electronic records and, in fact, you'd likely fall into what is in the regulations for VVPAT malfunction or other issue that would revoke the procedures in that portion of the regulation. MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think the question and answer is what are the reasons. I have a problem with it. I can't get a correspondence with the comments from NJIT, if you don't mind $I$ want to make sure that when we cover the criteria, it is the same one that NJIT responded to. So if you don't mind, I am going to switch from that approach and really just walk right through the criteria itself.

The criteria which has been on the Attorney General election website for some time now starts out with a number of general definitions that really don't do anything other than define what you are looking at. Then it
goes into issues of operations and that sort of thing I am going to walk through some of those.

I am going to start with B1 on page two. The VVPRS may be designed in various configurations. In all configurations, prior to casting the ballot, the voter shall have the ability to verify his or her selections on a paper record in a private and independent manner.

I might indicate that was one of the issues that was raised in the report of NJIT brought up and one of the questions raised that a six-foot tall individual, would you respond to that?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Mr. Chair, I
would like to. NJIT performed the testing. They performed it against the Advantage that you see up against the wall here without curtains present. You can see with the curtain that a little bit. With the ones you have the curtains in place as they are literally renders that point somewhat moot. You would have to be well over seven feet tall to look over the curtains or from the left-hand side.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am going to

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take the liberty and ask the staff here from
NJIT, was that similar to the way the machine
was complete when you saw it?
                                    MR. DARER: We tested with a
curtain.
                                    MR. WOODBRIDGE: Did you test it
with that kind of curtain?
                                    MR. DARER: Yes.
                                    MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that the kind
of curtain you found a problem with the six-foot
tall individual?
    Can you show us how that works?
    MR. DARER: Yes, this is it.
    MR. WOODBRIDGE: The point
basically is that there was testimony made if
someone was tall enough you could basically sort
of between that crack with the curtain and the
metallic side or shield and see into it. Of
course, that also begs whether the public would
do that. I'm not sure, but we'll ask this
question just to make sure.
The VVPRS shall be designed to allow the voter to easily review or accept or reject his or her paper record. A, the DRE shall not record the electronic record until the
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paper record has been approved by the voter.
I also note that this is the stuff in the NJIT exceptions where they say the voter does not have the opportunity to verify the contents of the paper record corresponding to the third vote after rejecting the first two as it's deposited in the storage bin immediately after printing.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, the New Jersey State law you are allowed to spoil three ballots or two ballots and on the third one is your final choice regardless of voting mode or method with the DRE. So the machine processes that. As they pointed out earlier. the machine does provide a warning that this is your last chance and however you vote, if you hit that cast vote button it's basically going in.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The issue I think is that may be the case, but you don't have an opportunity, long enough opportunity to take a look at that third paper ballot to verify that is, in fact, what you voted on. How long do you get to see the third ballot that you voted on paper?
MR. SMITH: It is very short. It
is only a matter of seconds.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that something
that is correctable?
MR. SMITH: Yes, it is
correctable.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B3, VVPRS records
may be printed and stored by two different methods. A, cut and drop method. The voter views and verifies the paper record, which the VVPRS cuts and drops into a storage unit.

B, continuous spool method. The
voter views the paper record on a spool-to-spool
paper roll. This method shall be used in a
manner that fully protects the secrecy of all votes cast.

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other
comments on that criteria?
MR. SMITH: No, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B4, no electronic
or paper record shall indicate the identity of a voter or be maintained in a way that allows a voter to be identified.

MR. SMITH: There are no
identifying indicators. Of course, by the time

> the voter gets to the machine there name has been script from any work flow or information flow.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: There is nothing on the ballot per say that would identify the individual by name?

MR. SMITH: No, and by use of the cut and drop the way they call it, there is no opportunity for someone to determine how the voter is voting.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just a question about when they fall. I would assume the first one falls on or near the bottom of the bag and the last one falls on the top. It.is not really truly a random drop.

MR. SMITH: It is not truly random, no, but it is randomized enough that if someone wanted to take the effort to develop a list of voters in the order they voted on a particular machine that they could not reliable use that to reconstruct how the individual voted.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B5, the
electronic and paper records shall be created and stored in ways that preserve the privacy of
the record.
Before I go any further, are there copies of the criteria here? Does the audience have copies? You all have copies of the criteria and it's in the back of the report.

I don't know if I have to read every word here. This also related to one of the exceptions that NJIT described as exception number one, the same one we took a look at. So do you have any further comments on B5?

MR. SMITH: No, sir, I apologize I was misinformed about the curtains. Apparently he did use them for the single test, but not for the volume test where more members of the staff participated. I will state that jurisdictional tradition and current procedures call for no one being able to be around the equipment or the sides of the equipment and certainly behind the equipment. So if you were a poll worker and you saw an individual leaning over the machines when someone was voting, clearly you would have legal rights to have that person removed and that is rights in all fifty states. No state allows people to be around the equipment.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B6, the VVPRS
components shall conform to federal and state accessibility requirements. A, these requirements shall include, but are not limited to, an audio component that shall accurately relay the information printed on the paper ballot to the voter.

This is noted on exception number three of the NJIT report which states as follows. For voter system vote if a paper record is printed on multiple pages, the voter is required to print the next page after the first page on the LCD screen rather than through the message thus violating the privacy of the hearing impaired voter by exposing .the paper record to the poll worker.

MR. SMITH: Yes, I would like to respond to that, Mr. Chair.

We prepare the test ballot to NJIT
with the specifications and as NJIT mentioned earlier today, we were not allowed for just a few minutes to interact with staff. The issue there centers around really a fairly piece of election procedures. What we do in that case is record an instruction to the blind voter as jurisdictions do and based on the jurisdictional
practice to instruct the voter is that there are multiple pages to their VVPAT ballot and they need to press the enter button or whatever button on the audio hand set to progress the VVPAT through the pages and we will overcome this.

As I mentioned, we were not able to work with the NJIT staff. They basically shooing us out of the way which is fine, but unfortunately it leads to situations like this jurisdictional practice for this type.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So you don't
disagree with what they found, but you are taking the position that it is fixable, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: That is not only fixable, but it is typically fixed in elections where jurisdictions record audio to the blind voter at the beginning of the ballot that explain here's the button, here's what they do, here's how you navigate, here's how you make choices and when you get to your paper record and the system tells you your paperwork is up for review, you will have multiple pages, please use button $X$ to scroll through your record and
then once you go through it, it picks up and says this is your last page, press button $X$ or $Y$ to cast your vote and then finish.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B7, the VVPRS
device shall draw its power from the DRE or the same electrical circuit from which the DRE draws its power.

I'd like to mention that was one of the questions $I$ had on the checklist. You answered that.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, you can see the cables coming from the back of the electronics box to the VVPAT both power and data are in there.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The voting
machine shall provide a standard, publicly documented printer port or the equivalent, using a standard communication protocol.

MR. SMITH: Yes, it's using a standard protocol.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Nine, the VVPRS shall mark the paper record precisely as indicated by the voter on the DRE and produce an accurate paper record and corresponding electronic record of all votes cast.

MR. SMITH: To that $I$ hang my hat on the NJIT testimony. They do a four way cross check and found it to be accurate.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think the
committee will note that $N J I T$ did make representation that the core criteria which included the cross counting of electronic records to paper.

MR. SMITH: We also did testing for federal qualification of the product and the work that they do to also check that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B10, DRE electronic ballot image records shall include all votes cast by the voter including write-ins and undervotes.

MR. SMITH: That is correct. The VVPAT shows that the vote on the handset and the capabilities allow for write-in candidates which goes in the electronic record and on the paper record and $I$ believe NJIT tested for that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: If I can ask,
Mitch, I don't know if you heard it, but did NJIT test for undervotes, overvotes, that sort of thing?

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MR. DARER: Yes.
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MR. WOODBRIDGE: 10A, write-in
votes are votes cast by a voter for an individual not listed on the ballot as a formal candidate.

MR. SMITH: They vote through a keypad towards the bottom of unit being closest to the voter and for visually impaired unit through their audio handset.

MR. FLEMING: On the printout it shows it as the main one.

MR. SMITH: That's correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: You mentioned you tested the write-in capability.

MR. DARER: Yes, we did.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, undervotes are elective office and/or public questions on the ballot for which the voter has not cast a vote. You count the votes.

MR. SMITH: We track them, but we don't count them because they are not a valid vote, but you can tell how many there are. It depends on your definition of count. We count and track, but they are not tallied.

MR. FLEMING: On the printed
ballot paper, how does that show it?

MR. SMITH: No selections.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B11, an
electronic ballot image record shall have a corresponding paper record. A, the paper record shall be printed and the voter shall have the opportunity to verify the paper record in its totality prior to the final electronic record being recorded.

I note that was also one of the exceptions that NJIT pointed out when stated the only identifier on the paper record to link to the associated electronic ballot image is the ballot image index contained in the barcode that is printed on the accepted paper ballot. If there is one or more missing paper records, the electronic ballot image records cannot be correctly linked to the corresponding paper ballots.

MR. SMITH: That is a true statement. However, once again, as I stated earlier, if you have missing paper records and there are other portions of the record votes because you have evidence that there is a malfunction or some other issue at hand and in any situation you have missing paper ballot,
whether it is real or otherwise, you have a much more serious issue than being able to correspond back and $I$ would submit that the system that can't identify the voter or anything along those lines can provide correspondence of paper records missing.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am a little
confused. There is a barcode. Maybe we can show you here. These are the three -- these are the first two ballots that were attempted, but not cast. These were two spoiled ballots. The last one that is cast you notice has a barcode on the top. I guess my first question is maybe it has to do with why does just the accepted ballot have a barcode?

MR. SMITH: Because you don't want an opportunity for someone accidentally read an unaccepted barcode so instead of barcode being void --

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Could you not put a barcode on each of the ballot, even the voided one that has it embedded the barcode that it is a spoiled ballot?

MR. SMITH: You could, but once again, you're opening yourself up to mistakes.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Part of our
concern is that or part of my concern is that if paper is going to be trumped, for lack of a word, if there is a paper ballot missing, what to do.

MR. SMITH: The regulations have provided for that. We had to send in documentation to the Attorney General's Office what constitutes convincing evidence that there was a malfunction.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: These two spoiled paper ballots, is there an identifier in the electronic machine that indicates that spoiled ballots were, in fact, not voted on, but are in fact, there?

MR. SMITH: No.
MR. ALLEN: I'm Dave Allen. There is a State law that actually prevents us that until the votes have been accepted, we can't record the ballot itself. If we were to record it and then void it, we would still be recording that ballot so we'd actually be in violation.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are
suggesting these spoiled ballots don't leave an electronic trail?

MR. ALLEN: No.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are
suggesting they are not supposed to?
MR. ALLEN: Absolutely, yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mitch, do you
have any comments on that?
MR. DARER: We concur.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: When you say you
concur, then in that record is it fair to say that the accepted ballots, the ones with the bar codes, do have unique identifiers to verify?

MR. DARER: Yes.
MR. ALLEN: I would like to say, however, the technique for linking as such that NJIT did correctly state that the way the records are retrieved and the way the information tabulated on the barcode, if any paper records are missing, it makes it difficult to cross relate. In the conversion of the code which is currently undergoing federal certification that's been addressed by altering the way that the electronic ballots are retrieved and presented to the officer which will allow them to identify when a paper ballot is actually missing.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So, for example, let's say that a hundred people went in and voted and you only found ninety-eight of these things in there, you could reconstruct the missing two?

MR. ALLEN: You could identify the electronic records that were associated with those missing two, yes.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: In theory, if a judge was so inclined he or she could count the two missing ballots and add a paper version to it?

MR. ALLEN: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the DRE electronic ballot image record shall correspond to the paper record in a manner that does not reveal the voter's identity.

I think we established that.
11C, the paper record shall
contain all voter selection information stored in the electronic ballot image record.

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: In other words, every vote that voter cast does have corresponding record on the paper ballot, is
that correct?
MR. SMITH: That's correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section three, design requirements for a VVPRS printer. One, the printer shall be designed to have a sufficient amount of paper, ink, toner, ribbon or like supply for use in an election, taking into account an election district should have at least one voting machine per seven hundred fifty registered voters.

Now, we do have a comment from NJIT that paper replacement is required after five hundred votes.

MR. SMITH: That is correct in terms of how it is set up for the election, five hundred ballots. Reams of five hundred pieces of paper.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Could you if you wanted to do more than five hundred or is it best designed for five hundred?

MR. SMITH: The paper is available in a deck of five hundred.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It comes in five
hundred each, is that correct?
MR. SMITH: Yes.

MR. ALLEN: Counting the supplies we use in this particular printer, five hundred is the largest size they do. There is no physical reason why they couldn't bring packs larger, but because it is most standard size if someone were to purchase those, it would be a special manufacturing process and cost would increase considerably.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you know of any states that absolutely mandate that you achieve seven hundred fifty ballots.

MR. SMITH: No, not that $I$ know of, sir. The number, the few numbers that $I$ am aware typically are quite low. If .you look a seven hundred fifty voters to represent a turn out of sixty-six and two-thirds percent, five hundred is relatively a low turn out.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Of course the flip side you don't know how that offsets.

MR. SMITH: One thing to bring to light you saw how easy the paper was changed and if the jurisdiction so chooses, rather than change the full ream of paper, the unit is made to be removed as a whole and simply replaced with another unit.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Swap out with
what?
MR. SMITH: The entire system hangs on the side of the unit. You could have one full of paper refill and set it back on the record plug in the printer port and you are off to the races again.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You wouldn't really have to change the paper, you change the whole thing.

MR. SMITH: You can change the entire unit. Of course, the entire time the ballots are in the bag secured and very stiff opening is small and you got your procedural and security.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I know the language that appears. It says the printer shall be designed to have a sufficient amount of paper, taking into account the election district should have at least one voting machine for seven hundred fifty votes. So the sixty-four thousand dollar question, does that mandate a seven hundred fifty ballot cartridge.

MR. FLEMING: My question right
now is at the county level. What is your
requirement for the machines per number of vote, seven fifty, so that is the requirement?

MR. CHAGARIS: Arthur Chagaris.
The regulation says there should be a machine for seven fifty. The machine is capable of more than seven hundred fifty so it is a matter of adding the paper which is a fairly easy process. I think the criteria is satisfied.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It is not a
thousand percent clear whether it means you have to permit seven hundred fifty ballots before you have to change paper or whether just accommodate seven hundred fifty.

MR. ALLEN: Section 3A1A actually addresses the issue of changing the paper in the printer during the day which implies that that process was actually expected by the State.

I would like to point out one
other thing because obviously there is still a concern with security. The likelihood of this happening is actually very low. Five hundred ballots cast with one machine every seven hundred fifty voters constitutes sixty-six point seven percent. I think any jurisdiction that achieves almost sixty-seven percent turnout
would be phenomenally happy with their voter turnout and something like this would be almost I am sure they would be happy to supply another paper.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: This goes into the next section which means if any additional paper or other supplies required shall be done with minimal disruption to voting without circumvention of security features if a printer storage unit which protects the cast ballots and secrecy of votes.

MR. CHAGARIS: The first part to help interpret it is to understood there will be paper change.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to respond in this manner. If the board believes that this is a mandated requirement then we will offer the jurisdiction the one thousand deck pack. We will go back to the paper vendor and we will work with them to make a one thousand pack. It will be a custom card deck. I want to make that clear for the public and for yourself, but we will offer that for sale if it believes that is a requirement and thus we can easily satisfy the seven hundred
fifty requirement.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, 2, the
VVPRS shall have a low-paper indicator that will
allow for the timely addition of paper so that each voter can fully verify without disruption all of his or her ballot selection.

MR. SMITH: Before the VVPRS runs out of paper it will cease allowing the next voter to go in.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do I understand correctly if a voter goes in to cast a vote if there isn't enough paper they cannot cast a vote.

MR. SMITH: That is correct. If they couldn't do the three times, then it will cease.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does it give warning before you get to the --

MR. ALLEN: In fact, the way it works if there is not enough paper for them to cast three ballots, it will not even allow you to begin.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: How does it
detect when you are down on paper.
MR. ALLEN: It has a sensor which
senses how much paper is actually left.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is this an
optical sensor?
MR. ALLEN: Yes.
MR. FLEMING: Does that also
include a page printer.
MR. ALLEN: Yes, it does, correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Three, the
printer shall be secured by security seals or
locking mechanisms to prevent tampering. The printer shall be accessed only by those election officials authorized by the county commissioner of registration.

This is also the subject of NJIT comments which stated that printer is unsecured by seals or locking mechanism and maybe vulnerable to tamper.

MR. SMITH: We have on the units for security seals. We are not exactly sure, once again, we did not interface with NJIT.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You may want to raise your voice.

MR. SMITH: We don't understand, we have a provision for locks and seals on the equipment and as $I$ stated earlier, we are not
able to interface with NJIT so it is difficult for us to respond to that other than say we have provided what we believe are appropriate numbers of locations for seals.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am going to ask Mitch as a spokesperson here.

MR. DARER: Can we go up to the machine.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let the record reflect that we took a short five or ten minute visit to the inspect the actual equipment to take a look at the cover on the printer and asked some questions with regard to security and tamper evident seals and possible use thereon and so let's continue back to where we were. I appreciate it letting us take this digression. So if $I$ understand correctly, seals can be added to the device. NJIT raised the issue of whether or not the cover should be locked during elections and I understand your position is that is a choice of the county or the election district that makes that, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: Yes, that's correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if we were to
ask if there was a physical lock of the plastic cover during an election, that is simply what?

MR. SMITH: Yes, we could do that.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: A4, the VVPRS
shall be capable of showing the information on the paper record in a font size of at least 3.0 mm and should be capable of showing the information in at least two font ranges, 3.0-4.0 mm and 6.3-9.0 mm, under the control of the voter or poll worker. This criteria can be met by providing a magnification device with the VVPRS.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, we do provide for the jurisdictions each of the font sizes.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I know NJIT probably pointed this out in the criteria. I will see if we can move along and take a logical break in about fifteen minutes.

Section 3B, paper record display unit. One, the paper record shall be displayed in a way that allows the voter to privately and independently inspect it.

This has been the subject of the first exception from NJIT.

MR. SMITH: Once again, we assert that it is very difficult to view. You have to walk around the side or the rear of the machine which once again violates what $I$ suspect is a state law, certainly procedure.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So this is
basically same answer to the question we had about operation?

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B2, if the paper record cannot be viewed entirely in the display unit at one time, the voter shall have the opportunity to verify the entire paper record prior to the electronic or the paper ballot being stored and recorded.

Again, this is the subject of the second exception that NJIT raised just to refresh everybody's recollection was that the voter does not have an opportunity to verify the contents of paper record corresponding to the third vote. After reviewing or rejecting the first two as it is impossible because it goes in the storage bag after the printing. This is the

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people not being able to actually see the paper of the third paper ballot.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, we
interpret this clause in the regulations a little bit differently. We interpret this to mean if you have a multiple page ballot that the voter be allowed to review page one of two and control the units that after he or she read through page one or two can read page two of two and then if it agrees with both pages cast the ballots.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So I am not sure I understand how you read this. The point NJIT is making you don't have enough time to really review the third paper ballot before it is cast. I am not sure how that relates to a ballot that has multiple sheets.

MR. SMITH: That is a different part of the regulation. The third ballot being the final ballot. This is a different clause. This clause being reviewed entirely in the display unit meaning the window at one time.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So, in other
words, what you are saying here this goes to a different issue than if you have two sheets or
more you will review more than one sheet before you cast the ballot.

MR. SMITH: You receive an
instruction in the display window that says press enter to review the next page of the VVPAT record. Then you will hit the enter button and get page two of two will come out and if you want read pages or see how you voter cast vote, it drops into the bag. If you disagree, you can go and change your vote.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You can actually get to the third ballot say the second one and you want to see if page three of your long paper ballot corresponds with your vote, you actually be able to see the electronic vote and your paper ballot at the same time.

MR. SMITH: That is correct during the printing of VVPAT record, the vote that you cast is still displayed on the face of the current machine. You can you also at any time see how you voted as you wanted to vote and then you can check the records side-by-side.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: How do you go
back to the second or first page of that long ballot and review the entire paper ballot is
that correct against the electronic?
MR. SMITH: No, sir, the printer does not scroll backwards so you review the VVPAT record one page at a time once you review the first you enter and review the second and third or fourth or fifth.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You cannot scroll back up.

MR. SMITH: You cannot scroll back up.

MR. FLEMING: Going back to the first one in that third time through right now would have multiple pages it will spit the paper virtually out of the printer. You .have new code working on that so right now it will have multiple pages on the third try and the new code will supply the first page and second page so they can verify what they are actually doing.

MR. SMITH: That is correct.
MR. ALLEN: Mr. Chairman, one thing I think we are going to have to get some sort of recommendation concerning how the regulations in State law. New Jersey State law says it third ballot will be cast. Now if we need to we could slow it down to allow people to
view it, yes, but then what is the point of that if you then have to cast it. If they have to cast that ballot. If they are going to void it then a third time then we would need to confirm that is allowable in the State law. Because of the anonymity, there is no way to if they voter said I still believe there was wrong, I made a mistake the third time there is no way to isolate that vote.

MR. FLEMING: I think it's the
voter verifiable. The voter wants to know that last one was actually they want to be able to see that is my interpretation. It is not that they can change it again. It is just that they can see what really this whole printer not really have paper ballot to be able to count it is really so the voter is getting confidence in saying what $I$ 'm seeing is what is actually put in.

MR. ALLEN: You are suggesting they should be able to void it a third time?

MR. FLEMING: No, that is their vote, but at least they can see what they voted for and if they made a mistake then that is another issue, but they made the mistake on that
third try at least they know they made a mistake.

MR. SMITH: As I mentioned there is code currently.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just for
clarification, do $I$ understand that if you get to your third ballot that is automatically cast, is that correct.

MR. SMITH: It is not
automatically cast, but once you have cast it the paper record is not available for you to make changes to. And I think the point of contention here is that it goes by fairly quickly such that you can't take a .full reading of it and walk away comfortable that the record is really what you did that third time around.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The display unit shall have a protective covering which shall be transparent and shall not obscure the voters view of the paper record. The this covering shall be in such condition that it can be made transparent by ordinary cleaning of its exposed surface.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, we provide a plexiglass cover over the paper record and you
can clean it.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The record should
probably reflect too the members of the committee took a look at the machine and the cover over the paper vote.

C, paper. Any paper record
produced by a VVPRS shall be readable by voters and election officials.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: What we have up
here perhaps the public would want to take a look during the break is the samples of the ballots that were printed out to spoiled ones and one final one and they are readable.

C2, all paper records shall be stored in accordance with vendor specifications. I guess that begs a question what are vendor specifications for storage.

MR. SMITH: In short they essentially are temperature and humidity that we find in this room and you can save some variation around that considering voting machines are stored in a warehouse environment which may not have perfect air conditions like at your house or in a business office.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: How do you secure the bags when the vote is finished?

MR. SMITH: I'm not sure.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: You finished
voting at the end of the day and the people have dropped the ballots in bags how do you keep people from reaching in the bag and.

MR. SMITH: That is really more of a jurisdictional issue. We provided some physical security and place additional seals and locks with the bag. We put a cover over it when you move the back from the printer unit or you can transport it as a whole.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do people
typically seal the bags when they are finished so it can't be broken without some sort of evidence.

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is typical
that jurisdiction require that the seals remain intact and leave the machine as it is take it down, but leave the printer and the bag basically as they are in a sealed or locked condition or if you do open the bag that you put tamper evident tape or something over the opening so that if it is tampered with
attempting to fish ballots out of bag or insert ballots in the back it would be easily detectable.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: C3, if stored in accordance with vendor specifications, the paper used to produce a paper record shall be readable for a period of at least two years after the election in which it is used.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we assert that is.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you have any idea what the life of the paper ballot is?

MR. ALLEN: The specifications
from the paper manufacturers assert the ink should be good for up to seven years if it is kept within the environment which is specified.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Are these what kind of print is this we print on anything other than paper?

MR. SMITH: No, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is the susceptibility with regard to light? I know light tends to mess things up.

MR. SMITH: Part of storage is that they are kept in the dark which normally
that is not as much after been issue because they are typically boxed and secured.

MR. MAHONEY: What about excessive heat?

MR. SMITH: Heat will get them too, but it has to be pretty excessive.

MR. MAHONEY: What do you consider excessive?

MR. SMITH: Leaving it on the dashboard of your card for extensive period of time.

MR. MAHONEY: Is that eighty-five or ninety degrees?

MR. SMITH: That will reduce the readable life the paper, but not -- the paper does take into account the warehouse.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think we are going to do one more section here and then take a break just for the record we appear to be probably a little bit less than halfway through the specifications.

D, paper record storage unit. One, Security protection including, but not limited to, security seals or locking mechanisms shall be built into the storage unit to prevent
tampering at all times, including pre-election, election day and post-election. The Attorney General, through the Department of Law and Public Safety, will issue chain of custody guidelines regarding the storage unit.

I don't think we have to deal with the last sentence obviously but for the record you might want to review for the committee again the security seals and locking mechanisms for the paper records storage unit.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provision for loops to provide locks or seals went the ballot bag and the printer unit of the system and as Mr. Allen pointed out earlier the equipment tamper efforts that adhesive seals are easily placed between the cover and chassis an the chassis and the unit so that pre-election is complete and the machines is ready to go at that time jurisdiction typically apply those locks and seals and tape and they will remain there until the jurisdiction procedure. The paper or whole printer change outs and certainly election activities.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: This was one of the exceptions that NJIT pointed out that says
it is not security by seals or locking mechanisms maybe vulnerable to tamper this was an issue obviously discussed a few minutes ago during our voyage over to the Sequoia vending machines.

It is almost 12:30. I think it we made decent progress. Why don't we take a one hour break and reconvene here at 1:30. See if we can wrap up the criteria and then give the public an opportunity.

Out of curiosity how many people to we have signed up to speak. I see a show of hands. Okay, thanks, we will see you back here at $1: 30$ and ready to go.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Ladies and gentlemen, if we could resume with the hearing.

Mr. Smith, you were here two seconds ago, oh. We hope we have been able to make some improvement with the audio equipment. I apologize if it is been hard for us to be understood out there. I know the court reporter, Tony, has been suffering through difficulties and hope this goes a little bit better.

You may recall we were walking through the criteria and by stopped right before section four which is the procedural and use built requirements and so I'm going to pick up from that part of the page five with the paper records.

Part of the criteria that says paper records shall include identification of the particular election, the election district and the voting machine. And I'll also note NJIT had provided a comment with regard to that particular section in which they stated that the name primary election and general election was not printed on the record.

Do you want to comment on that?
MR. SMITH: That's fixed in the version that is currently being tested.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So the version
they saw did not include a description of whether it is a prime election, but you are saying that has been fixed?

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
MR. FLEMING: When you did that
version will be out?

MR. SMITH: September or October. It will be a firm upgrade. It is not a hardware change.

The question was the nature of the correction to print all of the information that is listed in the regulation and that is firmware is in verification and due out in two or three months and we will get them upgraded.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So I understand that software will be available if you choose to use it?

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: And it will State primary election?

MR. SMITH: Yes, all the information that appears will be included.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section 4A2, the paper record shall include a barcode that contains the human-readable contents, shorthand is acceptable, of the paper record.

We did see, of course, there was a barcode on the cast ballot. I'm not quite sure what you mean by shorthand.

MR. SMITH: I am not sure either,
sir, but that is not applicable we simply
printout a readable record of the voters intent.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: I'm sorry, I
didn't understand that.
MR. SMITH: The barcode provides a
full record of the voters choice.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The barcode you
have all the information how the voter voted, is that correct. You can get the entire vote from the barcode.

MR. SMITH: That is correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: 2A, the barcode
shall use an industry standard format and shall be able to read using readily available commercial technology.

MR. SMITH: Yes, the 417 barcode and it is readable.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Readily available commercial technology?

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, if the corresponding electronic record contains a digital signature, the digital signature shall be included in the barcode on the paper record.

MR. SMITH: As I said by NJIT we take an electronic signature of the entire cast
record votes when the poles are closed not of each individual voter so this is not applicable. MR. WOODBRIDGE: I guess I am still a little bit confused about that concept a digital signature for a batch of votes that correct.

MR. SMITH: Yes, an individual
signature taken when the poles are closed so at the end of the day when the tabulations are made by the poll worker the tabulations stored on the machine has a digital signature taken of that entire set of cast ballots and that digital signature is recorded and you can utilize that to ensure or check on the tampering.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am really
confused about what a digital signature is. Is a digital signature something that is printed on the record or is it something that is stored in the machine and what is the digital signature.

MR. SMITH: The record of the
digital signature.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is it? What is this digital signature we are talking about. MR. ALLEN: A digital signature is a value which is calculated on data which is
unique to that and it uses a key which means if you change it you will not be able to read calculate.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It is a private key encryption.

MR. ALLEN: That is actually hash value which is used in the digital signature. It encrypted it is and then verified by any --

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Where is the
signature stored?
MR. ALLEN: The signature in this case the signature is actually each bar does have a digital signature associated with it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So each barcode would have a signature for the batch.

MR. ALLEN: It protects the data.
It allows you to compare the data to show that the data contained in the barcode in this case is the same as what the signature was calculated upon.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B1, a digital
signature is extra data appended to an
electronic document which identifies and authenticates the sender and message data using public key encryption or other means approved by

LPS.
Is that the hash code arrangement?
MR. SMITH: That is correct. We use a hash code to show what is assigned the data set which you can use to later show it has not been tampered with.

MR. FLEMING: I need to step back with the digital signature. Basically NJIT found did not see that there was a digital signature for each record.

MR. ALLEN: For each electronic ballot.

MR. FLEMING: But you had just stated each barcode --

MR. ALLEN: Each barcode.
MR. FLEMING: There is a digital signature of the barcode matched to the record, but not for the individual record itself?

MR. ALLEN: Correct, however, I would like to say that the it actually does create a digital signature with each ballot.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Same section the barcode shall not have -- the barcode shall not contain any information other than an accurate reflection of the paper records human readable
content error correcting codes and digital signature information.

MR. ALLEN: There are correction code that is part of the pdf format that is used in the barcode.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Those are
reflected in the barcode itself.
MR. ALLEN: It is part of the
same. Part of that is the correction
information in there.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: 3, for the cut
and drop method, if the paper record cannot be displayed in its entirety on a single page, each page of the record shall be numbered and shall include the total count of pages for that ballot.

MR. SMITH: Yes, as mentioned earlier we are put a two of two or one of three, two of three on each page.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, the image created on a paper record shall include every contest that is displayed to the voter on the DRE including write-ins and undervotes.

MR. SMITH: Yes, that is an area we will do.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Also assuming the audience benefit that if it did not meet this criteria, NJIT would have probably brought it to our attention. I am assuming that if the machine didn't meet some of that criteria, NJIT would have brought it to our attention is that correct. Looks like a yes nodded.

MS. VENETIS: This was not tested by NJIT there was no specification.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let's deal with the public later if that is okay.

Five, the paper record shall be created such that its contents are machine readable.

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: You said the barcode includes all the information.

MR. SMITH: Correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Six, the paper record shall contain error correcting codes for the purpose of detecting read errors and for preventing other markings on the paper record from being misinterpreted when the paper record is machine read.

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is per the
barcode standard.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section B, DRE electronic records. The electronic ballot image record and paper records shall be linked by including unique identifiers so that an individual paper record can be identified with its corresponding electronic record. Unique identifiers are tools that will allow LPS to measure the reliability and accuracy of the voting system as necessary. The electronic ballot image and the paper record shall not reveal the identity of the voter.

A, unique identifiers shall not be displayed in a way that can be easily memorized.

As mentioned previously, there this was also pointed out in one of the comments from NJIT which said the only identifier on the ballot linked to the associated image is through a valid index in the barcode and printed on the paper record. If there are one or more missing paper records the electronic ballot image records cannot correctly linked to the corresponding paper record.

MR. SMITH: We stand by what we said earlier to that with a missing paper record
you have clearly other issues, but considering the process to proceed normally and you can cross tie the papers to electronic records. MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think that if you missing some paper records that aren't uniquely identified you will be able to.

MR. SMITH: What $I$ am saying if you're missing paper records with current electronic and paper records it remember very difficult and if you're missing a significant number of paper records it would be near impossible to tie them together.

MR. ALLEN: I would like to add to that statement. As I stated earlier the method or of retrieving the electronic information has been approved in the versions and now allows you could compensate for that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: 2, the DRE shall generate and store a digital signature for each electronic record.

There is also a comment from NJIT on that which says the DRE does not indication a signature for each record, but only of a batch of records will be accepted paper record an additional -- the DRE does not generate
additional signature for each electronic record pertaining to ballot image record of accepted paper record and does generate additional signature for each set of electronic records printed on electronic ballot image. This is calculated on the entire set of electronic records within the associated digital signatures.

MR. SMITH: We agree with that as stated and we will generate for each and every cast vote record.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just so there is no confusion. Is this the same software that you are talking about being available in two or three months?

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, it is.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B3, the
electronic ballot image records shall be able to be exported for auditing or analysis on standards-based and/or COTS, commercial off-the-shell information technology computing.

A, the exported electronic ballot image records shall be publicly available, nonproprietary format.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, if I may go
back to earlier. The DRE should generate an electronic record it is not a mandatory requirement in the regulations. I'd just like to point that out for the record.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: But nevertheless you will.

MR. SMITH: We are computing our system to comply, but it is not a mandate.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Going back to section three with regard to exporting for auditing analysis on standards-based or COTS, what is your exporting mean.

MR. SMITH: 3A would be we provided to NJIT and the units generate images through the small printer in the back. You can also get them out of text file Microsoft export from the machine electronically.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So a text file or pdf.

MR. SMITH: A TAC.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the records shall be exported with a digital signature which shall be calculated on the entire set of electronic records and their associated digital signatures.

This also was NJIT had a comment on this which was similar to what we just talked about?

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if you have a text file or as a graphic file there is a digital signature?

MR. SMITH: It is reading across. It took me a second, but there is a long string of the letters and numbers at the bottom.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You support for someplace for tabulation or what have you.

MR. ALLEN: Mr. Chairman, it is
included in the text when you export the information, you export it in two forms. It can be printed by the machine or it can be a text file. In either case the bottom of the record the entire record there is a string which is the hexadecimal representation of the digital signature which can be verified.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: C, the voting system vendor shall provide documentation about the structure of the exported ballot image records and how they shall be read and processed by software.

MR. SMITH: We are providing that documentation.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I might point out for the record that we have received a significant amount of documentation on all aspects of the machine.

D, the voting system vendor shall provide a software program that will display the exported ballot image records and that may include other capabilities such as providing vote tallies and indications of undervotes.

MR. SMITH: Yes, our selection management system allows for that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The voting system vendor shall provide full documentation of procedures for sporting electronic ballot image records and reconciling those records within the paper records.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided that documentation.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Next Section, C, voting with a VVPRS. One, LPS shall promulgate for voters instructions on how to use the VVPRS. A, the VVPRS vendor shall provide in plain language any reference material requested by LPS
to aid in the preparation of VVPRS instructions. These instructions shall be issued to each county board of election for board worker training.

I believe that method will be provided to us.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided operational manuals for the Advantage with VVPRS.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Instructions for use of a VVPRS shall be made available prior to an election on the Division of Election's website and shall be available to the voter at the polling place of an election.

C, prior to an election, the county commissioner of registration will provide demonstration machines at convenient locations throughout the county for voter education purposes.

With regard to that issue what do you provide to each voters on how to use the machine?

> MR. SMITH: We provide operator and maintenance manuals. The county takes those and write it down in language that is suitable
for the jurisdiction. They have graphics people and reformat accordingly, but we provide the base verbiage for them to draw from. We also provide personal and technical support so the jurisdictions are putting together training and voter education materials.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I believe as a footnote in our town about two or three years ago they actually had one of those happen to the machines. So you can see it.

D, the instructions for performing the verification process shall be made available to the voter on a location inside the voting machine. Where feasible, the instructions shall also be on the machine ballot face.

MR. SMITH: That's fine with us. We take that as best we can. You can certainly see the ballot and the instructions.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is it fair to say you vote on the DRE, you don't have to do anything special just press a button to vote?

MR. SMITH: It is a work flow to the vote to do so, but if they follow the prompts, it will carry them through the process.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: They
automatically get a paper ballot.
MR. SMITH: They can't say no to it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: They can confirm
if it asks to have a paper trail come out.
MR. SMITH: The machine will
automatically carry them to a paper trail.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two voter privacy
shall be preserved during the process of recording, verifying, and automatic continuing ballot sections. This includes a voter who uses an audio voting device. Voters using an audio voting device shall also be able to verify votes privately and independently.

You did have a couple of comments from NJIT in that regard one said the voting if a paper record is printing the voter is prompted to print the next page after the first page and were in LCD screen rather than audio message for the privacy by exposing the paper to the poll worker.

MR. SMITH: The jurisdiction can record and provide to the audio or instructions that states how to interact with the machine. So they would say once you have heard or
otherwise the first page is printed press this bottom and get the second page and it will tell them next and when you see your two pages you can press this button to cast your vote and be done. So they can provide instruction for you had audio.
Like I said, we were not able to
interact with NJIT except for a couple minutes,
otherwise we can demonstrated it. The
jurisdiction like many things on our machine
record audio instructions and local tradition is
local needs and this being one of them they can
do that.

Once again, also the NJIT report the next version of firmware will have an extra slot for lack of a better word for audio inserted so that in the script and flow for impaired voter it will come up with another audio queue so they can hear it from the beginning. They will get another audio queue that says you must do this to get from point $A$ to point $B$.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Three, in any election where the ballot contains a language in addition to English, the paper record shall be
produced in all such languages.
MR. SMITH: We have that
capability and I believe two of the units are programmed to do that for Spanish.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: To assist with manual auditing, candidate names on the paper record shall be presented in the same language as used in the DRE summary screen.

MR. SMITH: Whatever language the voter has chosen and thus the screen it is presented in will be there. Of course, with the Advantage the voter selection are shown constantly so there is no need for separate electronic screen so as the VVPAT is moving the voter can look at the full phase of the ballot and see it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, information on
the paper record not needed by the voter to perform verification shall be in English.

MR. SMITH: That is really the information on the VVPAT that the voter sees. Of course there is a barcode as such.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, the privacy
of voters whose paper records contain an alternative language shall be maintained.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, it is.
There is nothing out of the ordinary for an alternative language.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: There is nothing that would identify a voter?

MR. SMITH: No, sir.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The paper records shall distinguish between accepted and nonaccepted ballots.

MR. SMITH: The print on it if it's voided and the presence of the barcode the printed the word void.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just for the record, the two spoiled ballots appeared to have the word void written at the top of them and the third ballot with the barcode which is the one that the voter accepted actually has the word accepted in black on the left-hand side.

A, the voter shall have the opportunity to accept or reject the contents of his or her paper record.

Again, this goes back to the comment made about NJIT number two. It said the voter can have the opportunity to identify the contents of the record corresponding to the vote
as it is. We have discussed this issue. Would you explain for the record the response to that. MR. SMITH: To the number of times it allows. At this time the unit is programmed according to New Jersey law to have a maximum of two and a third and final paper record. It does present a warning notice as shown in sub item two and then if they did cast the vote it is in the final and as we stated earlier that third time because you cannot make changes to the VVPAT it does scroll down quickly and in the firmware we will structure it so goes in the same manner as the first and second to give an opportunity for the voter to see the third and not changeable is indeed in there.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: If the voter rejects the contents of the paper record, he or she may recast the ballot up to two additional times. This procedure is consistent with current State law.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir and because different states have different numbers, we allow the votes that number of times.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, before the voter causes a third and final paper record to
be printed, the voter shall be presented with a warning notice on the machine that the selections on the DRE will be final. The voter will see and verify a printout of the votes, but will not be given additional opportunities to change any vote. The third ballot cast shall constitute the final and the official ballot of such a voter.

MR. SMITH: It does behave in that manner.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: As I recall from your earlier testimony, it provides a warning on the LCD screen, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: That is correct.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does it provide any other warning before the ballot that he or she casts?

MR. SMITH: I believe it provides it that one time. That would be a key part of the process where you need to either say yes I have done it and hit the button or go back and reselect selections before the third time.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Upon rejecting a paper record, the voter shall be able to modify and verify the selections on the DRE without
having to reselect all choices in all contest he is on the ballot.

MR. SMITH: The machine does behave in that manner. You can change one or change the entire ballot.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if you change your mind and you just change one vote for a freeholder that is all you have to do, you don't have to revote the entire ballot?

MR. SMITH: Yes, you can make one change or if you decide the take it back the way it was originally, you can do that and hit cast vote. You can do it anyway you want to do it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, if a
mechanical error in recording or printing a paper record occurs, the record shall be counted as a spoiled paper record. It will not be counted as one of the voter's three attempted votes.

MR. SMITH: The machine behaves in that way. So the printer confirms back the finalized print it drops it in the box. It does not signal the machine of the other chances.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Five, the VVPRS
shall be designed to indicate the paper record
which the voter has identified and cast as his or her official ballot.

MR. SMITH: It does identify that through the word accepted. Accepted and cast.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Next section is
section five, security and reliability. A, VVPRS shall not be permitted to externally communicate with any system or machine other than the voting system to which it is connected.

MR. SMITH: As it's configured and as you can see there is no opportunity to unplug or transmit out, in other words, external communicating.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Assume we follow the procedures followed by the election.

MR. SMITH: To some extent you, but there is nothing structurally that allows them to communicate externally.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the VVPRS shall only be able to function as a printer, it shall not contain any other services, for example, copier or fax functions or network capability. The printer shall not contain any component with an external communication feature.

MR. SMITH: And it does not.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The paper path between the printing, viewing and storage of the paper record shall be protected and sealed from access except by election officials authorized by each county commissioner of registration.

MR. SMITH: I think we viewed that earlier with the opportunity to place seals and tamper proof tape.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: D, all
cryptographic software in the voting system shall be approved by the U.S. Government's Cryptographic Module Validation Program, if applicable, prior to being certified in New Jersey.

MR. SMITH: The 256 produces writing that is attached and we will find numerous manifestations of it approved.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: As stated in the discussion portion of Section 7.9.3 of the United States Election Assistance Commission draft criteria for voter verifiable paper audit trail requirement, there may be cryptographic voting schemes where the cryptographic algorithms used are necessarily different from
any algorithms that have approved CMVP implementations, thus CMVP approved software should be used when feasible, but it is not required. The CMVP website is given.

If I understand correctly, the cryptographic software we have the Government Cryptographic Module Validation Program, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: The 256 algorithm approved part of the issue from CMVP. It only includes end to end cryptographic solutions and does not improve and cannot approve the million algorithms when you put an approved algorithm inside a piece of software such as a voting machine, an ATM, any devices, satellites. The CMVP does not go to approve everybody, but you can clearly see from the website what algorithms are part of the approved suite and they could all the algorithms that the 256 is one of those. MR. WOODBRIDGE: It says may.

Two, the vendor shall provide a certification of CMVP approval, if applicable. If not applicable, the vendor shall provide a certification setting forth the reasons why CMVP approval does not apply.

MR. SMITH: It is as I just stated where CMVP does not approve the use of approved algorithms with embedded systems. They couldn't afford the manpower and staffing to go out and approve everyone that is using the algorithm so they don't -- they do approve solutions and they do approve algorithms themselves.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It seems to me
reading this literally that if that's the case we need some sort of certification from you all explaining the CMV approval.

MR. SMITH: We did provide that to the Attorney General's Office I think two weeks ago.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: They already have that.

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The printer be connected to the voting machine either by completely concealing the printer connection or via a security tag to prevent tampering.

MR. SMITH: In the case of
Advantage one end of the cable is completely shrouded and the other side a tamper proof seal. MR. WOODBRIDGE: F, the DRE shall
detect and notify the election officials at the polling place of any errors and malfunctions such as paper jams or low supplies of consumables, e.g., paper that may prevent paper records from being correctly displayed, printed or stored.

This was the subject of a comment number nine where it said if a mechanical error or malfunction occurs the DRE displays an error message in both the operators panel and were in LCD the voter the error doesn't always reflect the actual diagnosis. Further more, if a printer error occurs the printer has to be powered down and then powered on again to return to a workable status. The VVPRS appears out of the unfinished printing context in a different size and upside down on the paper.

MR. SMITH: We comply with the regulations that state shall attain and notify the election officials of any errors or malfunctions. It clear that the unit does give indication via LCD and the panel.

As for the particular
circumstances around that particular paper jam, it is difficult to say because with the
interface with NJIT, but in any case it happens to be a voter's third time to review the VVPAT record they could of course void that and continue to vote if they were unsure in the paperwork or for some reason they could not view it.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: We have NJIT
people here. I am a little confused. It says error message does not reflect the actual diagnosis.
Mitch, could you tell us exactly
what that means?
MR. DARER: There was six types of errors and malfunctions tested. Paper jam, paper broken within the one paper sheet broken, broken at the end of a paper sheet. Printer power disconnection, printer communication cable disconnection and low paper supply. So those are six different scenarios. Some involving the paper, some involving the printer power, some involving the printer communication cable and the same error message was observed for each of the first four, VVPAT printer error. So there were misleading an error signal came up, but it was not the correct one. It was misleading that
is what we encountered.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is the misleading message? Did it say that there is a printer error, but it doesn't tell you what the error is, is that correct or a jam?

MR. DARER: The error messages was either VVPAT printer error, printer off line or VVPAT printer error out of paper. Those were the only two error messages that showed up. They showed up even if the problem was printer communication cable disconnect, paper broken at the end, low paper supply.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So it gave you basically only two flavors of error messages, but it didn't give any --

MR. DARER: It did draw someone's attention to it. But according to the regulation in terms of a clear indication, we felt it wasn't clear.

In 5 G --
MR. WOODBRIDGE: We are not there yet, but almost there.

MR. DARER: One after another and we grouped them together.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let's go to 5G so
we can get the comments for the record. They will cover 5 F and 5 E and Section $G$.

If a mechanical error or malfunction occurs, such as, but not limited to, a paper jam or running out of paper, the DRE and VVPRS shall suspend voting operations, not record votes and present a clear indication of the malfunction to the voter and the election officials.

MR. DARER: As I mentioned earlier some of the criteria call for quantitative assessment. Does it have it or doesn't and words like easily or clear isn't there. We made our interpretation of it and felt it wasn't clear.

MR. FLEMING: But it was clear there was a problem?

MR. DARER: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: It gives you two types of instructions, but there are two types of error messages, but more types of problems than you can have clearly indicate what the problem is. For example, can you distinguish between error jam and running out of paper?

MR. ALLEN: With the regulations
it is clear there is an issue that the paper records be displayed. So our contention of the version of firmware does actually confirm the letter requirements however we agree there could be more error types distinguished and the version form that is coming pending certification which should be available for State certification next two or three months does include more certification on the exact cause.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So in two or three months we are likely to get some software perhaps with some of these other things he is talking about and be able to differentiate it between some of the these types of errors?

MR. ALLEN: Correct, depending on what the sensors are it will determine which error type is likely to be spelled out.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It seems to me the most common type of error is paper low or paper jam.

MR. ALLEN: If you find paper
movements and expect the papers to move and it doesn't and the paper is not alone, then will be able to say paper jam.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you.
Section H, if the connection between the voting machine and the printer has been broken, the voting machine shall detect and provide notice of this event and record it in the DRE's internal audit log. Voting operations shall be suspended and no votes shall be recorded.

We also have some comments from NJIT on that regard. It says quote the printer disconnections not recorded in the DRE's internal audit log.

MR. SMITH: We have no contention with that the version firmware under certification. On the other hand in the second sentence of this clause that operations be suspended and no votes recorded. If the printer is disconnected on the back of the units, the unit knows that and the suspend voting operations.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Maybe I did
not -- my hearing isn't very good, but if the connection is broken, is there a record of that event in the DRE's internal log?

MR. ALLEN: In the other firmware,
the firmware in federal certification and will be available to New Jersey in certification for three months does record that event in the internal DRE.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: To make sure I understand it, you don't disagree with their analysis in the first sentence, but there will be software available or correction to do that?

MR. ALLEN: Correct. My
colleagues pointed out that even with this
version of firmware when the printer is disconnected, the machine not only notifies, but also suspends that so that part is met.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Earlier there was feedback between the printer and the machine such that you can't go on the next one so this is part of that.

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Paragraph I, if the voter's selection on the DRE do not match the paper record, then the DRE shall immediately be withdrawn from service. One, the affected voter shall be able to vote on another voting machine, if available, or by emergency ballot. $J$, the vendor shall provide to LPS
documentation for the DRE and the VVPRS that includes procedures for the recovery of votes in case of a malfunction. LPS shall be responsible for disseminating this information to the county commissioners of registration.

MR. SMITH: We gave to the Attorney General's Office some weeks ago for the Advantage.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: K, Vendor shall provide to LPS documentation for the DRE and the VVPRS that includes recommended procedures to enable the election officials to return a voting machine to workable status after the machine has malfunctioned, the printer needs to be replaced or a voter has used it incompletely or incorrectly.

MR. SMITH: Once again, that is part of the troubleshooting in the operating manual.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: One, these procedures shall not cause discrepancy between the tallies of the electronic and paper records it.

MR. SMITH: None of our procedures call for involvement with the electronic paper
records and counting.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, the LPS shall be responsible for disseminating this information to the county commissioners of registration.

L, the vendor documentation shall include procedures for investigating and resolving printer malfunctions including, but not limited to printer operations, misreporting of votes, unreadable paper records and process failures.

MR. SMITH: Once again, we sent it to the Attorney General's Office in the trouble shooting guide and included in that added to our standard offering of that manual convincing evidence that procedures are around printer operations.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: If the machine malfunctions or becomes inoperable, voters will be entitled to vote by emergency ballot.

We historically required that emergency paper ballot box be placed inside of voting machines. I don't know whether they still do it. What do you do with respect to emergency ballots?

MR. SMITH: Paper ballots?
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Yes.
MR. SMITH: That is really a jurisdictional issue. I don't believe --

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I believe the DRE testing data require there been a box on the side of the machine that included a pencil and paper ballots. That may still be a valid requirement.

It doesn't say so here explicitly, but that is always been required by the State. This criteria isn't as explicit as the gold criteria was with respect to provided, for example, emergency paper ballots so that is something that will resolve itself. If you were required to place a box on the side of the machine would that be any problem?

MR. SMITH: Well, the Advantage base unit that you see over there has been certified since 1994 so if there is a requirement that the machine --

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Probably for general certification.

MR. ROMEI: I'm Adolph Romei with
Sequoia. The machines that you are looking at
right here don't have a ballot box attached, but at least one machine in every voting district in machine has emergency ballot box. It is a sealed ballot box itself attached by State law to the machine so it is available already so that is in the prior certification.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: That would be
including with these machines here, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: Absolutely, there is no change in that certification. MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think my recollection $I$ think every machine is supposed to have those on there whether the county enforces that or not, I don't know. Everyone should have on the side of it a place to put a paper with thirty ballots.

Move to page eleven some of the criteria coming past that point really aren't directly relevant to the vendors.
So I am going to skip
certification Section 6A, $B$ and $C$ and skip down to C1 and C2. The vendor shall provide to the State, electronically and in hard copy, all use and technical specifications and documentation
relating to the function of the VVPRS.
MR. SMITH: Yes, I believe we comply with that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, the vendor
shall submit a certification that the VVPRS satisfies the State's criteria.

MR. SMITH: We provided it.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: You provided it,
is that correct?
MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The next section
actually we dealt with at the very beginning on our checklist, but $I$ will read it anyhow. D, a VVPRS shall not at any time contain or use undisclosed hardware or software. The only components that may be used in the system are components that have been tested and certified for use in the State.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, we are complying with that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The vendor will be required to provide the source code for the DRE and the VVPRS to the State and/or to place such source code in escrow to allow for independent testing by the state at its
discretion. Upon request, the State will enter into a nondisclosure agreement with the vendor. MR. SMITH: We are negotiating that now and we will comply with that. MR. WOODBRIDGE: You're negotiating? MR. SMITH: We're negotiating that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you keep your escrow?

MR. SMITH: Yes, through the State requires.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: How far along are you with the certification with the State of New Jersey?

MR. SMITH: We have a substantial draft.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The draft of the Attorney General's Office.

MR. SMITH: I believe it is in at this time.

MR. ROMEI: We do indeed have a draft.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We believe the draft is final subject to a remaining
comment by the Attorney General's office and that agreement expressly addresses the source code.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, the vendor
will be responsible for the cost of any testing of the VVPRS that the State deems necessary to achieve certification.

G, vendor documentation shall
include printer reliability specifications
including Mean Time between failure estimates and shall include recommendations for appropriate quantities of backup printers and supplies.

MR. SMITH: We have supplied that to the Attorney General's office.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mean Time between failures. Section seven, pre-election procedures and post-election procedures were on the checklist.

A, a VVPRS's components shall be integrated into the existing local logic testing procedures performed by county election officials which are performed in preparation for an election.

MR. SMITH: Our response to that
is our equipment is certainly able to perform tests the other machines past.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: In fairness we asked this from the checklist.

I am going to skip over sections 8A, B and C because they are not relevant to this hearing.

Go to 8D, in case the machine cartridge becomes unreadable or is damaged for an audit or recount, the county commissioner of registration shall produce the ballot image audit log from the machine. The vendor shall provide to LPS documentation regarding the production of such audit log.

MR. SMITH: Yes, that is in the operations manuals and various other manuals we provided to the attorney.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Similarly, 8E, the paper record shall be created such that its contents are machine readable for purposes of any recount, audit or initial tallying of an election in the event that the machine cartridge containing the electronic record is not usable.

MR. SMITH: It is.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: This may be
redundant. The paper record shall contain error correcting codes for the purpose of detecting read errors. This may be done by barcode. MR. SMITH: As we discussed, it is.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: G, the vendor
shall provide to LPS written procedures to identify and resolve any discrepancy between an electronic record and its corresponding paper record. LPS shall be responsible for disseminating this information to the county commissioners of registration.

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: H, the vendor
shall provide written procedures for determining what constitutes clear evidence that a paper record is inaccurate, incomplete or unreadable. LPS shall be responsible for disseminating this information to the county commissioners of registration. Now, the vendor shall provide written procedures for determining what constitutes clear evidence that a paper record is inaccurate, incomplete or unreadable.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided that as part of the machine.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: It would seem to me if a paper record was unreadable, it is not readable.

We walked through the different sections of the statutes we do have a few more questions. Do we have copies of certification from other states? This accommodation with the printer.

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, it is.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: The DRE has been
approved by other states, is that correct?
MR. SMITH: Yes, statewide
implementation in Louisiana.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other states?
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, Colorado. I really need someone in sales at this point, but we can find that list. I just can't recall off the top of my head.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You will provide copies of documentation.

MR. SMITH: The Advantage has always gone through Wyle Labs.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other ITA documentation?

MR. SMITH: A system as a whole we
took the management and procedure end to end qualification, but all of the hardware in the Advantage and other offerings all was Wyle Labs or Assist Labs.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we get to the public input is David Millstein here? Would you come here for a second.

We have a gentleman here who wants to address the issue of the disability and in order to fairly wrap this up. Mr. Millstein, thank you for coming here today. We have just been through a fairly long and somewhat tedious piece by piece review of the equipment that is in front of us.

The only remaining component before we could take public input is to get your input with regard to the functionality of the machine with regard to people who are visually or audibly impaired and $I$ understand your prepared to comment on that.

MR. MILLSTEIN: I am, yes. Good afternoon, my name is David Millstein. I am a State ADA administrator, the Americans With Disabilities Act. Yesterday afternoon we did a review of the machines to my left and also to my
right. The machines to my left do have the proper clearance that we are looking for for a wheelchair user to roll directly under to be able to utilize the machine for voting. The clearances we have are twenty-nine inches for underneath. We have a twelve-inch spread to allow for the wheelchair to go fully under with a person doing a forward reach. The reach itself as the clearance from side to side is anywhere from thirty-six to forty-eight inches for clearance.

We also had a person from the department of human services who is visually impaired, blind, to actually do a test and do a voting ballot. We used audio for that. We hooked up speakers instead of the actual headphones for us to here as well as herself. The way the machines operated for her was that the instructions were very well read, very well heard.

When it came to the actual ballot for voting the voice synthesizer was usable hearable, but was not the best. The key pad which is a small hand held type remote was very well addressed with brail for each of the
buttons explaining what button is being used for and there was no problems with her using the machine to vote.

We did certify what she did put into the machine for her requests did come out on the paper for what was inputted by her. The machines to my right.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we go
ahead you said machines to your left which machine are you referring to, is that referring to the Sequoia Advantage machine.

MR. MILLSTEIN: That would be the large machines over here.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: On the front left?

MR. MILLSTEIN: Yes.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: I want to make sure for the record we understand what machines you are pointing to with regard to comments.

MR. MILLSTEIN: The machines to my right. Those also are usable machines by both a wheelchair user as well as someone who has a visual impairment. The machines do rise up and down.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Millstein,
those machines on the right-hand side are the Advante machines, not these ones. The ones we are concerned with are just those ones over here.

MR. MILLSTEIN: So I guess in
closing -- so we are only going to be speaking the machines to the my left. Those machines are usable for both a person who is a wheelchair user a person who would have a visual impairment being youth rise the machine. The machine is workable readable has voice activation for both the voice synthesizer as well as the instructions.

Everything that was inputted by the user did certify by paper trail so at this point $I$ would say yes, this would be a certified machine to someone with a disability.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very much for your input.

Why don't we take a five-minute break and then we will come back we will take public comment. I would suggest that we have six people signed up for comments.

Now, if you do want to speak don't forget to sign up so we will reconvene in five
minutes and take the public comment in the order signed up.

Thank you.
(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we go into public session and get public comment, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Mahoney have one or two questions to ask so while everyone getting ready I will ask Mr. Mahoney to go first.

MR. MAHONEY: The question I have during the prelogic and accuracy test when the technicians are setting up the machine if the VVPRS also tested at that time?

MR. SMITH: Yes, it is the procedures that we have given in the jurisdictions, for instance, the Edge with VVPAT call for the same testing that you do today with VVPAT, however, we take the secondary step the taking the VVPAT record matches the script whether its simulation whether it be by manual.

MR. MAHONEY: Thank you. MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Fleming. MR. FLEMING: A lot of questions we have had have been based on fixed in the
firmware and you said the firmware is being tested by the federal government?

MR. SMITH: Yes.
MR. FLEMING: Is there any reason why NJIT couldn't get and test at the same time and answer all the questions?

MR. SMITH: There is two aspects to that one. I believe it is clear that it needs to be certified and gone through the testing. Second, the timing of the regulations prohibited that.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: We are going to head into the public comment part of the area. This is the last part and I appreciate your patience especially those who want to speak. Again, just to refresh our collective memories, if you have questions comments please address them to me.

You will do us a large favor if you keep comments directed towards the issue the committee has to deal with, namely, whether or not this particular piece of equipment meets the State guidelines.

Having said that we have a sign-up sheet and I am delighted to ask those who have
signed up to come in order and $I$ will start out with Penny Venetis from the public advocates office.

MS. VENETIS: I just want to make one minor correction before I speak. My name is Penny Venetis, that is true, but I actually am a law professor at Rutgers Law School. I am not with the public advocates office.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: My apologies.
MS. VENETIS: In my capacity as a clinical professor at Rutgers Law School, I'm also lead counsel in a lawsuit called Gusciora, versus Corzine which many people in the room might be familiar with and that lawsuit challenges on constitutional grounds the -- I'm going to continue the lawsuit Gusciora, versus, Corzine was filed in 2004 and challenges on constitutional grounds the use of electronic voting machines in the state that do not produce a voter verified paper ballot.

I would like the record to reflect my strong belief that this committee should not certificate the AVC Advantage printer that has been demonstrated today and that AVC Advantage should be replaced with optical scanners that
scan paper ballots. Since the Help America Vote Act was passed by Congress in 2001 and states began spending money on audible electronic voting machines, computer scientists have offered study after study that electronic voting machines can be tampered with to manipulate the election. That vulnerability is the thrust of the Gusciora lawsuit. Because of the vulnerability pose for our most fundamental right to vote by electronic voting machines our own State legislature now requires that every voting machine in the use in the State produce a voter verified paper ballot by January 1st, 2008, which is a short five months. from now. As I have maintained since the Gusciora lawsuit filed in 2004, New Jersey's electronic voting machines cannot be trusted with the right to vote. The Sequoia AVC Advantage, which is most commonly used throughout the state could be manipulated fairly easily. In deed Professor Andrew Apel of Princeton University was able to break into control panel and remove the ROM chip of AVC Advantage which contains valuable information on how votes are cast and stored and tallied in a
matter of seconds. Professor Apel made front page news when he purchased five AVC Advantage series for less than seventeen dollars each from an Internet clearing house called govdeals.com. This purchase made clear that anyone can buy the very same electronic voting machines used by the majority of the voters in the State and that anyone can tinker with them and learn how to manipulate them to throw an election.

Unfortunately, despite evidence of its many vulnerabilities, the software of the AVC Advantage has still not been tested. The NJIT contract that we spoke of for many hours today did not require testing of the software. It only requested testing of the hardware to see whether or not the hardware performs. This new testing of not only hardware and software I believe is mandated by Title 19 given that we have heard repeatedly today that new software was introduced to operate the voter verified paper ballot printers and that new software wear has been introduced to make the machine compliant with the legislature's January 1st requirements.

So I request that this committee not only examine the firmware, but also examine the software because it is new and Title 19 requires that when modifications are made to voting machines, regardless of whether they are electronic or nonelectronic, that the entire system has to be recertified and that does not appear to have been done or to even have been discussed today.

Without such certification, these machines cannot be used given that they have been modified so substantially.

Additionally, Cyber Labs which Sequoia has used to certify its software has been permanently decertified by the federal government.

Now, Mr. Woodbridge, you asked some follow up questions about the certification and the Sequoia representative very definitely refused to truthfully give you information. He said that there are some software that is being tested or some hardware being tested by Wily Labs, but the firmware my understanding is has been used in the past was tested by Cyber. In July of 2006 , Cyber was decertified by the
federal government and only a few weeks ago was permanently decertified by the federal government. The reason Cyber lost its certification was that it is was not applying its own standards in testing the voting machines and the government felt that any reports that were issued by Cyber were not -- indeed did not reflect whether or not the voting machine did indeed meet safety and security guidelines and federal qualifications.

So I ask that you follow up with some questions about what portions of this machine that has been demonstrated today was tested by Cyber Labs.

The NJIT team outlined twelve critical problems that arose during the testing of the printers and should give this committee pause and cause it to reject the printers. I will not go into detail on those twelve exceptions because we have spend the entire day discussing them.

What I do want to point out though
is that those twelve exceptions and the answers given by the Sequoia representative makes very, very clear that these machines are not ready for

State certifications. These machines and the printers that have been demonstrated do not meet the new guidelines that were promulgated by the New Jersey Attorney General's Office and I won't go into the specifics or problems with what $I$ believe exist in the guidelines. I have done that in written comments and that is not the subject of today's hearings, but based on the guidelines that actually exist there are serious problems and reasons why this committee should recommend that the voting machines should not be certified.

Now, members of the Sequoia team have told the State several things .they said that certain parts exist to make the machine tamper proof, but those parts were not provided to the NJIT team until after the testing had been done. We will only have the NJIT's team results to go by. We don't know whether or not those tamper proof seals exist or not and until further testing is done we really won't know whether or not that very critical security issue that was raised by the NJIT team can even be resolved.

Secondly, there have been several

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mentions made the software that is in the process of being developed that we have heard will be made available to the NJIT team that might remedy some of the problems that the NJIT team recognize with the printers. Well, again, first of all, the software won't be made available for another two to three months. That is what was estimated. That brings us dangerously close to the January 1st, 2008 deadline.
Secondly, again, we don't know whether or not the software will indeed solve problems that was raised by the NJIT team and we have absolutely no way of verifying that until it is provided to the State and that software is tested to see whether or not it addresses the NJIT team concerns.
Third, again, since this is a modification of software that we are talking about when this software if and when it is produced, it will require a complete and total recertification of the entire voting mechanism. Not just a test of the hardware to see how many votes it processes, but an entire testing of the software.
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Finally, the NJIT team tested a very small number of voting machines. Computer scientists have made very clear that each voting machine contains software that can be manipulated and altered in very specific and unique ways. Therefore, each voting machine has to be certified and the software has to be certified.

I also asked the committee to ask further questions about the barcode issues that had been raised. I am not a computer scientist, but $I$ have been working very, very closely with computer scientists who looked at NJIT reports an also had serious questions about the barcode issue and whether or not you could actually match a barcode with a specific machine.

Barcodes can be very, very easily manipulated and $I$ will provide the commission with a certification that was drafted by one of my expert witnesses, Andrew Apel of Princeton University who took issue with the barcodes that exist.

I also want to say that according to the contract between the state and NJIT, there was no testing of the barcode required to
make sure that there was an encrypted barcode that was secure.

So I would recommend that the State if the State goes interested in that pursuing that issue further that the contract be expanded so that the NJIT team can really determine with certainty how secure the barcode is. That is particularly important because if you are going to have -- if you are going to count the voter verified paper ballots which is the official ballots using a barcode scanner then the barcode has to be secure plus the scanner has to be tested to make sure the scanner hasn't been manipulated. So I wanted to raise that issue for the committee.

As mentioned earlier the problems that were identified by the NJIT team alone warrant the rejection of the entire system that has been presented to the committee today and that is the subject of these hearings. The AVC Advantage printer reveals itself to be unsecure unreliable and explicitly and specifically fails to meet the State mandates.

Surely this is not the system that the legislature contemplated when it mandated
all electronic voting machines produce voter verified paper ballots to instill voter confidence. It would be a tremendous waste of taxpayer dollars at this point to spend any funds, in particular, dozens of millions of dollars to purchase this faulty system.

So, again, $I$ urge the committee to reject the system that's been presented. I am planning and have spoken to the chair of the committee about submitting written comments and elaborate further on the comments that $I$ have made today. I also in addition to asking the committee to ask the members of the Sequoia team about the Cyber Certification Group and also about the barcode.

I also ask the committee in making its determination as to whether or not to certify these machines to take into account Sequoia Corporation as a whole and whether or not it is a credible corporation whether or not it is an honest corporation. There have been several representations made today that are simply not true. One representation is that Sequoia is a U.S. corporation. It is not, it is a Venezuelan corporation that was under federal

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investigation and the Venezuelan Government,
rather than complying with various federal
investigations, said it was selling off Sequoia
so that it wouldn't have to respond to
governmental questions concerning holdings of
the corporation by the Venezuelan Government.
In addition, there is ongoing federal
investigation on fraud. Charges against the
corporation that is independent from the
investigation into whether or not elections
should be run by a foreign owned corporations.
                        The other issue representation
that have been made deal with the usage of the
AVC Advantage. Yes, it has been used in several
states as has been the Edge, but it also has
been decertified by several counties and states.
Louisiana is selling off its Advantage machines.
It doesn't want them anymore and that is indeed
how Professor Apel got the machine off the
Internet because it was being sold off and
disregarded by the State of Louisiana. Thee
have been multiple problems with the Sequoia
machines. In Chicago is another place that was
mention. Front page New York Times and other
newspaper headlines when Cook County was using
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the Sequoia machines for the first time they were breaking down and there were findings that misrepresentations had been made during the purchase phase. In Mercer County alone misrepresentations were made about when certain products, the voter verified paper ballot counter would be available. It was promised five years ago.

Again, this should all go into the picture of the committee in determining whether or not it should spend good taxpayer dollars on these machines that do not on their face meet State certifications requirements and, again, I am going to supplement these comments with my written comments and $I$ thank the members of the committee for their kind attention.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very much. I understand that the written comments will be provided within the week, is that right? Thank you very good comments.

In the interest of moving things along, I think it is smart that get everybody's input. If there is any reaction to the response by Sequoia representative or committee that will be the best time to do it so they have their
chance to say their peace.
Is Flavio Kowver here.
MR. KOWVER: Mr. Woodbridge and members of the committee, good afternoon. My name is Flavio Kowver, deputy public advocate. The mission of the Department of the Public Advocate is to make government more accountable and responsive to the needs of New Jersey residents.

The public advocate's mission is to act as a voice of the people on a range of critical issues and that vigorously impact the public. The public advocate appears in these proceedings pursuant N.J.S.A. 57:27.W59, which among other things, authorizes the Department to protect the public interest by participating and intervening in administrative proceedings. We also appear pursuant to our rights as a member of the public.

In furtherance of public advocates mission, the public advocate is undertaking the voting rights campaign. On the issue of voting machines specifically for months the public advocate has consistently taken the position that it is necessary to have rigorous state
level certification of our voting machines. That includes specific standards define what that rigorous testing is, that the complete machine be tested and the test simulate election day conditions.

The department in some is working to create a system in which all voters can justify being confident and we present these comments today to address the questions of whether the use of the Advantage machines and, in fact, creates a situation in which voters can justify the confidence of their election machine.

My colleague, Alex Glad, sitting to my left here will bring up to you a number of exhibits that we have prepared numbers one through sixty-seven. We will not be using thirty-eight, thirty-nine, fifty or sixty. We will provide exhibit sixty tomorrow.

This list of exhibits with the exception of last five was communicated to the Attorney General on the morning of Thursday, July 19, in fact, I might add before the NJIT report was, in fact, issued and I would simply make reference to that as well as to our prior
letter to the Attorney General of July 16 as part of the record of this case. We, of course, reserve the right to introduce additional exhibits or testimony as further evidence maybe induced in the course of these hearings.

Mr. Chairman, in this age of electronic voting, the thorough and scientific testing and certification of voting machines can make a difference between a fair election and an unfair one. The right to vote is the hallmark of citizenship, the foundation of democracy and it is too important to be left on machines that may malfunction, printers that may jam or to hackers who may seek to alter election results.

As I mentioned before, the public advocate has for many months been urging the Attorney General in the State chief election official to ensure adequate testing and certification of voting systems that we all use in upcoming elections. This mandate is especially present as the state prepares to the comply with the statute that takes affect in January 1, 2008 requiring paper records of some sort in all voting machines whether through DRE or through different systems where the voter
marks a paper ballot such as an optical scan. In any events, the State must purchase and install more than ten thousand voting machine printers or similar paper based systems.

While the Attorney General has taken the step of seeking independent testing of the printers under consideration, the public advocate continues to have serious concerns about both the standards under which the testing took place and the results of this test.

The committee is now receiving evidence to determine whether those printers proposed for the three voting machines used in New Jersey have been thoroughly tested. The this committee will then make a determination to the Attorney General. As a result, the questions before the voting machine examination committee is, therefore, whether Sequoia has met its burden by proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the Advantage in this case which has been proposed for use in New Jersey by January 1st, 2008 meets all the statutory criteria applicable for the voter verified paper record system. In particular,
our focus is on five of these criteria.
Number one, the machines have been thoroughly tested.

Number two, that the machines are found to be reliable.

Number three, that they are found to guarantee secrecy to all voters in the act of voting.

Four, will correctly register and record and accurately count all votes cast and, five, that each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast which shall be made available for inspection, verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast. Based on the record presented, Mr. Chairman, Sequoia has not met those elements.

The need to completely and thoroughly test voting machines and their printers prior to election day is clear when one considers the history of these devices. In records we have submitted, we have demonstrated various recent elections where printers in particular as well as other components of voting machines have failed, sometimes on a massive
basis.
While it's true not all these examples represent products of Sequoia or represent products of the Advantage, we nevertheless have an instance in the 2006 primary election held in Ohio lost ten percent of the paper ballots and in the November 2006 election, a county in North Carolina experienced problems in about nine percent of printers there.

Again, while not Sequoia printers, the fact that manufacturers who are supposedly enjoy the benefit the federal testing have their printers fail demonstrate the thorough State testing is appropriate to determine whether similar debacles would occur here in New Jersey. The lesson to be learned from this, therefore, is readily apparent. Because voting machines and printers present risk of malfunctioning and breaking, proper rigorous an scientific standards and proper rigorous and scientific testing are required.

The current record fails to
establish the printers confirm to State law and, therefore, the public advocate recommends that
on the record as it now exists these printers not be approved. The criteria the State promulgated for evaluating the reliability and accuracy of these printers is really a problem in the process of evaluating printers. These criteria do not establish any definition of failure or failure rate. Therefore, testers cannot know what malfunctions or other problems count as failures or when the number of such problems amounts to a failure of the system.

In our April 16, 2007 comments on this issue which are in the record, we make clear that this represented a violation of legal requirements of the state that machines be thoroughly tested. You might consider this as sort of an analogy. A professor is giving somebody a test, he should let people know what the passing grade for that test is and the State's criteria don't say if a machine fails X number of times in $Y$ number of hours of testing, the machine is a failure. It is unfair $I$ think both to the manufacturers as well as the public to issue this test without stipulating the passing grade.

In contrast to the New Jersey
standards, credible national organizations have recommended standards for voting machine certification. We address these in our comments, but the Federal Election Assistance Commission, for example, in its 2005 voluntary voting systems guidelines and its 2002 voting systems standards says that a voting system should not be certified if a part of that system malfunctions more than once after one hundred sixty-three hours of voting and those standards are reproduced in the record.

The National Institute of
Standards in Technology, in fact, goes even further and they say a system should not be certified if a device within that system malfunctions more than once for every ten thousand voters.

The State did not adopt these kind of standards or meet any kind of standards for determining the failure rate, nor did the State follow the recommendations of these credible national organizations on how to perform testing to verify compliance criteria. 2005 volunteer systems guidelines, for example, makes clear and this is also in the 2002 -- I'm sorry voluntary
voters system guidelines makes clear that in order to verify clients with this requirement machines ought to be tested for at least one hundred sixty-nine hours.

Another example of rigorous testing methods is from the State of California where they look a hundred machines for six hours and have voters manually cast one hundred ten ballots on each machine. If one percent of the machine fails to count the vote properly or three percent of the machines have failure such as powering off of the machine or paper jam that the operating system of the machine cannot greatly manage the machine fails. The criteria for voting machines adopted by this State in which NJIT did not use this kind of modern scientifically accepted methodology for testing. What the State did instead was to pick and choose from selected portions, not very detailed and rigorous ones of the 2005 federal guidelines and to ask NJIT to test to those ill defined and nonrigorous standards. We did not test for one hundred sixty-nine hours. As best we can tell from this report, there was a twelve hundred vote test somewhere on the order of
eight or nine hours and fourteen hour test took fourteen hours for a total somewhere between twenty and twenty-five hours of testing or so. Not withstanding the claims of thousands of hours have been devoted to testing. What I can see from the NJIT reports is those were the two tests, the two volume tests at issue which were performed.

In fact, if these kinds of standards had been in place, what you have seen with the Sequoia machines is that they would likely not have passed. While I respect NJIT's views that the printer jam might not have resulted in the loss of fifty-six votes, I will accept for the sake of argument that representation. Nevertheless, after in the twenty-five or so hours of volume testing that were done the machine jammed once. Jamming after nine hundred twenty-two votes in a twelve hundred vote test. So if the federal standard one in one hundred sixty-three hours had been in place or in the NIST standard of ten thousand voters had been placed or even if the physical standard of one percent and three percent of the machine had been in place, that would have
resulted in a failure and it is unfortunate that the State did not list and test to those particular standards. Those standards being scientifically accepted, modern, appropriate for printer testing.

I would also add and the professor mentioned this before. I want to add to this as well. Given the testing appears to have focused on the printers alone rather than the system as a whole, this is somewhat problematic. Under State law any change to a voting system that impairs the efficiency of the voting system means the entire system has to be retested and I would refer you to both the 2005 guidelines as well as Exhibit 36 and, frankly, what doctor -it was a Sequoia representative that mentioned the addition of the VVPAT additional work to the voter.

So what you have is the addition of the printer requires you to recertify the entire system before it can be used again in the State. Again, there is no evidence in the record of the meaningful review of this machine software or source code. I understand there is representations that some kind of examination is
underway, but it has not been completed as of yet. Which would suggest to me that thorough testing in this record has not occurred.

Let me just address some of the exceptions that NJIT noted in its report. First of all, it was said $I$ think without conviction that once the voter recess the button to cast their third ballot, the ballot cycles through the machine without stopping and it cycles through in a manner that the voter does not have sufficient time as doctor she stated before. The voter does not have sufficient time to look at and confirm whether those votes were
accurately cast. Again, the N.J.S.A. 1948 VVPAT and what they are supposed to do that presence a real problem with the statute as well as the testing as performed by NJIT.

It was also stated before that voting machines do not always display the proper diagnosis of a problem. There is really know evidence to contradict that. The evidence I think is that a update of that software is in testing, but as it stands right now it does not meet that criteria.

I would also speak briefly about
exception twelve. I mentioned this before about the paper jam. Even if you accept that the jam would not have resulted in a loss of fifty-six votes in a real election if you accept that there was still a jam and it occurred in less than time frame prescribed for failure by the DSS, the voter verified system guidelines as well as NIST standards.

> In sum, Mr. Chairman, voters
deserve reasonable assurances that the machines and printer are reliable accurate private and secure. Statute requiring a paper record has been replaced since July 2005. We are very late in that process. I also want to raise the concern that the NJIT reports were replaced late on any after noon in the public and here we are on a Tuesday morning. That presence a serious issues as to whether the public and advocates had enough time to road those reports, prepare to respond and it causes me great concern that these hearings move forward so precipitously and so soon after the reports were published. We previously articulated that to the committees counsel so I am not going to repeat that again today, but suffice it to say that three reports
have more than a hundred twenty pages each is a little bit to digest in the course of one business day.

For the reasons I have stated for the reasons in the documents presented Sequoia has not met its burden of establishing their system has been thoroughly tested found to be reliable or correctly registers to report all votes cast and applied to the mandate every voter to register their vote. On the present record the certification should be denied without prejudice to return when it confirming system is presented.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you for your comments. The timing is not good for anybody.

Theresa Engel. Mike Van Pelt. Ann Reu.

MS. REU: I'd like to thank the committee for allowing me to speak. My name is Ann Reu and I've come from Montclair, New Jersey I am a member of Blue Wave New Jersey, a grass roots political organization.

We have been concerned that any voting system be secure, accurate and reliable.

In short we want every vote accurately counted and in such a manner that the electorate will have total confidence in the results of all elections.

To this end, we have attended meetings of our county Freeholder Board. We have contacted our local election officials. We have reviewed the purchase contracts between Essex County and Sequoia. We have repeatedly requested an opportunity to view and test the proposed printer which is the subject of this hearing. Despite these requests, no access to the printer was given until today July 24,2007 when the hearing is taking place. .
Additionally, the report of NJIT
which tested the printer was not available until the end of last week. We wish to express our great concern and dismay that the procedure. Instead of transparency and openness we feel that there is only the illusion of a fair process. That being said and with the understanding we object to the framework of this hearing, we would like to note the following egregious shortcomings in this system which are obvious even with the limited opportunity
afforded to observe the machine and prepare for this hearing.

No real world testing has been
done. Instead of having a large number of machines tested by average voters operated by regular poll workers under conditions approximating an actual election, three probably brand new machines were tested under laboratory conditions. We have no way of calculating the probable failure rates based on these tests. The underlying machine has not been properly certified.

Additionally, even the inadequate certification of the machine previously done is no longer valid due to the modifications made to accommodate the printer. The entire value of the printed record is that it be voter verified. The fact that there is no opportunity for the voter verification of the third ballot after two have been rejected suggests clearly fatal to any possibility of accepting this machine.

This was the criteria set by the Attorney General and despite of all the time given to the manufacturer, they have not yet met this minimal standard. A voter verified ballot
requires to the voter can see his actual final ballot in the substantial number of instances where the voter rejects his first two ballots. There is no verification as of now. This must be corrected before the next election.

The failure to demonstrate seals and locking mechanisms at this late date is another cause for concern. A follow up demonstration should be in order to see the promised changes.

As noted, there was insufficient opportunity to review the report and observe the devices to bring an exhaustive disposition of their deficiencies, however, it is clear that the machines not only have not been properly tested, but even the tests done have demonstrated fatal and egregious flaws. The proposed purchase of these machines should not go forward.

The voting machines have not been modified to confirm with the minimal requirements necessary to safeguard the electoral process. For far less expenditure of public monies, we can use a paper ballot with optical scan counters and avoid the possibility
of fraud and manipulation inherent in the proposed system. We must do as was done in Florida, Maryland and other jurisdictions and put the security of the vote first.

We strongly urge the proposed
devices be rejected. Thank you.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very
much for your comments.
Mary Ellen Marino.
MS. MARINO: Thank you. Thank you
very much. Mary Ellen Marino, M-a-r-i-n-o. I have to thank the other public testifiers because they have worked long and hard and have given me a lot of information that. I didn't have before, but $I$ must admit that $I$ was appalled to walk in here at 9:00 o'clock and find out immediately from the Attorney General that the machines had already been decided on that they were already okay and then by a few minutes before 3:00 after spending three-quarters of the a day I learned that that wasn't the case. Not only were we only supposed to talk about the printers and the paper trail, in fact, it hadn't still been decided by the Attorney General whether these machines were
acceptable or still in negotiation.
But the fundamental thing that $I$
want to do is just to submit an alternate. This is unfortunately national numbers of voting districts and cost, but to submit some cost information on hand counting the ballots and/or optical scanning the ballots because clearly if what we want is the integrity of the vote and we have been hearing more and more and more about vote stealing, vote fraud and election fraud and abuse that we must do what we can and that is to have a public control of the elections publicly counted and not hidden in some unverifiable code.

I happened to work in the State of New Jersey when we brought in computers twenty-five years ago and we brought the Wang. The Wang doesn't even exist anymore and it is kind of the example of what we are doing now. We are buying with big dollars machines that haven't been tried and tested and true. If this machine as $I$ learned 3:00 o'clock was tested and approved by the State in 1994 and they continually and at this very moment is making more changes. Then we haven't really tested and
approved the machines that you are talking about having us use this year.

So I am just going to submit this documentation and I thank you very much for listening to me.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you for your very nice well targeted comments. Thank you very much.

Ellen Sleeter and before we begin, there were two people who signed up whose names appear here, but don't appear to be present so if there is anybody that we overlooked, please let me know.

MS. SLEETER: Hi, my name is Ellen
Sleeter. Battery failure, does that ever happen. My name is Ellen Sleeter. I am from Maplewood, New Jersey. I am active and an organizer of Essex County Democracy for America. We and Blue Wave comprised of voter task force in Essex County to try to assert more involvement in the acquisition of the voting machines there.

I have one question which you can answer at your leisure because I am the last speaker, but, boy, I want to hear the answer and
then three comments and $I$ will start with a question.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: All questions to the Chair.

MS. SLEETER: The question is about digital signatures. Now, I heard -- I read very clearly what $I$ understood in NJIT's response to their testing which was that the individual ballot record did not contain a digital signature. I heard in clarification comments twice from Sequoia that yes, that was a true observation that there was a digital signature for the aggregate for that machine, but later in this course on the same topic I heard from another person in Sequoia that yes, there was a digital signature at the barcode level and, therefore, the barcode level represented the individual ballot so that seems to me to be in contradiction.

So I would like to be clear about whether this did pass the test of having the digital signatures at the ballot level currently not in firmware that will be available in two to three months. So that is the question.

Comments. I looked at the Sequoia

Advantage when $I$ was first demonstrated at Turtle Back Zoo in Essex County that was some years ago and tested immediately. I have an IT background. I worked in IT since the seventies. I know about the Internet since many of you were born. I tried to write in mechanism and was appalled at the inability once having stated a write-in that $I$ couldn't somehow recall it. I couldn't neither change it nor could I even see what $I$ had written in.

Now, in this demonstration day.
The good news is that you can on the paper ballot see what you have written in. The bad news is that it was very difficult.from a user interface standpoint and that is something $I$ know something about to know how to make that change. I rejected the ballot, I saw it. I can't recall -- $I$ couldn't figure out how to get myself into a reset mode on the write-in itself. I finally did get myself into reset mode and I am not sure how I did. That I might have just changed the buttons and then it gave me -- in the little panel it gave me these arrows where $I$ could accept it or reject it. These arrows were pointing to something that was
unclear to me. So rejection was on the left which is good for DFA and I pressed some buttons and ultimately rejected the write-in and got a chance to write it again. This is very hard. I am a computer geek. You don't see my propeller head, but it is there. That is a problem.

Three strikes I must register my utter dismay at the inability to verify as presented the third attempt at the ballot. We understand that the legislation says you can't change it, but the absolute assurety that Sequoia presented about the fact that because it says you can't change it, you don't need to verify it because it is a done deal. That is not okay. That is not good business.

The section $6 C 2$ quote $I$ heard the vendor shall submit a certification that the VVPRS satisfies the State criteria and Sequoia said yes, they have submitted that. But how can you submit a certification that you satisfy the criteria when the NJIT report says that clearly you have not. So maybe I don't understand that process. I don't perhaps understand the process.

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Lastly, I urge you to reconsider
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the Sequoia Advantage processor itself because it is certainly changed and it has been not we think credibly certified as a voting machine itself. We think this is a great opportunity to save the money that you would have spent on retrofitting the Advantages with this printer and go to paper ballots that are counted using optical scanners.

Thank you.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very
much. Do we have any other input from the public?

Okay, seeing no input $I$ ask the vendors in they have any comments they would like to make in response. Why they are caucusing, $I$ am going to ask the committee if they have any questions to ask.

MR. CHAGARIS: May I ask the -- my name is Arthur Chagaris on behalf of Sequoia.

I'd like to request that whatever documentation has been submitted to the commission today by the public advocate or would be submitted apparently by Ms. Venetis and the other witness that we also get a copy of that information so we may have an opportunity to
review it if that is appropriate.
MR. WOODBRIDGE: I'm going to ask the public advocate, are their copies that can be provided to the vendor?

MR. KOWVER: They are not copies of publication if they are requesting the exhibits in as something we can provide probably tomorrow.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think that is what he is requesting and also in fairness to the public advocate provided us with a list of what these documents were going to be I presume that is the same list as consistent with the documents that we have.

MR. KOWVER: Yes, sir, I think the list was one through sixty-seven.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So maybe if you could provide the list sooner rather than later and get the follow up documents to them in the day or two.

MR. CHAGARIS: Also, with respect to the other two witnesses that they had follow up statements, we'd like to get those statements as well.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I understand that
the professor is going to get us comments by the end of the week, is that right, and Mary just gave us your's, correct, so I think the answer to that question is could you arrange to get a copy to the attorney over here.

MR. CHAGARIS: As to the other comments that were made at this time, I'd like to present Mr . Adolph Romei as to sort of legal issues and thereafter the other representative from Sequoia would present some technical issues.

MR. ROMEI: Adolph Romei on behalf of Sequoia. There is a few misinformation that seemed to keep circulating. One is that Sequoia is not a U.S. company. Sequoia is a Delaware corporation with headquarters currently in Oakland, California.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Get closer to the microphone.

> MR. ROMEI: Sequoia is a Delaware corporation. The management is American. It is based in Oakland, California at the current time. It is not a foreign corporation. Second item that seems to keep coming up is federal investigations. To my
knowledge as outside counsel Sequoia is not the target of any federal investigation.

Third, the issue of foreign
ownership. Sequoia voluntarily or I should say its parents voluntarily filed a application it is my understanding that that application has been resolved there is no ongoing investigation.

If there is any further questions the committee has.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You said there are some technical comments.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, just a few comments. There have been some significant comments. The question to be said about on page six of the October 2006 federal certification letter regarding it clearly indicates on page six this is given to the Attorney General that Wyle Laboratories did an assessment on the Advantage firmware. That is clearly obviously what you heard earlier, but it is here on page six.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Which firmware are you talking about that Wyle did that testing on?

MR. SMITH: About the Advantage.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: On this machine here?

MR. SMITH: On that machine so that is contradictory to what we heard.

There was some discussion on barcode encryption. Barcode encryption is not in the regulations. It is not required anywhere so I am not sure why that is brought up as an issue.

The question that was asked, the short summary version is that if the electronic records and when the polls are closed have to be signed. The barcode of each individual which is what is on the paper and not in the units have a authorization for every cast vote record. So those two are not contradictory because the records are in different places. If you still puzzled, I will be happy to speak to you about it.

I think that is all $I$ have for the technical issues. In terms of just a short summary of my remarks going back to the very beginning of the day with NJIT and the testing that they did was thorough and it was indeed rigorous and the public advocates to state that
trying to disclaim that they are not. The machines tabulate accurately and that they are able to tie in in four places where the voters intent is recorded in the machine and the paper record which by the way, it is viewed by the voter and it is thus independent of the software and the machine which is more modern.

The fact is paper record and voter gets to see it and it can be recounted and it is protected with both physical and procedural security and electronic security so that we know that we can trust.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, is there a short comment? Okay, we have got to wrap up because we have got two more days.

MS. VENETIS: Yes, thank you very much and this is just a follow up comment. This is Penny Venetis from Rutgers Law School. Two issues. The federal investigation there is still an ongoing federal investigation on bribery charges. The Miami Herold has documented this quite well and continues to document it.

Sequoia is a holding of a
Venezuelan corporation. That is why it was the
subject of a second federal investigation. The company, the holding company said that it would sell off Sequoia rather than continue to comply with a request from the federal government. To my knowledge, that sale has not yet occurred so it is still a holding of a Venezuelan corporation.

I would ask this committee to specifically ask members of Sequoia whether or not Cyber has tested any of the software in this machine perhaps maybe Wyle did test a component, but my understanding is from letters sent to Judge Feinberg by the Attorney General's Office that Cyber was indeed the laboratory that was testing this components.

So it is a very simple question and perhaps maybe Wyle did test some of the components, but my understanding is that Cyber also tested components and did indeed test the bulk of the components and that information came directly from the Attorney General's office.

Thank you.
MR. CHAGARIS: Just a short reply
as far as the investigation is concerned. I don't know how there is disclosure of any kind
of federal investigation because it is my understanding federal investigations are supposed to be confidential, but we have not been indicted for anything and as far as $I$ know we are not going to be indicted for anything. So you can throw out loosely in terms of federal investigation without any evidence that there is such an investigation that we are a target or anything, but it is just not the case.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, it is
getting towards the end. Make sure people understand that this is not an easy gratification exercise. We are to make some sense out of this and then give to the office as soon as possible some kind of recommendation. Again, I want to stress that these criteria are longer better or worse, but they are longer than we have had to deal with before and this is a new aspect of what we had to do so I request your patience as we try to sort through this and make some sense of it.
I do want to thank again NJIT for
sitting back there patiently in the hottest part of the room and enduring this and helping us. It's been extremely valuable and I am sure you
will have us who are here including the audience appreciate. This goes beyond the call I ask Tony, the court reporter, a question how soon is it likely we can got the transcript.

I just want is to remind people that the second day hearing start tomorrow. I assume it will be at the same time so we will see you here at 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning. At that time we will review the pros and cons of the Sequoia Edge machine which is the other machine over there in the corner and look forward to seeing you there.

Thank you very much for your patience and thank you for attending.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 4:20 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, ANTHONY HOFMANN, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, and Notary Public within and for the State of New Jersey, certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of the stenographic notes of said witness(es) who were first duly sworn by me, on the date and place hereinbefore set forth.

ANTHONY HOFMANN, C.S.R.
LICENSE NO. XIO1854

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