1	STATE OF NEW JERSEY
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3	IN THE MATTER OF: *
4	* TRANSCRIPT
5	VOTING MACHINE HEARING * OF
6	XX PROCEEDINGS
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9	NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY
10	151 EGGERTS CROSSING ROAD
11	LAWRENCEVILLE, NEW JERSEY
12	Tuesday, July 24, 2007
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1	B E F O R E:
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3	VOTING MEDIA EXAMINATION COMMITTEE
4	RICHARD WOODBRIDGE, Chairman
5	DARYL MAHONEY, Member
6	JOHN FLEMING, Member
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1	(The time is approximately 10:10
2	a.m.)
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4	MR. ORLANDO: Thank you all for
5	coming for this hearing for the public
6	examination of the voting machines or the VVPRS
7	that is up for certification. Special thanks to
8	NJIT for doing the testing for this which is
9	unprecedented by the state.
10	Without further ado, I'd like to
11	introduce the Attorney General, Ms. Anne
12	Milgram.
13	MS. MILGRAM: Thank you very much.
14	Good morning, welcome to I think Jason said
15	it right, it is unprecedented for the State of
16	New Jersey. It is a pleasure to be here.
17	I want to start by thanking the
18	committee members who are giving us their entire
19	week to basically go through this very important
20	process to see and to test and basically take
21	testimony on whether or not the voter verified
22	paper attachment that has been submitted by
23	Sequoia should be certified.
24	They will make recommendations and
25	the determination will be made to certify these

devices.

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I wanted to say a couple words because I think if you sit here today or the next three or four days, if you look around you are going to see something pretty incredible and something you don't often get to see which is democracy in action. This is what it is about.

Voting is the most integral part of democracy. It's one of most important things that the State of New Jersey and the Attorney General's office, the Division of Elections does is to protect the right to vote. It is our sincere and profound obligation just as people of the state have a right to vote, it's our duty to make sure that we protect the integrity of the vote, show that every single voter that walks into the machine knows that when they cast a vote, that the vote that they cast is going to be counted and that they have full comfort that the election will be fair and the machines will work and that the results as they come out at the end of the day will be consistent with how the people have voted. That is democracy.

What you are going to see in the next three or four days is a very open and

1 transparent process. For the first time, the 2. State of New Jersey has issued criteria for the voter verified paper attachments. 3 This is something that legislature has, which I strongly 4 5 agree with to basically say we need to have 6 voter verified paper attachments on our 7 electronic machines so that the public can have confidence and we can have confidence that the 8 9 votes we cast are actually being counted the way 10 that we have cast them. So that if I am voting 11 for someone, I can look up at that piece of 12 paper and confirm that is the vote I have cast. 13 What the legislature did is they 14 required that the voter verified paper 15 attachment be in effect January 2008. So the 16 State of New Jersey and the Attorney General's 17 Office stepped back and we looked at what other 18 states were doing. We looked at what the 19 Federal Election Systems Commission was 2.0 recommending and the Federal Election Systems 21 Commission was recommending voluntary 22 guidelines, not mandatory, recommended 23 nationally, they are voluntary and go into 24 affect in 2008.

Those are the guidelines that we

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use when we come up with our criteria. We are going to follow the national standard and we not only follow it, but actually go beyond it in a number of areas. The State Division of Elections felt we could and should do more to protect the right to vote. That is where we started.

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We issued those criteria, we held the criteria open for public comment and then they were publicly released. That is the point in which we took a second unprecedented step. We went out and contracted, Attorney General Rabner, contracted with the New Jersey Institute of Technology for the first time in the history of the State. We went out and we basically got an independent group of computer experts to kick the tires to basically take these machines through the tests to say are they going to be able to stand up to the criteria that the State of New Jersey requires.

How are we going to find that out, the answer was basically asking NJIT, the computer experts in the back of the room to spend weeks upon weeks testing the machines, voting them to make sure the machines are safe,

to make sure the machines are secure, to make sure that the machines work. You will actually see the reports. Those reports have been issued publicly. There will be testimony about the process NJIT followed today.

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You will hear from the vendors who will talk a little bit about their products and their machines and then I hope very much that we also get to hear from all of you sitting in the audience, the public, the people who actually vote. We want to hear your comments.

Again, this is democracy in action. This is a very important part of the process which is finding out what voters think about these machines which are here for you to try out and to test today.

So the hearing will be conducted and -- actually, let me step back and make one other comment about the machines in general.

Because I have gotten a number of questions about that. The question is can voters have confidence in the electronic machines. I believe the answer is yes. Without the verified paper trail, the State looked at a number of different machines and we come away with full

confidence that the DRE the State is using works
and are accurate and the voters can have
confidence.

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What we are doing today is doing belt and suspenders. The voter verified paper trail is important because if there is any question about whether or not your vote is being counted when you cast your vote, that question will be gone because you will be able to look up and see who it is. You will be able to push a button on the electronic machine, know who you voted for, look up and then see on that paper trail whether or not that is the vote that is being cast and then counted in a recount. That is critically important because it will let voters have confidence when they cast a ballot that is the actual vote that will be counted.

Now, that is belt and suspenders. What the State would like to do and, again, it is an ongoing process is belt, suspenders and shoelaces which is to say we want and believe that there have to be mandatory random audits in addition to these two other pieces.

In addition to have electronic machines and in addition to having the voter

verified paper attachments, we are going to need to have an audit process that is random and mandatory in a certain percentage of our machines. That way, again, the voter will know and it will cast the vote on the electronic machine, the paper will come out, the paper will be the official ballot for the recount and then what the State will do is take responsibility to randomly audit to make sure that the votes that are being cast, the paper ballots are consistent with the electronic ballots and that is a way to make sure we can have absolute and complete confidence in our voting machines.

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So I believe this is an important part of the process. Again, this is an important step. These hearings are just on the voter verified paper attachment. These are on the criteria the State issued. I recognize there will be people here who want to talk about other things. I will tell you for the purpose of this committee and the purposes of the certification, the only comments that we are actually going to use and incorporate and the committee will take under advisement will be those that relate to the voter verified paper

attachment because that is the subject of today's hearing, but again, I want to thank you for being here. It is democracy in action.

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I am going to ask you to basically honor the great traditions of democracy which is to get involved publicly. Obviously, we expect and know that you will be professional and courteous. I want everyone here to engage and I think it is a critical part of the process we hold these hearings publicly and we have these public conversations about one of the most important things we do in the State which this is.

So I want to thank everyone for being here. I want to thank NJIT and thank the committee and without further ado, I want to turn it over for the important work to happen. Thank you very much.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you, Anne, and congratulations again on a perfect introduction to what we do.

Let me start off with a few preliminary things. First of all, I would like to thank the Attorney General's Office who has been a tremendous support and assistance to us

including Jason Orlando, Donna Kelly, Karen

Dumars, Donna Barber and Maria Koch. Without

their help it will be very difficult to do our

job. So I publicly want to thank you and I'd

like to thank the Attorney General and I'd like

to thank NJIT.

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This is a new dimension for us and we've always felt that it would be useful to have some technological background and assistance and we are delighted to have you all with us today. Especially pleased to see a significant turn out for today's hearings.

Just a little bit of background for those of you who may not be familiar with the State procedure. Item nineteen is what dictates the election with the laws and our election machines and have a rather unique part to it that requires a three person committee, namely us, to make a recommendation to, in this case, the Attorney General's Office concerning whether or not a machine meets the criteria that the State should set forth.

It does have the unique and rather odd characteristic of requiring that a patent attorney be on that committee and that's what I

1 My background is computers and electronics. 2. I have been in electrical engineering for 3 Princeton University. I have been in the computer business for over forty years and been 4 5 on this committee off and on since 1982. 6 always chairing it. I think the only reason I 7 chair it is because the chair gets asked to 8 write the report so that is why I am here. 9 So I'd like to start off by 10 introducing the two other members of the 11 committee. On my left is John Fleming who is in 12 charge of the management information and the 13 Department of Law and Public Safety and, John, 14 you might want to say a few comments about 15 yourself. 16 I have been employed MR. FLEMING: 17 with the State of New Jersey for nineteen years. 18 I have been in computer systems in the office 19 and I have been on this committee since about 2.0 2000. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: On my right, your 22 left, is Daryl Mahoney who is the assistant 23 director of Bergen County voting machines 24 division. If you want to say a few comments.

MR. MAHONEY: Yes, my name is

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Daryl Mahoney. I have been employed with Bergen County for fourteen years as a technician and then I became the assistant director of voting machines. I am also a member of the New Jersey State Election Officials Association.

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MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you, Daryl.

This particular hearing is really quite unique to us. This is the first VVPAT, the voter verified paper trail hearing we've had. The criteria that we have as the Attorney General explained is actually rather long. It is longer and more detailed than this committee has had to deal with in the past.

The hearings today will probably go longer than we traditionally have gone because we have the extra dimension of the NJIT people here too. So I think we are going to insist on fairly tight ground rules so that everybody has an opportunity to speak and to be heard. Basic procedure is we are going to start off with a vendor overview of the machine describing what it is, how it operates.

Then we are going to ask NJIT to come up and present, first of all, their general criteria and scope of work and ultimately some

of what they refer to as exceptions with regard to the Sequoia Advantage machine we are looking at.

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After that the committee will walk through the criteria a piece at a time. It is a fairly laborious process, but the only way we can guarantee, in fact, we are getting the information we need. We also have a checklist that we will go through after that point to make sure we don't miss anything.

Because it is going to be a long meeting and we have to go through the criteria so much longer, I am going to try to keep this fairly tight. Basic ground rules are that you have to understand, first of all, the sole job of the committee is only to make recommendations to the Attorney General's Office. We do not certify voting machines.

The object of our committee here is basically to take a look at the machines and paper trail devices added on to it. Basically, the suspenders which go with the belt to see if, in fact, it meets the criteria that we have been given.

To keep the process moving

smoothly, the vendor will not be taking
questions. There won't be any public questions
until after the vendor has made the
presentation, after NJIT had made the
presentation and after this committee has had an
opportunity to ask its questions. After that
point, we will open it up to public comment.

We probably won't make any

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We probably won't make any determination today simply because I doubt there is going to be enough time to do that. We welcome public comment at the end. We take public comment in consideration in fairness to everybody and to the short attention span of some of us on the committee, we would appreciate it, as the Attorney General suggested, to keep your comments directed towards the materials the committee has to deal with, namely, does the machine we take a look at meet the criteria of the State statute. That is our only job up here and if you keep your comments focused on that aspect, you will be doing us a big favor.

I also should remind people that if you do want to speak, please there is a sign-up sheet. I'm not quite sure where it is -- in the back there. So if you want to

1 speak, please sign up ahead of time. 2. Lastly, very importantly, I am 3 reminded that not only are you not supposed to smoke in the building, but you are not supposed 4 5 to smoke in the front of the building either. 6 So if you are going to smoke, I guess there is a 7 place in the back. 8 Without further ado, I am going to 9 start off with a vendor and ask the vendor to 10 give us an overview of the machine and after 11 that I'm going to ask NJIT to make its 12 presentation. 13 Mr. Smith, are you ready to go on, 14 Why don't you take the microphone. 15 you for coming today. 16 Thank you for having MR. SMITH: 17 us and good morning. Once again, my name is Ed 18 Smith. I'm vice-president of compliance, 19 quality and certification of Sequoia Voting 2.0 Systems. Mr. Chairman, members of the 2.1 22 committee, representatives from the Attorney 23 General's Office and the voters of New Jersey,

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good morning.

We are pleased to be here today to

1 address any concerns and questions the committee 2. may have concerning Sequoia's addition to the 3 voter verifiable paper audit trail or VVPRS in the regulations for use with the Sequoia 4 5 Advantage and the Sequoia Edge machines that you 6 see to my left. 7 The following representatives of Sequoia are pleased to be present today. 8 9 guess it is speak softly and carry a big microphone. I will just start over again. 10 11 Once again, good morning, Mr. 12 Chairman, members of the committee, 13 representatives from the New Jersey Attorney 14 General's Office and the New Jersey voters here 15 present. At Sequoia Voting Systems we are 16 pleased to be here this morning. 17 With me to discuss and respond to

With me to discuss and respond to any questions or concerns from the committee are several folks from Sequoia. Once again, my name is Ed Smith and I am vice-president of compliance, quality and certification. We have Mr. Howard Cramer, who is our vice-president of sales. Mr. David Allen, who is vice-president of our E Voting Solutions development.

Ms. Sandy Green, who is director of

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certification and Mr. Joseph McIntyre, who many of you know is a senior project account manager and Ms. Christine Valeriano, who is also with sales and will provide a demonstration of the equipment shortly.

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Sequoia is an American company.

It was originally founded as the Automatic

Voting Machine Corporation in Jamestown, New

York in 1896. In the over one hundred ten years
that Sequoia has been in business its products
have ranged from some of the original lever

voting machines through paper ballots and now to
the DRE or direct recording electronic machines
that we have before us today for certification.

In fact, Sequoia's Advantage electronic voting machine has been in use in New Jersey since 1994 and has established an excellent track record for reliability and accuracy.

Throughout its history, Sequoia has been a proponent of transparent and verifiable voting. This commitment led Sequoia to be the first manufacturer in the electronic voting machine industry to come out with the VVPAT. In fact, in 2004 the State of Nevada was

1 | the first user and had great success with it.

2 | The VVPAT began in a statewide election, in

3 | fact, in both the primary and presidential

4 elections. Since then we have brought the VVPAT

5 to several of our customers in numerous

6 jurisdictions, sixteen different states

7 | including the District of Columbia. That

8 included twenty-one counties in the State of

9 California, the City of Chicago and Cook County,

10 | Illinois, Colorado and, of course, Nevada as I

11 | mentioned earlier and the first use of the VVPAT

12 | in the United States election.

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tests from NJIT.

All that being said, Sequoia recognizes the heightened public concern over the past decade with openness and verified voting process. We commend the State of New Jersey and Attorney General's Office, the New Jersey Institute of Technology for the thorough and rigorous review and testing conducted in anticipation of the use of the Sequoia VVPAT here in the State of New Jersey. Sequoia embarked on the certification process with confidence in the equipment and we know that confidence is justified by the results of the

One thing to keep in mind as we go forward that the successful elections are a result not just of accurate equipment, but trained personnel and established practiced procedures. Of the items discussed in the NJIT report you will find only a few pertain to the equipment itself and most of those are easily addressed. In fact, many of the solutions are already in place.

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Any testing as thorough as NJIT almost inevitably invites questions and comments. We welcome those and we note that those exceptions contained in the reports relate primarily to the election process itself and not to any impaired use of the VVPAT.

We appreciate and understand the desire of this committee to conduct a thorough review of the report and any concerns and we remain at your service to respond to those questions and to continue to prove our leadership in the VVPAT area and anticipation of using our VVPAT here in the State of New Jersey to benefit the New Jersey voters and their confidence in the elections.

Thank you.

1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Smith, a 2 question. The issue is which machine will you 3 describe today? Which machine are we taking a look at? Maybe give us a brief demonstration of 4 5 it. 6 MR. SMTTH: The machine is a 7 Sequoia Advantage which is a full face voting 8 machine. Full face means at any time the voter 9 can see which selections they have made and what 10 selections they have yet to make and then as the 11 voter verifiable paper audit trail or VVPAT so 12 they can see it and verify their selections are 13 accurately recorded. 14 So Christine is going to give a 15 short demonstration. I will bring her the 16 microphone. 17 MS. VALERIANO: Hello, my name is 18 Christine Valeriano. I am from Sequoia Voting 19 Systems and I am going to give a demonstration 2.0 of our AVC Advantage voting machines voter 2.1 verifiable paper audit trail. 22 The poll worker activates the 23 voting machine for the voter. The voter will

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step inside the voting machine as they currently

They would choose their selections. Once

they have made a final first round of selection, they press the cast vote switch. When that is pressed, the AVC Advantage will dispense a voter verifiable paper audit trail for the voter to review. The voter reviews the ballot to make sure it matches their selection on the face of the machine. If the voter would like to change their mind if they deselect their choice, their ballot is voided. They are then able to go back to the Advantage, make their new selections, press the cast vote switch again. The machine then is going to print another voter verifiable paper audit trail for the voter to review.

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Again, I verified the ballot, make sure it matches my selection on the machine. I then again decide I want to change my mind. I would deselect a selection. It will void my ballot for a second time. I have a third opportunity to cast my ballot. On this third opportunity the AVC Advantage reads this is your final chance to change your ballot. The voter has to acknowledge that they understand this is their third time and final opportunity to cast their ballot. I press okay, I make my final selections, press the cast vote button and it's

automatically going to cast my ballot.

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On the first two ballots it will show that my selections were voided and on the third ballot it shows the barcode and also shows the serial number of the machine. The reason for the barcode is in the event of a recount, we would hand count the ballot images, but you could also use a third party off-the-shelf barcode scanner to make sure your ballots match.

Just to let you know, on election day you are not going to be able to have your ballots. The reason I took them out is to pass around for demonstration. There is a bag attached to the voter verified paper audit sealed on by lock and key.

I had one question to show how to change the paper on the machine. I'm going to turn it around so you can see. The printer has a clear cover on it where the poll worker can see when the paper is running low. It also has a paper low sensor. In the event that the paper needs to be changed, you would uninsert these little pins in the side of the machine that holds the cover on. You would then lift the plastic cover up off of the machine and then

1 there is instructions that says open press down, 2. open push. So you open it, press it down. 3 machine then will allow you to add paper. 4 is approximately five hundred sheets to a ream 5 of paper. So if you take the paper, put it in 6 the cradle, make sure the black line is facing 7 You would then snap this back into place, 8 take the paper and it has an automatic feed that 9 will pull paper through. You put the cover back 10 on, put the pins back on and then you continue 11 the voting process. 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very 13 much. 14 Mr. Smith, do you have any other 15 comments to make at this stage? 16 MR. SMITH: No, sir, not at this 17 time. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: At this point I 19 am going to ask Mitch and your crew from NJIT to 2.0 come forward. Mitch, if you would introduce 2.1 yourself. Those microphones should be hot. 22 Thank you for coming here, otherwise you'd be on 23 vacation. 24 MR. DARER: Good morning.

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mic's working, great.

First of all, I'd like to thank 1 2. the committee, of course, for this opportunity 3 to discuss our project and report. My name is Mitchell Darer, Executive Director of NJIT 4 5 Center for Information Technology. 6 I will provide an overview of the 7 project, of the environment and the testing 8 process. Following my statement, Professor 9 Aridaman Jain, one of the key project leaders 10 will describe the types of tests including 11 sample sizes of ballot scenarios and, finally, 12 professor Yun-Qing Shi, another key project 13 leader, will discuss the exceptions to the 14 criteria found for the Sequoia Advantage machine 15 under examination today. 16 In May 2007, the Attorney 17 General's Office issued, as discussed already, 18 the criteria for voter verified paper records 19 for the paper record for the electronic voting 2.0 machine. It requested NJIT to develop and 2.1 retest and evaluate certain machines against this criteria. 22 23 The thirteen page criteria 24 document includes design requirements, 25 procedural and usability requirements, security

reliability targets each with specific

subelements that form the performance criteria

used in our test.

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The criteria includes qualitative subjective items such as allow the voter to easily review his or her paper record. As well as quantitative items, matters of fact to be determined such as shall not externally communicate with any system or machine. Each of over seventy individual requirements in the criteria was subjected to up to four different types of tests.

Throughout the entire project after all the testing we found that two core requirements were satisfied by all machines. First of all, voters were able to verify their votes on the paper records and, secondly, the vote tallies derived from four different sources, paper records, barcodes on the paper, closed poll reports and electronic records all matched.

On the other hand, exceptions defined as a situation where in testing against the criteria did not completely or clearly yield required or expected results were reported for

each machine. The project team included senior faculty and staff with extensive experience in information technology, cyber security and statistical analysis.

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A secure lab was established and designed to perform the testing and to house all vendor items. Each vendor supplied three machines, for example, the Advantage of a particular model as well as public and internal documentation and other peripheral equipment such as barcode scanners, barcode readers and audio components. Vendor staff explained the machine operations and answered technical questions although they were not present or involved in the actual testing.

Furthermore, the Attorney General's Office did not influence or participate in the testing.

Our team spent thousands of hours over two months on this project scientifically and objectively evaluating and documenting the machine's performance against the criteria.

Four different types of test procedures were designed and used to evaluate different elements of the performance criteria and they were used

for different reasons.

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These four tests are the single test and three types of volume tests. The three types of volume tests are called the twelve hundred vote test, the fourteen hour test and the fifty-six vote test.

The single test is a one time examination or inspection or review of equipment and in vendor documentation. The twelve hundred vote test is a volume test involving mock voting casting twelve hundred votes either manually or through electronic programming of the machine. The fourteen hour test emulates real voting situation replicating a typical election day. A long ballot was used completely balanced in terms of the votes and included election questions, write-ins, undervotes and voided votes.

Lastly, the fifty-two vote test is designed to force the paper ballot to extent for multiple pages by looking at a long ballot in conjunction with a large font size.

Furthermore, to support these volume tests, sample ballot scenarios were developed. The results have been tabulated and documented on

1 the reports to the Attorney General's Office. 2. Now, I would like to introduce 3 Professor Aridaman Jain who will discuss the test, the sample sizes and ballot scenarios and 4 5 various tallies. 6 MR. JAIN: Thanks, good morning. 7 I'm Aridaman Jain, in the division of mathematical sciences at NJIT and I will be 8 9 describing in more detail than he did the test 10 procedures. These are the procedures that the 11 Attorney General referenced in the opening 12 remarks. 13 So we had four type of tests, the 14 single test is a one time examination, 15 inspection or review of equipment operations and 16 vendor documentation. It includes a physical 17 inspection of various components of the DRE and 18 the voter verified systems as well as 19 examination and comparison of paper records with 2.0 other records, electronic records and scanned 21 records. 22 The basic operations and 23 configuration of the voter verified system are 24 examined by conducting a mock election by using 25 one or more voters.

Lastly, the vendor documentation is examined to include certain items that are required for how people in the polling booths will be using the equipment.

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There are three types of volume The fourteen hour test emulates the tests. actual physical voting situation over a fourteen hour period that you would run into in a typical election in real life. Mock voters are recruited to cast various types of voting scenarios. Each voter votes for about an hour, they take a couple minutes break and then votes again. So we had several mock voters go through this process. This test procedure adopts -- the fourteen hour test adopts the long ballot where we had twelve different voting scenarios that represent the different types of scenarios that actual voters will run into. Each voter is presented with a shuffle set of cards. We want to randomize the sequence in which the different types of scenarios were voting on.

This fourteen hour test resulted in about six hundred votes being cast manually by the voters. After each set of voting scenarios, the mock voter was asked some

questions about were they able to verify their choices and other questions in terms of doing the voting itself to understand what a real voter would experience. So that is the fourteen hour test.

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The twelve hundred vote simulated test generates about twelve hundred votes continuously based on a short ballot. the ballot that was demonstrated to you a few minutes ago. This is done through a script the program set up electronically for two minutes and manually for one type of machine. So here the votes are not cast by people, but electronically. The number of votes, twelve hundred, was chosen to exceed the guidelines of seven hundred fifty voters and also to meet other statistical criteria. The way the twelve hundred votes were generated electronically was that we generated the long ballot which had nineteen voting slots, hundred and twenty-five times and the supplemental ballot, the other kind of ballot, fifty times. So we had long ballot and hundred twenty-five and long ballot fifty times resulting in twelve hundred votes. So these tests generated the paper records that

we saw earlier. The electronic records and the barcode records, the one that are scanned with the barcode and we compared all of them and the same kind of thing was done for the fourteen hour voting.

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The third kind of volume test that we did was fifty-two vote test. We conducted fifty-two votes. The main focus was to be able to test out multiple page ballot. But in addition to the multiple page, we also wanted to test out the capability to change votes. You vote and you change your vote up to two times and those machines where it is feasible, we also tested the fleeing voter scenario. Somebody doesn't complete the voting process and walks away, what happens.

To support these three types of testing we developed two types of ballots, the short ballot that you see on these Advantage machines with nine slots and then the long ballots which you run in some elections with nineteen items. The eight scenarios were completely balanced in terms of whether you vote for Republican or Democrat, whether you answer yes or no to a question. In that respect they

were completely balanced and they were designed to represent millions of possible choices that a voter can have with nineteen slots.

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Then we had four hour voting scenarios which captured the write-in votes and other scenarios that we used the ballots. After doing all these three types of volume tests, we generate four types of categories. Paper records that are there, take them out, put back and counting them, how many votes were cast for each position. The scanned barcode paper records counts of those and then the voting machine itself had a tally of how many votes had been cast for each position and finally the electronic votes. We compared all those four types of tallies for the fourteen hour test and they matched perfectly hundred percent agreement.

Now, for one of the machines there was a paper jam which resulted in a loss of some paper ballots. So in that case we were able to compare the paper records with the scanned records and they matched perfectly. We could compare these to the other two which are the tallying of the machine and the electronic

1 record and those two matched perfectly so we did 2. not find any errors in terms of these four types 3 of counts. 4 Thank you. 5 MR. SMITH: Thank you. I'd like 6 to introduce Professor Yun-Qing Shi who will 7 discuss the exceptions and will cycle the 8 criteria for the machine under examination for 9 the Sequoia Advantage. 10 MR. SHI: My name is Yun-Qing Shi. 11 Professor of electrical at NJIT. As they 12 already mentioned in general, our testing found 13 that the AVC Advantage machine complied with 14 most of the criteria mainly, basically, with 15 some problem, but basically voter can verify 16 their sheet on the paper record. 17 Secondly, the electronic records 18 compared with the paper records match each other 19 so after you compile it. There are twelve 2.0 exceptions we would like to present here. 2.1 representing some problems including some 22 additional reports. 23 So exception number one, one of 24 the criteria by the AG's office is the VVPRS may

be designed in various configurations.

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configurations, prior to casting the ballot, the voter shall have the ability to verify his or her selections on a paper record in a private and independent manner.

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Exception number one says if an observer is six feet or even closer is allowed to stand directly next to the left or right side of the curtain, he or she may be able to look in and see the section on the voter panel. If on the left side, this observer may also be able to see the paper record in the display unit so that's exception number one.

Exception number two. On one hand the criteria says, the paper record shall be printed and the voter shall have the opportunity to verify the paper record in its totality prior to the final electronic record being recorded.

Our finding is that the voter does not have an opportunity to verify the contents of the paper record corresponding to the third vote which is the last vote and they deposit it into the storage bag immediately after print. So in general the voter will be able to verify his selection, but the last one which the voter does not have a chance to change anymore, but

that is the last one, this one the voter cannot
have enough time to view it again because that
one is dropping into the bag.

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MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is it the voter doesn't have enough time or the voter doesn't see it at all?

MR. SHI: That is because the machine is designed in such a way that is the first one you have enough time to review it, second time same. The third time, that's the last one, you do not have more choice and this one goes quickly into the bag.

The third exception according to the criteria is voter privacy should be preserved during the process of the recording, verifying and auditing ballot selections. This includes a voter who uses an audio voting device. Voters using an audio voting device should also be able to verify votes privately and independently.

What we found is that for audio assisted voting if the paper record is printed in multiple pages, otherwise there is no problem, but if the paper record occupied more than one page, then the voter is prompted to

print to the next page after the first page on that screen rather than slow the audio message. So this one may violate privacy of the visually impaired voters by exposing the paper record to the poll worker.

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The exception number four, the criteria says an electronic ballot image record should have a corresponding paper record and another criteria is the electronic ballot image record and paper records should be linked by including unique identifiers so that an individual paper record can be identified with its corresponding electronic record.

What we found is that the only identifier of the paper record that can link to the associated electronic ballot image is the ballot index contained in the barcode that is printed on the paper record. If there are one or more paper records missing, then that is a circumstance the electronic ballot image records cannot be correctly linked with their corresponding paper ballots.

The exception number five, according to the criteria, the printer should be designed to have a sufficient amount of paper,

1 ink, toner, ribbon or like supplies for use in 2. an election, taking into account an election district should have at least one voting machine 3 per seven hundred fifty registered voters. 4 5 We found that paper replacement is 6 expected after about five hundred votes. 7 The exception number six criteria 8 is that the printer should be secured by 9 security seals or locking mechanisms to prevent 10 tampering. The printer should be accessed only 11 by those election officials authorized by the 12 county commissioner of registration. 13 What we found is that the printer 14 is not secured by any security seals or locking 15 mechanism and it may be vulnerable for 16 tampering. That's number six. 17 Number seven, the criteria asks, 18 the paper record should include identification 19 of the particular election, the election 2.0 district and the voting machine. 2.1 What we found is the particular 22 election name, namely primary election or 23 general election is not printed on the paper

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record.

Exception number eight, the

criteria is asking for -- says the DRE should
generate and store a digital signature for each
electronic record.

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What we found is that the DRE does not generate for each electronic record.

Another criteria reads, the records should be exported with a digital signature which should be calculated on the entire set of electronic records and their associated digital signatures.

What we found that because for each individual electronic record there is no signature so this second criteria does not hundred percent satisfied.

Exception number nine, the criteria reads the DRE should detect and notify the election officials at the polling place of any errors and malfunctions. Another criteria also reads if a mechanical error or malfunction occurs, such as, but not limited to, a paper jam or running out of paper, the DRE and VVPRS should suspend voting operations, not record votes and present a clear indication of the malfunction to the voter and the election officials.

What we found is that indication 1 2. is not clear enough and the details are listed 3 in the table as to those two paragraphs. 4 Exception number ten, the criteria 5 reads if the connection between the voting 6 machine and the printer has been broken, the 7 voting machine should detect and provide notice of this event and record it in the DRE's 8 9 internal audit log. 10 What we found that the printer 11 connection/disconnection is not recorded in the 12 DRE internal audit log. 13 Exception eleven we mark it as 14 It reads if the voter leaves without serious. 15 finishing the vote, there is no audio or visual 16 signal to alert the poll worker. 17 Number twelve is another serious, 18 reads during the electronic verification vote 19 test which is the pretest mentioned by two 2.0 previous speakers. We found paper jam resulted 2.1 in fifty-six paper records not being printed. 22 So I think those are it. 23 MR. WOODBRIDGE: The last item, 24 the jam, would you explain the situation in 25 which that jam occurred versus how that differs

1	from regular election operations?
2	MR. SHI: Yes, this is the
3	pretest, this is not official election and those
4	twelve hundred votes are electronically
5	continuously running so that would not happen in
6	real election and we have random here. In real
7	election this will not happen because if paper
8	jam and the next vote or poll worker would not
9	be a real problem, but we think that one should
10	be reported.
11	MR. MAHONEY: Was that during the
12	manual voting this occurred or was this done in
13	some other way?
14	MR. SHI: Electronic namely twelve
15	hundred voting is a program electronically
16	executed so continuously going.
17	MR. MAHONEY: That wouldn't
18	necessarily happen during regular voting?
19	MR. SHI: During regular votes
20	this will not happen because it will not
21	automatically continuously run.
22	MR. MAHONEY: Thank you.
23	MR. FLEMING: For testing down the
24	line, are you going to be able to have tests
25	directed so when there is a jam, it stops and it

1 continues on? 2. MR. DARER: I think when we set up 3 the twelve hundred vote test, we will re-examine 4 each time you do it and if appropriate we will. 5 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I have a couple questions. First of all, I'd like to preface by 6 7 saying you have done a thorough job and thousands of hours worth of work. 8 I think New 9 Jersey is in appreciation. 10 Overall, what is your impression 11 of the machine? 12 MR. DARER: Well, as I summed up 13 in the beginning, I think there are two core 14 requirements that were met. The voter does have 15 a chance to review and verify his or her vote on the paper record. And the tallies from the four 16 17 different sources, the paper record, the barcode on the paper record, the electronic record and 18 19 the tallies in the closing of the poll, they all 2.0 match. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Also had a couple 22 specific questions if I could. Maybe Dr. Shi 23 can demonstrate. I am not clear exactly with 24 regard to number one, could you show us maybe on

the machine with regard to the privacy question.

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                   MR. SHI:
                             Number one, there's a
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     curtain surrounding the machine during the
     election, but that curtain is not tall enough
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     such that perhaps a poll worker if he or she is
 5
     tall then he or she may be able to see the
 6
     voting and that minor privacy issue.
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                   MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that something
 8
     that could be fixed?
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                   MR. SHI: All of those
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     exceptions --
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                   MR. DARER: It's not a question
12
     for us.
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                   MR. SHI: It's not a question for
14
     us.
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                   MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am trying to
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     get some clarification. Let me ask you one or
17
     two issues if I could.
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                   The exception number four stated
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     that the only identifier of the paper record
2.0
     electronic ballot machine is the index
2.1
     containing the barcode except on the paper
22
     ballot if there are one or more missing paper
23
     records in the electronic ballot, the image may
24
     not be linked with the corresponding paper
25
     record. Would that be you're suggesting that
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perhaps each of the ballots that are not cast 1 2. should have a barcode on it? 3 MR. SHI: Number four. On one 4 hand they have correspondence, yes, on the other 5 hand there is some potential problem. As we 6 found that if we stamp bar codes then each 7 barcode has a certain ballot index. Then you 8 list the ballot image index so all the paper 9 records can be listed. Then electronic records 10 already been there and then you can find a 11 correspondence so no problem. We listed it 12 because of the following. 13 Namely, you need to have all paper 14 ballots listed in the scanner listed in this way 15 then you can find the correspondence. So that 16 means if a human error take place during the 17 scan, then the correspondence we may possibly 18 lose one or two paper ballots. Then the 19 correspondence will be not be reliable to be 2.0 found. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let me ask you 22 one last question for clarification. 23 machines have all been tested with regard to the 24 seven hundred fifty registered voters. Is seven

hundred fifty a realistic number?

1 MR. DARER: We got seven hundred 2. fifty from the guideline from the State that the 3 district is supposed to have one machine per seven hundred fifty registered voters. Whether 4 that is the right number, I don't know. 5 6 Also, lastly with MR. WOODBRIDGE: 7 regard to exception eight, you talk about 8 generating a signature for each electronic 9 record so each electronic record that is cast or 10 not cast, is that correct, should have a unique 11 identifier to it? 12 MR. SHI: It should, but namely 13 suggested if each paper vote were corresponded 14 with a signature with the electronic ballot, 15 that would make the thing secure because nobody 16 can change. Then for all the ballot imaging 17 when you export the data, you generate another 18 digital signature for the whole group and is 19 also secure. That is what this criteria. 2.0 the Advantage do, they have for each one there 2.1 is no digital signature, but for a group they do 22 have. 23 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Group being 24 defined as like fifty or a hundred or group 25 being one, two or three?

1	MR. SHI: Depends on the actual
2	situation. If in the election there is five
3	hundred votes or seven hundred fifty votes, then
4	those would be it.
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: This five hundred
6	votes might have of the same signature, is that
7	correct?
8	MR. SHI: Each has individual,
9	then grouping five hundred have another one. In
10	this way the transmission to export the data
11	will become very secure, very reliable because
12	anything wrong we will be able to locate.
13	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are saying it
14	doesn't have that?
15	MR. SHI: Now, it doesn't have.
16	For group they have.
17	MR. MAHONEY: If you have five
18	hundred, was five hundred based on having the
19	voter having multiple chances as well as
20	multiple pages?
21	MR. DARER: I think as demoed the
22	ream is five hundred pages so that is five
23	hundred pages and if there were multiple page
24	votes, there might be fewer than five hundred
25	votes.

1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thanks for a 2. wonderful job. 3 MR. DARER: In addition to the 4 VVPAT, I'd like to echo what Ed Smith said 5 before the two very important components, 6 crucial components to ensure security elections 7 are trained personnel and best practices and 8 procedures regardless of what happens with the 9 machines. So we described our project and 10 procedures and our findings and hope the 11 committee finds it helpful and thank you for 12 your time. 13 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very 14 much. 15 These comments are available on 16 the Attorney General's election website. Also 17 available are the rebuttal comments from 18 Sequoia. So those documents are of public 19 record if anybody would care to see them. Moving along at a reasonable clip 2.0 2.1 so far. What I think we will do is start 22 walking through the criteria with a view towards 23 maybe taking an hour break around 12:15 or 24 12:30. We will make sure you have plenty of 25 time.

1	Mr. Smith, are you ready to go
2	through the criteria?
3	MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
4	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The Attorney
5	General's Office has put together a version of
6	the statute which correlates to the various
7	questions people asked and since we have now
8	have a fully correlated version of that, what we
9	will do is basically go through the checklist
10	rather than go through the entire criteria. We
11	are not going to leave any substance out, but I
12	think it will be easier to follow.
13	So I am going to start by asking
14	some of the questions. Most of it comes out of
15	the statute. First question is the VVPRS, does
16	it contain any does the VVPRS contain any
17	undisclosed hardware or software?
18	MR. SMITH: No, sir, it does not.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The cryptographic
20	software in the voting system is approved by the
21	U.S. Government's Cryptographic Module
22	Validation Program, CMVP?
23	MR. SMITH: Yes, the SHA-256
24	algorithm is approved by the program.
25	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Which algorithm?

1	MR. SMITH: SHA-256.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Can the VVPRS
3	components be integrated into the existing local
4	logic and accuracy testing requirements?
5	MR. SMITH: Yes, they do.
6	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does the VVPRS
7	draw power from the DRE or the same electrical
8	circuit from which the DRE draws its power?
9	MR. SMITH: Yes, it does.
10	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does the DRE
11	provide a standard, publicly documented printer
12	port or the equivalent using a standard
13	communication protocol?
14	MR. SMITH: Yes, it does.
15	MR. WOODBRIDGE: For every DRE or
16	electronic ballot image there is a corresponding
17	paper record with a unique identifier?
18	MR. SMITH: Yes, it can be.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Now, that
20	question actually came up during the course of
21	our discussions and I would ask if you would
22	respond to the comment that there weren't
23	identifiers with each ballot.
24	MR. SMITH: Sir, we are not saying
25	there aren't unique identifiers. In the records

for -- the electronic record, however, if you're missing a paper record, then it becomes more difficult.

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I submit to you on the other hand if you're missing paper records that the process for any verification to be passed is hard to follow regardless and the correspondence of electronic records and, in fact, you'd likely fall into what is in the regulations for VVPAT malfunction or other issue that would revoke the procedures in that portion of the regulation.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think the question and answer is what are the reasons. I have a problem with it. I can't get a correspondence with the comments from NJIT, if you don't mind I want to make sure that when we cover the criteria, it is the same one that NJIT responded to. So if you don't mind, I am going to switch from that approach and really just walk right through the criteria itself.

The criteria which has been on the Attorney General election website for some time now starts out with a number of general definitions that really don't do anything other than define what you are looking at. Then it

goes into issues of operations and that sort of thing I am going to walk through some of those.

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I am going to start with B1 on page two. The VVPRS may be designed in various configurations. In all configurations, prior to casting the ballot, the voter shall have the ability to verify his or her selections on a paper record in a private and independent manner.

I might indicate that was one of the issues that was raised in the report of NJIT brought up and one of the questions raised that a six-foot tall individual, would you respond to that?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Mr. Chair, I would like to. NJIT performed the testing. They performed it against the Advantage that you see up against the wall here without curtains present. You can see with the curtain that a little bit. With the ones you have the curtains in place as they are literally renders that point somewhat moot. You would have to be well over seven feet tall to look over the curtains or from the left-hand side.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am going to

1	take the liberty and ask the staff here from
2	NJIT, was that similar to the way the machine
3	was complete when you saw it?
4	MR. DARER: We tested with a
5	curtain.
6	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Did you test it
7	with that kind of curtain?
8	MR. DARER: Yes.
9	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that the kind
10	of curtain you found a problem with the six-foot
11	tall individual?
12	Can you show us how that works?
13	MR. DARER: Yes, this is it.
14	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The point
15	basically is that there was testimony made if
16	someone was tall enough you could basically sort
17	of between that crack with the curtain and the
18	metallic side or shield and see into it. Of
19	course, that also begs whether the public would
20	do that. I'm not sure, but we'll ask this
21	question just to make sure.
22	The VVPRS shall be designed to
23	allow the voter to easily review or accept or
24	reject his or her paper record. A, the DRE
25	shall not record the electronic record until the

paper record has been approved by the voter.

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I also note that this is the stuff in the NJIT exceptions where they say the voter does not have the opportunity to verify the contents of the paper record corresponding to the third vote after rejecting the first two as it's deposited in the storage bin immediately after printing.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, the New
Jersey State law you are allowed to spoil three
ballots or two ballots and on the third one is
your final choice regardless of voting mode or
method with the DRE. So the machine processes
that. As they pointed out earlier, the machine
does provide a warning that this is your last
chance and however you vote, if you hit that
cast vote button it's basically going in.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: The issue I think is that may be the case, but you don't have an opportunity, long enough opportunity to take a look at that third paper ballot to verify that is, in fact, what you voted on. How long do you get to see the third ballot that you voted on paper?

MR. SMITH: It is very short. It

1	is only a matter of seconds.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is that something
3	that is correctable?
4	MR. SMITH: Yes, it is
5	correctable.
6	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B3, VVPRS records
7	may be printed and stored by two different
8	methods. A, cut and drop method. The voter
9	views and verifies the paper record, which the
10	VVPRS cuts and drops into a storage unit.
11	B, continuous spool method. The
12	voter views the paper record on a spool-to-spool
13	paper roll. This method shall be used in a
14	manner that fully protects the secrecy of all
15	votes cast.
16	MR. SMITH: Yes, it is.
17	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other
18	comments on that criteria?
19	MR. SMITH: No, sir.
20	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B4, no electronic
21	or paper record shall indicate the identity of a
22	voter or be maintained in a way that allows a
23	voter to be identified.
24	MR. SMITH: There are no
25	identifying indicators. Of course, by the time

1 the voter gets to the machine there name has 2. been script from any work flow or information 3 flow. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: There is nothing 5 on the ballot per say that would identify the 6 individual by name? 7 MR. SMITH: No, and by use of the cut and drop the way they call it, there is no 8 9 opportunity for someone to determine how the 10 voter is voting. 11 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just a question 12 about when they fall. I would assume the first 13 one falls on or near the bottom of the bag and 14 the last one falls on the top. It is not really 15 truly a random drop. 16 MR. SMITH: It is not truly 17 random, no, but it is randomized enough that if 18 someone wanted to take the effort to develop a 19 list of voters in the order they voted on a 2.0 particular machine that they could not reliable 2.1 use that to reconstruct how the individual 22 voted. 23 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B5, the 24 electronic and paper records shall be created 25 and stored in ways that preserve the privacy of

1 | the record.

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Before I go any further, are there copies of the criteria here? Does the audience have copies? You all have copies of the criteria and it's in the back of the report.

I don't know if I have to read every word here. This also related to one of the exceptions that NJIT described as exception number one, the same one we took a look at. So do you have any further comments on B5?

MR. SMITH: No, sir, I apologize I was misinformed about the curtains. Apparently he did use them for the single test, but not for the volume test where more members of the staff participated. I will state that jurisdictional tradition and current procedures call for no one being able to be around the equipment or the sides of the equipment and certainly behind the equipment. So if you were a poll worker and you saw an individual leaning over the machines when someone was voting, clearly you would have legal rights to have that person removed and that is rights in all fifty states. No state allows people to be around the equipment.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B6, the VVPRS

1 components shall conform to federal and state 2. accessibility requirements. A, these 3 requirements shall include, but are not limited 4 to, an audio component that shall accurately 5 relay the information printed on the paper 6 ballot to the voter. 7 This is noted on exception number 8 three of the NJIT report which states as 9 For voter system vote if a paper 10 record is printed on multiple pages, the voter 11 is required to print the next page after the 12 first page on the LCD screen rather than through 13 the message thus violating the privacy of the 14 hearing impaired voter by exposing the paper 15 record to the poll worker. 16 MR. SMITH: Yes, I would like to 17 respond to that, Mr. Chair. 18 We prepare the test ballot to NJIT 19 with the specifications and as NJIT mentioned 2.0 earlier today, we were not allowed for just a 21 few minutes to interact with staff. The issue 22 there centers around really a fairly piece of 23 election procedures. What we do in that case is 24 record an instruction to the blind voter as

jurisdictions do and based on the jurisdictional

practice to instruct the voter is that there are
multiple pages to their VVPAT ballot and they
need to press the enter button or whatever
button on the audio hand set to progress the
VVPAT through the pages and we will overcome
this.

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As I mentioned, we were not able to work with the NJIT staff. They basically shooing us out of the way which is fine, but unfortunately it leads to situations like this jurisdictional practice for this type.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: So you don't disagree with what they found, but you are taking the position that it is fixable, is that correct?

MR. SMITH: That is not only fixable, but it is typically fixed in elections where jurisdictions record audio to the blind voter at the beginning of the ballot that explain here's the button, here's what they do, here's how you navigate, here's how you make choices and when you get to your paper record and the system tells you your paperwork is up for review, you will have multiple pages, please use button X to scroll through your record and

1 then once you go through it, it picks up and 2. says this is your last page, press button X or Y 3 to cast your vote and then finish. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B7, the VVPRS 5 device shall draw its power from the DRE or the same electrical circuit from which the DRE draws 6 7 its power. 8 I'd like to mention that was one 9 of the questions I had on the checklist. You 10 answered that. 11 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, you can see 12 the cables coming from the back of the 13 electronics box to the VVPAT both power and data 14 are in there. 15 MR. WOODBRIDGE: The voting machine shall provide a standard, publicly 16 17 documented printer port or the equivalent, using 18 a standard communication protocol. 19 MR. SMITH: Yes, it's using a 2.0 standard protocol. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Nine, the VVPRS 2.2 shall mark the paper record precisely as 23 indicated by the voter on the DRE and produce an 24 accurate paper record and corresponding

electronic record of all votes cast.

1	MR. SMITH: To that I hang my hat
2	on the NJIT testimony. They do a four way cross
3	check and found it to be accurate.
4	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think the
5	committee will note that NJIT did make
6	representation that the core criteria which
7	included the cross counting of electronic
8	records to paper.
9	MR. SMITH: We also did testing
10	for federal qualification of the product and the
11	work that they do to also check that.
12	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B10, DRE
13	electronic ballot image records shall include
14	all votes cast by the voter including write-ins
15	and undervotes.
16	MR. SMITH: That is correct. The
17	VVPAT shows that the vote on the handset and the
18	capabilities allow for write-in candidates which
19	goes in the electronic record and on the paper
20	record and I believe NJIT tested for that.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: If I can ask,
22	Mitch, I don't know if you heard it, but did
23	NJIT test for undervotes, overvotes, that sort
24	of thing?
25	MR. DARER: Yes.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: 10A, write-in
2	votes are votes cast by a voter for an
3	individual not listed on the ballot as a formal
4	candidate.
5	MR. SMITH: They vote through a
6	keypad towards the bottom of unit being closest
7	to the voter and for visually impaired unit
8	through their audio handset.
9	MR. FLEMING: On the printout it
10	shows it as the main one.
11	MR. SMITH: That's correct.
12	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You mentioned you
13	tested the write-in capability.
14	MR. DARER: Yes, we did.
15	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, undervotes are
16	elective office and/or public questions on the
17	ballot for which the voter has not cast a vote.
18	You count the votes.
19	MR. SMITH: We track them, but we
20	don't count them because they are not a valid
21	vote, but you can tell how many there are. It
22	depends on your definition of count. We count
23	and track, but they are not tallied.
24	MR. FLEMING: On the printed
25	ballot paper, how does that show it?

MR. SMITH: No selections.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: B11, an

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electronic ballot image record shall have a corresponding paper record. A, the paper record shall be printed and the voter shall have the opportunity to verify the paper record in its totality prior to the final electronic record being recorded.

I note that was also one of the exceptions that NJIT pointed out when stated the only identifier on the paper record to link to the associated electronic ballot image is the ballot image index contained in the barcode that is printed on the accepted paper ballot. If there is one or more missing paper records, the electronic ballot image records cannot be correctly linked to the corresponding paper ballots.

MR. SMITH: That is a true statement. However, once again, as I stated earlier, if you have missing paper records and there are other portions of the record votes because you have evidence that there is a malfunction or some other issue at hand and in any situation you have missing paper ballot,

1 whether it is real or otherwise, you have a much 2. more serious issue than being able to correspond 3 back and I would submit that the system that 4 can't identify the voter or anything along those 5 lines can provide correspondence of paper 6 records missing. 7 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am a little 8 There is a barcode. confused. Maybe we can 9 show you here. These are the three -- these are 10 the first two ballots that were attempted, but 11 not cast. These were two spoiled ballots. 12 last one that is cast you notice has a barcode 13 on the top. I guess my first question is maybe 14 it has to do with why does just the accepted 15 ballot have a barcode? 16 MR. SMITH: Because you don't want 17 an opportunity for someone accidentally read an 18 unaccepted barcode so instead of barcode being 19 void --2.0 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Could you not put 2.1 a barcode on each of the ballot, even the voided 22 one that has it embedded the barcode that it is 23 a spoiled ballot? 24 MR. SMITH: You could, but once

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again, you're opening yourself up to mistakes.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Part of our
2	concern is that or part of my concern is that if
3	paper is going to be trumped, for lack of a
4	word, if there is a paper ballot missing, what
5	to do.
6	MR. SMITH: The regulations have
7	provided for that. We had to send in
8	documentation to the Attorney General's Office
9	what constitutes convincing evidence that there
10	was a malfunction.
11	MR. WOODBRIDGE: These two spoiled
12	paper ballots, is there an identifier in the
13	electronic machine that indicates that spoiled
14	ballots were, in fact, not voted on, but are in
15	fact, there?
16	MR. SMITH: No.
17	MR. ALLEN: I'm Dave Allen. There
18	is a State law that actually prevents us that
19	until the votes have been accepted, we can't
20	record the ballot itself. If we were to record
21	it and then void it, we would still be recording
22	that ballot so we'd actually be in violation.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are
24	suggesting these spoiled ballots don't leave an
25	electronic trail?

1	MR. ALLEN: No.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You are
3	suggesting they are not supposed to?
4	MR. ALLEN: Absolutely, yes.
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mitch, do you
6	have any comments on that?
7	MR. DARER: We concur.
8	MR. WOODBRIDGE: When you say you
9	concur, then in that record is it fair to say
10	that the accepted ballots, the ones with the bar
11	codes, do have unique identifiers to verify?
12	MR. DARER: Yes.
13	MR. ALLEN: I would like to say,
14	however, the technique for linking as such that
15	NJIT did correctly state that the way the
16	records are retrieved and the way the
17	information tabulated on the barcode, if any
18	paper records are missing, it makes it difficult
19	to cross relate. In the conversion of the code
20	which is currently undergoing federal
21	certification that's been addressed by altering
22	the way that the electronic ballots are
23	retrieved and presented to the officer which
24	will allow them to identify when a paper ballot
25	is actually missing.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: So, for example,
2	let's say that a hundred people went in and
3	voted and you only found ninety-eight of these
4	things in there, you could reconstruct the
5	missing two?
6	MR. ALLEN: You could identify the
7	electronic records that were associated with
8	those missing two, yes.
9	MR. WOODBRIDGE: In theory, if a
10	judge was so inclined he or she could count the
11	two missing ballots and add a paper version to
12	it?
13	MR. ALLEN: Yes.
14	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the DRE
15	electronic ballot image record shall correspond
16	to the paper record in a manner that does not
17	reveal the voter's identity.
18	I think we established that.
19	11C, the paper record shall
20	contain all voter selection information stored
21	in the electronic ballot image record.
22	MR. SMITH: Yes.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: In other words,
24	every vote that voter cast does have
25	corresponding record on the paper ballot, is

1	that correct?
2	MR. SMITH: That's correct.
3	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section three,
4	design requirements for a VVPRS printer. One,
5	the printer shall be designed to have a
6	sufficient amount of paper, ink, toner, ribbon
7	or like supply for use in an election, taking
8	into account an election district should have at
9	least one voting machine per seven hundred fifty
10	registered voters.
11	Now, we do have a comment from
12	NJIT that paper replacement is required after
13	five hundred votes.
14	MR. SMITH: That is correct in
15	terms of how it is set up for the election, five
16	hundred ballots. Reams of five hundred pieces
17	of paper.
18	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Could you if you
19	wanted to do more than five hundred or is it
20	best designed for five hundred?
21	MR. SMITH: The paper is available
22	in a deck of five hundred.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: It comes in five
24	hundred each, is that correct?
25	MR. SMITH: Yes.

1 MR. ALLEN: Counting the supplies 2 we use in this particular printer, five hundred 3 is the largest size they do. There is no physical reason why they couldn't bring packs 4 5 larger, but because it is most standard size if 6 someone were to purchase those, it would be a 7 special manufacturing process and cost would 8 increase considerably. 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you know of any states that absolutely mandate that you 10 11 achieve seven hundred fifty ballots. 12 MR. SMITH: No, not that I know 13 of, sir. The number, the few numbers that I am 14 aware typically are quite low. If you look a 15 seven hundred fifty voters to represent a turn 16 out of sixty-six and two-thirds percent, five 17 hundred is relatively a low turn out. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Of course the 19 flip side you don't know how that offsets. 2.0 MR. SMITH: One thing to bring to 2.1 light you saw how easy the paper was changed and 22 if the jurisdiction so chooses, rather than 23 change the full ream of paper, the unit is made 24 to be removed as a whole and simply replaced 25 with another unit.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Swap out with
2	what?
3	MR. SMITH: The entire system
4	hangs on the side of the unit. You could have
5	one full of paper refill and set it back on the
6	record plug in the printer port and you are off
7	to the races again.
8	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You wouldn't
9	really have to change the paper, you change the
10	whole thing.
11	MR. SMITH: You can change the
12	entire unit. Of course, the entire time the
13	ballots are in the bag secured and very stiff
14	opening is small and you got your procedural and
15	security.
16	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I know the
17	language that appears. It says the printer
18	shall be designed to have a sufficient amount of
19	paper, taking into account the election district
20	should have at least one voting machine for
21	seven hundred fifty votes. So the sixty-four
22	thousand dollar question, does that mandate a
23	seven hundred fifty ballot cartridge.
24	MR. FLEMING: My question right
25	now is at the county level. What is your

1 requirement for the machines per number of vote, 2 seven fifty, so that is the requirement? 3 MR. CHAGARIS: Arthur Chagaris. 4 The regulation says there should be a machine 5 for seven fifty. The machine is capable of more 6 than seven hundred fifty so it is a matter of 7 adding the paper which is a fairly easy process. I think the criteria is satisfied. 8 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: It is not a 10 thousand percent clear whether it means you have 11 to permit seven hundred fifty ballots before you 12 have to change paper or whether just accommodate 13 seven hundred fifty. 14 Section 3A1A actually MR. ALLEN: 15 addresses the issue of changing the paper in the 16 printer during the day which implies that that 17 process was actually expected by the State.

I would like to point out one other thing because obviously there is still a concern with security. The likelihood of this happening is actually very low. Five hundred ballots cast with one machine every seven hundred fifty voters constitutes sixty-six point seven percent. I think any jurisdiction that achieves almost sixty-seven percent turnout

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would be phenomenally happy with their voter

turnout and something like this would be almost

I am sure they would be happy to supply another

paper.

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- MR. WOODBRIDGE: This goes into
  the next section which means if any additional
  paper or other supplies required shall be done
  with minimal disruption to voting without
  circumvention of security features if a printer
  storage unit which protects the cast ballots and
  secrecy of votes.
  - MR. CHAGARIS: The first part to help interpret it is to understood there will be paper change.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to respond in this manner. If the board believes that this is a mandated requirement then we will offer the jurisdiction the one thousand deck pack. We will go back to the paper vendor and we will work with them to make a one thousand pack. It will be a custom card deck. I want to make that clear for the public and for yourself, but we will offer that for sale if it believes that is a requirement and thus we can easily satisfy the seven hundred

1 fifty requirement. 2. MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, 2, the 3 VVPRS shall have a low-paper indicator that will allow for the timely addition of paper so that 4 5 each voter can fully verify without disruption 6 all of his or her ballot selection. 7 MR. SMITH: Before the VVPRS runs 8 out of paper it will cease allowing the next 9 voter to go in. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do I understand 11 correctly if a voter goes in to cast a vote if 12 there isn't enough paper they cannot cast a 13 vote. 14 MR. SMITH: That is correct. Τf 15 they couldn't do the three times, then it will 16 cease. 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does it give 18 warning before you get to the --19 MR. ALLEN: In fact, the way it 2.0 works if there is not enough paper for them to 2.1 cast three ballots, it will not even allow you 22 to begin. 23 MR. WOODBRIDGE: How does it 24 detect when you are down on paper.

MR. ALLEN: It has a sensor which

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1	senses how much paper is actually left.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is this an
3	optical sensor?
4	MR. ALLEN: Yes.
5	MR. FLEMING: Does that also
6	include a page printer.
7	MR. ALLEN: Yes, it does, correct.
8	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Three, the
9	printer shall be secured by security seals or
10	locking mechanisms to prevent tampering. The
11	printer shall be accessed only by those election
12	officials authorized by the county commissioner
13	of registration.
14	This is also the subject of NJIT
15	comments which stated that printer is unsecured
16	by seals or locking mechanism and maybe
17	vulnerable to tamper.
18	MR. SMITH: We have on the units
19	for security seals. We are not exactly sure,
20	once again, we did not interface with NJIT.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You may want to
22	raise your voice.
23	MR. SMITH: We don't understand,
24	we have a provision for locks and seals on the
25	equipment and as I stated earlier, we are not

1 able to interface with NJIT so it is difficult 2. for us to respond to that other than say we have 3 provided what we believe are appropriate numbers 4 of locations for seals. 5 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am going to ask 6 Mitch as a spokesperson here. 7 MR. DARER: Can we go up to the 8 machine. 9 (Whereupon, a short recess was 10 taken.) 11 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let the record 12 reflect that we took a short five or ten minute 13 visit to the inspect the actual equipment to 14 take a look at the cover on the printer and 15 asked some questions with regard to security and 16 tamper evident seals and possible use thereon 17 and so let's continue back to where we were. I 18 appreciate it letting us take this digression. 19 So if I understand correctly, seals can be added to the device. NJIT raised 2.0 2.1 the issue of whether or not the cover should be 22 locked during elections and I understand your position is that is a choice of the county or 23 24 the election district that makes that, is that 25 correct?

1	MR. SMITH: Yes, that's correct.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if we were to
3	ask if there was a physical lock of the plastic
4	cover during an election, that is simply what?
5	MR. SMITH: Yes, we could do that.
6	MR. WOODBRIDGE: A4, the VVPRS
7	shall be capable of showing the information on
8	the paper record in a font size of at least 3.0
9	mm and should be capable of showing the
10	information in at least two font ranges, 3.0-4.0
11	mm and 6.3-9.0 mm, under the control of the
12	voter or poll worker. This criteria can be met
13	by providing a magnification device with the
14	VVPRS.
15	MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, we do
16	provide for the jurisdictions each of the font
17	sizes.
18	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I know NJIT
19	probably pointed this out in the criteria. I
20	will see if we can move along and take a logical
21	break in about fifteen minutes.
22	Section 3B, paper record display
23	unit. One, the paper record shall be displayed
24	in a way that allows the voter to privately and
25	independently inspect it.

1 This has been the subject of the 2. first exception from NJIT. 3 MR. SMITH: Once again, we assert that it is very difficult to view. You have to 4 5 walk around the side or the rear of the machine 6 which once again violates what I suspect is a 7 state law, certainly procedure. 8 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So this is 9 basically same answer to the question we had 10 about operation? 11 Yes, sir. MR. SMITH: 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B2, if the paper 13 record cannot be viewed entirely in the display 14 unit at one time, the voter shall have the 15 opportunity to verify the entire paper record 16 prior to the electronic or the paper ballot 17 being stored and recorded. 18 Again, this is the subject of the 19 second exception that NJIT raised just to 2.0 refresh everybody's recollection was that the 2.1 voter does not have an opportunity to verify the 22 contents of paper record corresponding to the 23 third vote. After reviewing or rejecting the 24 first two as it is impossible because it goes in

the storage bag after the printing. This is the

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1 people not being able to actually see the paper 2. of the third paper ballot. 3 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, we 4 interpret this clause in the regulations a 5 little bit differently. We interpret this to 6 mean if you have a multiple page ballot that the 7 voter be allowed to review page one of two and control the units that after he or she read 8 9 through page one or two can read page two of two 10 and then if it agrees with both pages cast the 11 ballots. 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So I am not sure 13 I understand how you read this. The point NJIT 14 is making you don't have enough time to really 15 review the third paper ballot before it is cast. 16 I am not sure how that relates to a ballot that 17 has multiple sheets. 18 MR. SMTTH: That is a different 19 part of the regulation. The third ballot being 2.0 the final ballot. This is a different clause. 2.1 This clause being reviewed entirely in the 22 display unit meaning the window at one time. 23 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So, in other 24 words, what you are saying here this goes to a

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different issue than if you have two sheets or

more you will review more than one sheet before
you cast the ballot.

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MR. SMITH: You receive an instruction in the display window that says press enter to review the next page of the VVPAT record. Then you will hit the enter button and get page two of two will come out and if you want read pages or see how you voter cast vote, it drops into the bag. If you disagree, you can go and change your vote.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: You can actually get to the third ballot say the second one and you want to see if page three of your long paper ballot corresponds with your vote, you actually be able to see the electronic vote and your paper ballot at the same time.

MR. SMITH: That is correct during the printing of VVPAT record, the vote that you cast is still displayed on the face of the current machine. You can you also at any time see how you voted as you wanted to vote and then you can check the records side-by-side.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: How do you go back to the second or first page of that long ballot and review the entire paper ballot is

1 that correct against the electronic? 2. MR. SMITH: No, sir, the printer 3 does not scroll backwards so you review the 4 VVPAT record one page at a time once you review 5 the first you enter and review the second and 6 third or fourth or fifth. 7 MR. WOODBRIDGE: You cannot scroll 8 back up. 9 You cannot scroll back MR. SMITH: 10 up. 11 MR. FLEMING: Going back to the 12 first one in that third time through right now 13 would have multiple pages it will spit the paper 14 virtually out of the printer. You have new code 15 working on that so right now it will have 16 multiple pages on the third try and the new code 17 will supply the first page and second page so 18 they can verify what they are actually doing. 19 MR. SMITH: That is correct. 2.0 MR. ALLEN: Mr. Chairman, one 2.1 thing I think we are going to have to get some 22 sort of recommendation concerning how the 23 regulations in State law. New Jersey State law 24 says it third ballot will be cast. Now if we 25 need to we could slow it down to allow people to view it, yes, but then what is the point of that if you then have to cast it. If they have to cast that ballot. If they are going to void it then a third time then we would need to confirm that is allowable in the State law. Because of the anonymity, there is no way to if they voter said I still believe there was wrong, I made a mistake the third time there is no way to isolate that vote.

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MR. FLEMING: I think it's the voter verifiable. The voter wants to know that last one was actually they want to be able to see that is my interpretation. It is not that they can change it again. It is just that they can see what really this whole printer not really have paper ballot to be able to count it is really so the voter is getting confidence in saying what I'm seeing is what is actually put in.

MR. ALLEN: You are suggesting they should be able to void it a third time?

MR. FLEMING: No, that is their vote, but at least they can see what they voted for and if they made a mistake then that is another issue, but they made the mistake on that

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     third try at least they know they made a
 2
     mistake.
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                   MR. SMITH: As I mentioned there
 4
     is code currently.
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                   MR. WOODBRIDGE:
                                     Just for
6
     clarification, do I understand that if you get
7
     to your third ballot that is automatically cast,
8
     is that correct.
9
                   MR. SMITH:
                                It is not
10
     automatically cast, but once you have cast it
11
     the paper record is not available for you to
12
     make changes to. And I think the point of
13
     contention here is that it goes by fairly
14
     quickly such that you can't take a full reading
15
     of it and walk away comfortable that the record
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     is really what you did that third time around.
                                     The display unit
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                   MR. WOODBRIDGE:
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     shall have a protective covering which shall be
19
     transparent and shall not obscure the voters
2.0
     view of the paper record. The this covering
2.1
     shall be in such condition that it can be made
22
     transparent by ordinary cleaning of its exposed
23
     surface.
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                   MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, we provide a
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     plexiglass cover over the paper record and you
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1 can clean it. 2. MR. WOODBRIDGE: The record should 3 probably reflect too the members of the committee took a look at the machine and the 4 5 cover over the paper vote. 6 C, paper. Any paper record 7 produced by a VVPRS shall be readable by voters 8 and election officials. 9 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: What we have up 11 here perhaps the public would want to take a 12 look during the break is the samples of the 13 ballots that were printed out to spoiled ones 14 and one final one and they are readable. 15 C2, all paper records shall be 16 stored in accordance with vendor specifications. 17 I guess that begs a question what are vendor 18 specifications for storage. 19 MR. SMITH: In short they 2.0 essentially are temperature and humidity that we 2.1 find in this room and you can save some 22 variation around that considering voting 23 machines are stored in a warehouse environment 24 which may not have perfect air conditions like

at your house or in a business office.

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1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: How do you secure 2. the bags when the vote is finished? 3 MR. SMITH: I'm not sure. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: You finished 5 voting at the end of the day and the people have 6 dropped the ballots in bags how do you keep 7 people from reaching in the bag and. 8 That is really more of MR. SMITH: 9 a jurisdictional issue. We provided some 10 physical security and place additional seals and 11 locks with the baq. We put a cover over it when 12 you move the back from the printer unit or you 13 can transport it as a whole. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do people 15 typically seal the bags when they are finished 16 so it can't be broken without some sort of 17 evidence. 18 MR. SMITH: Yes, it is typical 19 that jurisdiction require that the seals remain 2.0 intact and leave the machine as it is take it 2.1 down, but leave the printer and the bag 22 basically as they are in a sealed or locked 23 condition or if you do open the bag that you put 24 tamper evident tape or something over the 25 opening so that if it is tampered with

1 attempting to fish ballots out of bag or insert 2. ballots in the back it would be easily 3 detectable. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: C3, if stored in 5 accordance with vendor specifications, the paper 6 used to produce a paper record shall be readable 7 for a period of at least two years after the 8 election in which it is used. 9 MR. SMITH: Yes, we assert that 10 is. 11 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you have any 12 idea what the life of the paper ballot is? 13 MR. ALLEN: The specifications 14 from the paper manufacturers assert the ink 15 should be good for up to seven years if it is 16 kept within the environment which is specified. 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Are these what 18 kind of print is this we print on anything other 19 than paper? 2.0 MR. SMITH: No, sir. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is the 22 susceptibility with regard to light? I know 23 light tends to mess things up. 24 MR. SMITH: Part of storage is 25 that they are kept in the dark which normally

1 that is not as much after been issue because 2. they are typically boxed and secured. 3 MR. MAHONEY: What about excessive 4 heat? 5 MR. SMITH: Heat will get them 6 too, but it has to be pretty excessive. 7 MR. MAHONEY: What do you consider 8 excessive? 9 MR. SMITH: Leaving it on the 10 dashboard of your card for extensive period of 11 time. 12 MR. MAHONEY: Is that eighty-five 13 or ninety degrees? 14 MR. SMITH: That will reduce the 15 readable life the paper, but not -- the paper 16 does take into account the warehouse. 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think we are 18 going to do one more section here and then take 19 a break just for the record we appear to be 2.0 probably a little bit less than halfway through 2.1 the specifications. 22 D, paper record storage unit. 23 One, Security protection including, but not 24 limited to, security seals or locking mechanisms 25 shall be built into the storage unit to prevent

tampering at all times, including pre-election,
election day and post-election. The Attorney
General, through the Department of Law and
Public Safety, will issue chain of custody

guidelines regarding the storage unit.

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I don't think we have to deal with the last sentence obviously but for the record you might want to review for the committee again the security seals and locking mechanisms for the paper records storage unit.

MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provision for loops to provide locks or seals went the ballot bag and the printer unit of the system and as Mr. Allen pointed out earlier the equipment tamper efforts that adhesive seals are easily placed between the cover and chassis an the chassis and the unit so that pre-election is complete and the machines is ready to go at that time jurisdiction typically apply those locks and seals and tape and they will remain there until the jurisdiction procedure. The paper or whole printer change outs and certainly election activities.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: This was one of the exceptions that NJIT pointed out that says

1 it is not security by seals or locking 2. mechanisms maybe vulnerable to tamper this was 3 an issue obviously discussed a few minutes ago 4 during our voyage over to the Sequoia vending 5 machines. 6 It is almost 12:30. I think it we 7 made decent progress. Why don't we take a one 8 hour break and reconvene here at 1:30. 9 we can wrap up the criteria and then give the 10 public an opportunity. 11 Out of curiosity how many people 12 to we have signed up to speak. I see a show of 13 hands. Okay, thanks, we will see you back here 14 at 1:30 and ready to go. 15 (Whereupon, a short recess was 16 taken.) 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Ladies and 18 gentlemen, if we could resume with the hearing. 19 Mr. Smith, you were here two 2.0 seconds ago, oh. We hope we have been able to 2.1 make some improvement with the audio equipment. 22 I apologize if it is been hard for us to be 23 understood out there. I know the court 24 reporter, Tony, has been suffering through 25 difficulties and hope this goes a little bit

1 better. 2. You may recall we were walking 3 through the criteria and by stopped right before section four which is the procedural and use 4 5 built requirements and so I'm going to pick up 6 from that part of the page five with the paper 7 records. 8 Part of the criteria that says 9 paper records shall include identification of 10 the particular election, the election district 11 and the voting machine. And I'll also note NJIT 12 had provided a comment with regard to that 13 particular section in which they stated that the 14 name primary election and general election was 15 not printed on the record. 16 Do you want to comment on that? 17 MR. SMITH: That's fixed in the 18 version that is currently being tested. 19 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So the version 2.0 they saw did not include a description of 2.1 whether it is a prime election, but you are 22 saying that has been fixed? MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 23 24 MR. FLEMING: When you did that 25 version will be out?

1 MR. SMITH: September or October. 2. It will be a firm upgrade. It is not a hardware 3 change. The question was the nature of the 4 5 correction to print all of the information that 6 is listed in the regulation and that is firmware 7 is in verification and due out in two or three 8 months and we will get them upgraded. 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So I understand 10 that software will be available if you choose to 11 use it? 12 MR. SMITH: Yes. MR. WOODBRIDGE: And it will State 13 14 primary election? 15 MR. SMITH: Yes, all the 16 information that appears will be included. 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section 4A2, the 18 paper record shall include a barcode that 19 contains the human-readable contents, shorthand 2.0 is acceptable, of the paper record. 2.1 We did see, of course, there was a 22 barcode on the cast ballot. I'm not quite sure 23 what you mean by shorthand. 24 MR. SMITH: I am not sure either, 25 sir, but that is not applicable we simply

MR. WOODBRIDGE: I'm sorry, I  didn't understand that.  MR. SMITH: The barcode provides a  full record of the voters choice.  MR. WOODBRIDGE: The barcode you  have all the information how the voter voted, is  that correct. You can get the entire vote from  the barcode.  MR. SMITH: That is correct.  MR. WOODBRIDGE: 2A, the barcode  shall use an industry standard format and shall  be able to read using readily available  commercial technology.  MR. SMITH: Yes, the 417 barcode  and it is readable.  MR. WOODBRIDGE: Readily available  commercial technology?  MR. SMITH: Yes.  MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, if the  corresponding electronic record contains a  digital signature, the digital signature shall  be included in the barcode on the paper record.  MR. SMITH: As I said by NJIT we  take an electronic signature of the entire cast	1	printout a readable record of the voters intent.
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	23	be included in the barcode on the paper record.
25 take an electronic signature of the entire cast	24	MR. SMITH: As I said by NJIT we
	25	take an electronic signature of the entire cast

1 record votes when the poles are closed not of 2. each individual voter so this is not applicable. 3 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I quess I am still a little bit confused about that concept a 4 5 digital signature for a batch of votes that 6 correct. 7 MR. SMITH: Yes, an individual 8 signature taken when the poles are closed so at 9 the end of the day when the tabulations are made 10 by the poll worker the tabulations stored on the 11 machine has a digital signature taken of that 12 entire set of cast ballots and that digital 13 signature is recorded and you can utilize that 14 to ensure or check on the tampering. 15 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I am really 16 confused about what a digital signature is. Ιs 17 a digital signature something that is printed on 18 the record or is it something that is stored in 19 the machine and what is the digital signature. 2.0 MR. SMITH: The record of the 2.1 digital signature. 22 MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is it? What. 23 is this digital signature we are talking about. 24 MR. ALLEN: A digital signature is 25 a value which is calculated on data which is

unique to that and it uses a key which means if 1 2. you change it you will not be able to read 3 calculate. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: It is a private 5 key encryption. 6 MR. ALLEN: That is actually hash 7 value which is used in the digital signature. 8 It encrypted it is and then verified by any --9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Where is the 10 signature stored? 11 MR. ALLEN: The signature in this 12 case the signature is actually each bar does 13 have a digital signature associated with it. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So each barcode 15 would have a signature for the batch. 16 MR. ALLEN: It protects the data. 17 It allows you to compare the data to show that 18 the data contained in the barcode in this case 19 is the same as what the signature was calculated 2.0 upon. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B1, a digital 22 signature is extra data appended to an 23 electronic document which identifies and 24 authenticates the sender and message data using 25 public key encryption or other means approved by

1	LPS.
2	Is that the hash code arrangement?
3	MR. SMITH: That is correct. We
4	use a hash code to show what is assigned the
5	data set which you can use to later show it has
6	not been tampered with.
7	MR. FLEMING: I need to step back
8	with the digital signature. Basically NJIT
9	found did not see that there was a digital
10	signature for each record.
11	MR. ALLEN: For each electronic
12	ballot.
13	MR. FLEMING: But you had just
14	stated each barcode
15	MR. ALLEN: Each barcode.
16	MR. FLEMING: There is a digital
17	signature of the barcode matched to the record,
18	but not for the individual record itself?
19	MR. ALLEN: Correct, however, I
20	would like to say that the it actually does
21	create a digital signature with each ballot.
22	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Same section the
23	barcode shall not have the barcode shall not
24	contain any information other than an accurate
25	reflection of the paper records human readable

1 content error correcting codes and digital 2. signature information. 3 MR. ALLEN: There are correction code that is part of the pdf format that is used 4 5 in the barcode. 6 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Those are 7 reflected in the barcode itself. 8 MR. ALLEN: It is part of the 9 Part of that is the correction 10 information in there. 11 MR. WOODBRIDGE: 3, for the cut 12 and drop method, if the paper record cannot be 13 displayed in its entirety on a single page, each 14 page of the record shall be numbered and shall 15 include the total count of pages for that 16 ballot. 17 MR. SMITH: Yes, as mentioned 18 earlier we are put a two of two or one of three, 19 two of three on each page. 2.0 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, the image 2.1 created on a paper record shall include every 22 contest that is displayed to the voter on the 23 DRE including write-ins and undervotes. 24 MR. SMITH: Yes, that is an area

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we will do.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Also assuming the
2	audience benefit that if it did not meet this
3	criteria, NJIT would have probably brought it to
4	our attention. I am assuming that if the
5	machine didn't meet some of that criteria, NJIT
6	would have brought it to our attention is that
7	correct. Looks like a yes nodded.
8	MS. VENETIS: This was not tested
9	by NJIT there was no specification.
10	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let's deal with
11	the public later if that is okay.
12	Five, the paper record shall be
13	created such that its contents are machine
14	readable.
15	MR. SMITH: Yes.
16	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You said the
17	barcode includes all the information.
18	MR. SMITH: Correct.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Six, the paper
20	record shall contain error correcting codes for
21	the purpose of detecting read errors and for
22	preventing other markings on the paper record
23	from being misinterpreted when the paper record
24	is machine read.
25	MR. SMITH: Yes, it is per the

1 | barcode standard.

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2. MR. WOODBRIDGE: Section B, DRE electronic records. The electronic ballot image 3 4 record and paper records shall be linked by 5 including unique identifiers so that an 6 individual paper record can be identified with 7 its corresponding electronic record. Unique identifiers are tools that will allow LPS to 8 9 measure the reliability and accuracy of the voting system as necessary. The electronic 10 11 ballot image and the paper record shall not 12 reveal the identity of the voter.

A, unique identifiers shall not be displayed in a way that can be easily memorized.

As mentioned previously, there
this was also pointed out in one of the comments
from NJIT which said the only identifier on the
ballot linked to the associated image is through
a valid index in the barcode and printed on the
paper record. If there are one or more missing
paper records the electronic ballot image
records cannot correctly linked to the
corresponding paper record.

MR. SMITH: We stand by what we said earlier to that with a missing paper record

1 you have clearly other issues, but considering 2. the process to proceed normally and you can 3 cross tie the papers to electronic records. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think that if 5 you missing some paper records that aren't 6 uniquely identified you will be able to. 7 MR. SMITH: What I am saying if 8 you're missing paper records with current 9 electronic and paper records it remember very 10 difficult and if you're missing a significant 11 number of paper records it would be near 12 impossible to tie them together. 13 MR. ALLEN: I would like to add to 14 that statement. As I stated earlier the method 15 or of retrieving the electronic information has 16 been approved in the versions and now allows you 17 could compensate for that. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: 2, the DRE shall 19 generate and store a digital signature for each 2.0 electronic record. 2.1 There is also a comment from NJIT 22 on that which says the DRE does not indication a 23 signature for each record, but only of a batch 24 of records will be accepted paper record an

additional -- the DRE does not generate

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1 additional signature for each electronic record 2. pertaining to ballot image record of accepted paper record and does generate additional 3 signature for each set of electronic records 4 5 printed on electronic ballot image. This is 6 calculated on the entire set of electronic 7 records within the associated digital 8 signatures. 9 MR. SMITH: We agree with that as 10 stated and we will generate for each and every 11 cast vote record. 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just so there is no confusion. Is this the same software that 13 14 you are talking about being available in two or 15 three months? 16 Yes, sir, it is. MR. SMITH: B3, the 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: 18 electronic ballot image records shall be able to 19 be exported for auditing or analysis on 2.0 standards-based and/or COTS, commercial off-the-shell information technology computing. 21 22 A, the exported electronic ballot 23 image records shall be publicly available, 24 nonproprietary format. 25 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chair, if I may go

1 back to earlier. The DRE should generate an 2. electronic record it is not a mandatory 3 requirement in the regulations. I'd just like 4 to point that out for the record. 5 MR. WOODBRIDGE: But nevertheless 6 you will. 7 MR. SMITH: We are computing our 8 system to comply, but it is not a mandate. 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Going back to 10 section three with regard to exporting for 11 auditing analysis on standards-based or COTS, 12 what is your exporting mean. MR. SMITH: 13 3A would be we 14 provided to NJIT and the units generate images 15 through the small printer in the back. You can 16 also get them out of text file Microsoft export 17 from the machine electronically. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So a text file or 19 pdf. 2.0 MR. SMTTH: A TAC. 2.1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the records 22 shall be exported with a digital signature which 23 shall be calculated on the entire set of 24 electronic records and their associated digital 25 signatures.

1	This also was NJIT had a comment
2	on this which was similar to what we just talked
3	about?
4	MR. SMITH: Yes.
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if you have a
6	text file or as a graphic file there is a
7	digital signature?
8	MR. SMITH: It is reading across.
9	It took me a second, but there is a long string
10	of the letters and numbers at the bottom.
11	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You support for
12	someplace for tabulation or what have you.
13	MR. ALLEN: Mr. Chairman, it is
14	included in the text when you export the
15	information, you export it in two forms. It can
16	be printed by the machine or it can be a text
17	file. In either case the bottom of the record
18	the entire record there is a string which is the
19	hexadecimal representation of the digital
20	signature which can be verified.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: C, the voting
22	system vendor shall provide documentation about
23	the structure of the exported ballot image
24	records and how they shall be read and processed
25	by software.

1	MR. SMITH: We are providing that
2	documentation.
3	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I might point out
4	for the record that we have received a
5	significant amount of documentation on all
6	aspects of the machine.
7	D, the voting system vendor shall
8	provide a software program that will display the
9	exported ballot image records and that may
10	include other capabilities such as providing
11	vote tallies and indications of undervotes.
12	MR. SMITH: Yes, our selection
13	management system allows for that.
14	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The voting system
15	vendor shall provide full documentation of
16	procedures for sporting electronic ballot image
17	records and reconciling those records within the
18	paper records.
19	MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided
20	that documentation.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Next Section, C,
22	voting with a VVPRS. One, LPS shall promulgate
23	for voters instructions on how to use the VVPRS.
24	A, the VVPRS vendor shall provide in plain
25	language any reference material requested by LPS

1 to aid in the preparation of VVPRS instructions. These instructions shall be issued to each 2. 3 county board of election for board worker 4 training. 5 I believe that method will be 6 provided to us. 7 MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided 8 operational manuals for the Advantage with 9 VVPRS. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Instructions for 11 use of a VVPRS shall be made available prior to 12 an election on the Division of Election's 13 website and shall be available to the voter at 14 the polling place of an election. 15 C, prior to an election, the 16 county commissioner of registration will provide 17 demonstration machines at convenient locations 18 throughout the county for voter education 19 purposes. 2.0 With regard to that issue what do 2.1 you provide to each voters on how to use the 22 machine? 23 MR. SMITH: We provide operator 24 and maintenance manuals. The county takes those 25 and write it down in language that is suitable

1 for the jurisdiction. They have graphics people 2. and reformat accordingly, but we provide the base verbiage for them to draw from. We also 3 provide personal and technical support so the 4 5 jurisdictions are putting together training and voter education materials. 6 7 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I believe as a 8 footnote in our town about two or three years 9 ago they actually had one of those happen to the 10 machines. So you can see it. 11 D, the instructions for performing 12 the verification process shall be made available 13 to the voter on a location inside the voting 14 machine. Where feasible, the instructions shall 15 also be on the machine ballot face. 16 MR. SMITH: That's fine with us. We take that as best we can. You can certainly 17 18 see the ballot and the instructions. 19 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Is it fair to say you vote on the DRE, you don't have to do 2.0 2.1 anything special just press a button to vote? 22 MR. SMITH: It is a work flow to 23 the vote to do so, but if they follow the 24 prompts, it will carry them through the process. 25 MR. WOODBRIDGE:

They

1 automatically get a paper ballot. 2. MR. SMITH: They can't say no to 3 it. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: They can confirm 5 if it asks to have a paper trail come out. 6 MR. SMITH: The machine will 7 automatically carry them to a paper trail. 8 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two voter privacy 9 shall be preserved during the process of 10 recording, verifying, and automatic continuing 11 ballot sections. This includes a voter who uses 12 an audio voting device. Voters using an audio 13 voting device shall also be able to verify votes 14 privately and independently. 15 You did have a couple of comments 16 from NJIT in that regard one said the voting if 17 a paper record is printing the voter is prompted 18 to print the next page after the first page and 19 were in LCD screen rather than audio message for 2.0 the privacy by exposing the paper to the poll 21 worker. 22 MR. SMITH: The jurisdiction can 23 record and provide to the audio or instructions 24 that states how to interact with the machine. 25 So they would say once you have heard or

otherwise the first page is printed press this
bottom and get the second page and it will tell
them next and when you see your two pages you
can press this button to cast your vote and be
done. So they can provide instruction for you
had audio.

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Like I said, we were not able to interact with NJIT except for a couple minutes, otherwise we can demonstrated it. The jurisdiction like many things on our machine record audio instructions and local tradition is local needs and this being one of them they can do that.

Once again, also the NJIT report the next version of firmware will have an extra slot for lack of a better word for audio inserted so that in the script and flow for impaired voter it will come up with another audio queue so they can hear it from the beginning. They will get another audio queue that says you must do this to get from point A to point B.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Three, in any election where the ballot contains a language in addition to English, the paper record shall be

1	produced in all such languages.
2	MR. SMITH: We have that
3	capability and I believe two of the units are
4	programmed to do that for Spanish.
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: To assist with
6	manual auditing, candidate names on the paper
7	record shall be presented in the same language
8	as used in the DRE summary screen.
9	MR. SMITH: Whatever language the
10	voter has chosen and thus the screen it is
11	presented in will be there. Of course, with the
12	Advantage the voter selection are shown
13	constantly so there is no need for separate
14	electronic screen so as the VVPAT is moving the
15	voter can look at the full phase of the ballot
16	and see it.
17	MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, information on
18	the paper record not needed by the voter to
19	perform verification shall be in English.
20	MR. SMITH: That is really the
21	information on the VVPAT that the voter sees.
22	Of course there is a barcode as such.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, the privacy
24	of voters whose paper records contain an
25	alternative language shall be maintained.

1	MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, it is.
2	There is nothing out of the ordinary for an
3	alternative language.
4	MR. WOODBRIDGE: There is nothing
5	that would identify a voter?
6	MR. SMITH: No, sir.
7	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The paper records
8	shall distinguish between accepted and
9	nonaccepted ballots.
10	MR. SMITH: The print on it if
11	it's voided and the presence of the barcode the
12	printed the word void.
13	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Just for the
14	record, the two spoiled ballots appeared to have
15	the word void written at the top of them and the
16	third ballot with the barcode which is the one
17	that the voter accepted actually has the word
18	accepted in black on the left-hand side.
19	A, the voter shall have the
20	opportunity to accept or reject the contents of
21	his or her paper record.
22	Again, this goes back to the
23	comment made about NJIT number two. It said the
24	voter can have the opportunity to identify the
25	contents of the record corresponding to the vote

1 as it is. We have discussed this issue. 2. you explain for the record the response to that. 3 MR. SMITH: To the number of times At this time the unit is programmed 4 it allows. 5 according to New Jersey law to have a maximum of 6 two and a third and final paper record. It does 7 present a warning notice as shown in sub item 8 two and then if they did cast the vote it is in 9 the final and as we stated earlier that third 10 time because you cannot make changes to the VVPAT it does scroll down quickly and in the 11 12 firmware we will structure it so goes in the 13 same manner as the first and second to give an 14 opportunity for the voter to see the third and 15 not changeable is indeed in there. 16 MR. WOODBRIDGE: If the voter 17 rejects the contents of the paper record, he or 18 she may recast the ballot up to two additional 19 This procedure is consistent with 2.0 current State law. 2.1 MR. SMITH: Yes, sir and because 22 different states have different numbers, we allow the votes that number of times. 23 24 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, before the 25 voter causes a third and final paper record to

1	be printed, the voter shall be presented with a
2	warning notice on the machine that the
3	selections on the DRE will be final. The voter
4	will see and verify a printout of the votes, but
5	will not be given additional opportunities to
6	change any vote. The third ballot cast shall
7	constitute the final and the official ballot of
8	such a voter.
9	MR. SMITH: It does behave in that
10	manner.
11	MR. WOODBRIDGE: As I recall from
12	your earlier testimony, it provides a warning on
13	the LCD screen, is that correct?
14	MR. SMITH: That is correct.
15	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Does it provide
16	any other warning before the ballot that he or
17	she casts?
18	MR. SMITH: I believe it provides
19	it that one time. That would be a key part of
20	the process where you need to either say yes I
21	have done it and hit the button or go back and
22	reselect selections before the third time.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Upon rejecting a
24	paper record, the voter shall be able to modify
25	and verify the selections on the DRE without

1 having to reselect all choices in all contest he 2 is on the ballot. 3 MR. SMITH: The machine does behave in that manner. You can change one or 4 5 change the entire ballot. 6 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So if you change 7 your mind and you just change one vote for a 8 freeholder that is all you have to do, you don't 9 have to revote the entire ballot? 10 MR. SMITH: Yes, you can make one 11 change or if you decide the take it back the way 12 it was originally, you can do that and hit cast 13 vote. You can do it anyway you want to do it. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Four, if a 15 mechanical error in recording or printing a 16 paper record occurs, the record shall be counted 17 as a spoiled paper record. It will not be 18 counted as one of the voter's three attempted 19 votes. 2.0 The machine behaves in MR. SMTTH: 2.1 that way. So the printer confirms back the 22 finalized print it drops it in the box. It does 23 not signal the machine of the other chances. 24 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Five, the VVPRS

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shall be designed to indicate the paper record

1 which the voter has identified and cast as his 2. or her official ballot. 3 MR. SMITH: It does identify that 4 through the word accepted. Accepted and cast. 5 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Next section is section five, security and reliability. A, 6 7 VVPRS shall not be permitted to externally 8 communicate with any system or machine other 9 than the voting system to which it is connected. 10 MR. SMITH: As it's configured and 11 as you can see there is no opportunity to unplug 12 or transmit out, in other words, external 13 communicating. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Assume we follow 15 the procedures followed by the election. 16 MR. SMITH: To some extent you, 17 but there is nothing structurally that allows them to communicate externally. 18 19 MR. WOODBRIDGE: B, the VVPRS 2.0 shall only be able to function as a printer, it 2.1 shall not contain any other services, for 22 example, copier or fax functions or network 23 capability. The printer shall not contain any 24 component with an external communication 25 feature.

1	MR. SMITH: And it does not.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The paper path
3	between the printing, viewing and storage of the
4	paper record shall be protected and sealed from
5	access except by election officials authorized
6	by each county commissioner of registration.
7	MR. SMITH: I think we viewed that
8	earlier with the opportunity to place seals and
9	tamper proof tape.
10	MR. WOODBRIDGE: D, all
11	cryptographic software in the voting system
12	shall be approved by the U.S. Government's
13	Cryptographic Module Validation Program, if
14	applicable, prior to being certified in New
15	Jersey.
16	MR. SMITH: The 256 produces
17	writing that is attached and we will find
18	numerous manifestations of it approved.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: As stated in the
20	discussion portion of Section 7.9.3 of the
21	United States Election Assistance Commission
22	draft criteria for voter verifiable paper audit
23	trail requirement, there may be cryptographic
24	voting schemes where the cryptographic
25	algorithms used are necessarily different from

1 any algorithms that have approved CMVP 2. implementations, thus CMVP approved software 3 should be used when feasible, but it is not 4 required. The CMVP website is given. 5 If I understand correctly, the 6 cryptographic software we have the Government 7 Cryptographic Module Validation Program, is that 8 correct? 9 MR. SMITH: The 256 algorithm 10 approved part of the issue from CMVP. It only 11 includes end to end cryptographic solutions and 12 does not improve and cannot approve the million 13 algorithms when you put an approved algorithm 14 inside a piece of software such as a voting 15 machine, an ATM, any devices, satellites. 16 CMVP does not go to approve everybody, but you 17 can clearly see from the website what algorithms 18 are part of the approved suite and they could 19 all the algorithms that the 256 is one of those. 2.0 MR. WOODBRIDGE: It says may. 2.1 Two, the vendor shall provide a 22 certification of CMVP approval, if applicable. 23 If not applicable, the vendor shall provide a 24 certification setting forth the reasons why CMVP

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approval does not apply.

1	MR. SMITH: It is as I just stated
2	where CMVP does not approve the use of approved
3	algorithms with embedded systems. They couldn't
4	afford the manpower and staffing to go out and
5	approve everyone that is using the algorithm so
6	they don't they do approve solutions and they
7	do approve algorithms themselves.
8	MR. WOODBRIDGE: It seems to me
9	reading this literally that if that's the case
10	we need some sort of certification from you all
11	explaining the CMV approval.
12	MR. SMITH: We did provide that to
13	the Attorney General's Office I think two weeks
14	ago
15	MR. WOODBRIDGE: They already have
16	that.
17	MR. SMITH: Yes.
18	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The printer be
19	connected to the voting machine either by
20	completely concealing the printer connection or
21	via a security tag to prevent tampering.
22	MR. SMITH: In the case of
23	Advantage one end of the cable is completely
24	shrouded and the other side a tamper proof seal.
25	MR. WOODBRIDGE: F, the DRE shall

detect and notify the election officials at the polling place of any errors and malfunctions such as paper jams or low supplies of consumables, e.g., paper that may prevent paper records from being correctly displayed, printed or stored.

This was the subject of a comment.

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This was the subject of a comment number nine where it said if a mechanical error or malfunction occurs the DRE displays an error message in both the operators panel and were in LCD the voter the error doesn't always reflect the actual diagnosis. Further more, if a printer error occurs the printer has to be powered down and then powered on again to return to a workable status. The VVPRS appears out of the unfinished printing context in a different size and upside down on the paper.

MR. SMITH: We comply with the regulations that State shall attain and notify the election officials of any errors or malfunctions. It clear that the unit does give indication via LCD and the panel.

As for the particular circumstances around that particular paper jam, it is difficult to say because with the

interface with NJIT, but in any case it happens
to be a voter's third time to review the VVPAT
record they could of course void that and
continue to vote if they were unsure in the
paperwork or for some reason they could not view
it.

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MR. WOODBRIDGE: We have NJIT people here. I am a little confused. It says error message does not reflect the actual diagnosis.

Mitch, could you tell us exactly what that means?

MR. DARER: There was six types of errors and malfunctions tested. Paper jam, paper broken within the one paper sheet broken, broken at the end of a paper sheet. Printer power disconnection, printer communication cable disconnection and low paper supply. So those are six different scenarios. Some involving the paper, some involving the printer power, some involving the printer communication cable and the same error message was observed for each of the first four, VVPAT printer error. So there were misleading an error signal came up, but it was not the correct one. It was misleading that

1	is what we encountered.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: What is the
3	misleading message? Did it say that there is a
4	printer error, but it doesn't tell you what the
5	error is, is that correct or a jam?
6	MR. DARER: The error messages was
7	either VVPAT printer error, printer off line or
8	VVPAT printer error out of paper. Those were
9	the only two error messages that showed up.
10	They showed up even if the problem was printer
11	communication cable disconnect, paper broken at
12	the end, low paper supply.
13	MR. WOODBRIDGE: So it gave you
14	basically only two flavors of error messages,
15	but it didn't give any
16	MR. DARER: It did draw someone's
17	attention to it. But according to the
18	regulation in terms of a clear indication, we
19	felt it wasn't clear.
20	In 5G
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: We are not there
22	yet, but almost there.
23	MR. DARER: One after another and
24	we grouped them together.
25	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Let's go to 5G so

we can get the comments for the record. 1 2. will cover 5F and 5E and Section G. 3 If a mechanical error or 4 malfunction occurs, such as, but not limited to, 5 a paper jam or running out of paper, the DRE and 6 VVPRS shall suspend voting operations, not 7 record votes and present a clear indication of 8 the malfunction to the voter and the election 9 officials. 10 MR. DARER: As I mentioned earlier 11 some of the criteria call for quantitative 12 assessment. Does it have it or doesn't and 13 words like easily or clear isn't there. We made 14 our interpretation of it and felt it wasn't 15 clear. 16 MR. FLEMING: But it was clear 17 there was a problem? 18 MR. DARER: Yes. 19 MR. WOODBRIDGE: It gives you two 2.0 types of instructions, but there are two types 2.1 of error messages, but more types of problems 22 than you can have clearly indicate what the 23 problem is. For example, can you distinguish 24 between error jam and running out of paper? 25 MR. ALLEN: With the regulations

1 it is clear there is an issue that the paper 2. records be displayed. So our contention of the 3 version of firmware does actually confirm the 4 letter requirements however we agree there could 5 be more error types distinguished and the 6 version form that is coming pending 7 certification which should be available for State certification next two or three months 8 9 does include more certification on the exact 10 cause. 11 MR. WOODBRIDGE: So in two or 12 three months we are likely to get some software 13 perhaps with some of these other things he is 14 talking about and be able to differentiate it 15 between some of the these types of errors? 16 MR. ALLEN: Correct, depending on 17 what the sensors are it will determine which 18 error type is likely to be spelled out. 19 MR. WOODBRIDGE: It seems to me 2.0 the most common type of error is paper low or 2.1 paper jam. 22 MR. ALLEN: If you find paper 23 movements and expect the papers to move and it 24 doesn't and the paper is not alone, then will be 25 able to say paper jam.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you.
2	Section H, if the connection
3	between the voting machine and the printer has
4	been broken, the voting machine shall detect and
5	provide notice of this event and record it in
6	the DRE's internal audit log. Voting operations
7	shall be suspended and no votes shall be
8	recorded.
9	We also have some comments from
10	NJIT on that regard. It says quote the printer
11	disconnections not recorded in the DRE's
12	internal audit log.
13	MR. SMITH: We have no contention
14	with that the version firmware under
15	certification. On the other hand in the second
16	sentence of this clause that operations be
17	suspended and no votes recorded. If the printer
18	is disconnected on the back of the units, the
19	unit knows that and the suspend voting
20	operations.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Maybe I did
22	not my hearing isn't very good, but if the
23	connection is broken, is there a record of that
24	event in the DRE's internal log?
25	MR. ALLEN: In the other firmware,

1	the firmware in federal certification and will
2	be available to New Jersey in certification for
3	three months does record that event in the
4	internal DRE.
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: To make sure I
6	understand it, you don't disagree with their
7	analysis in the first sentence, but there will
8	be software available or correction to do that?
9	MR. ALLEN: Correct. My
10	colleagues pointed out that even with this
11	version of firmware when the printer is
12	disconnected, the machine not only notifies, but
13	also suspends that so that part is met.
14	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Earlier there was
15	feedback between the printer and the machine
16	such that you can't go on the next one so this
17	is part of that.
18	MR. SMITH: Yes.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Paragraph I, if
20	the voter's selection on the DRE do not match
21	the paper record, then the DRE shall immediately
22	be withdrawn from service. One, the affected
23	voter shall be able to vote on another voting
24	machine, if available, or by emergency ballot.
25	J, the vendor shall provide to LPS

1 documentation for the DRE and the VVPRS that 2. includes procedures for the recovery of votes in case of a malfunction. LPS shall be responsible 3 for disseminating this information to the county 4 5 commissioners of registration. 6 MR. SMITH: We gave to the 7 Attorney General's Office some weeks ago for the 8 Advantage. 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: K, Vendor shall 10 provide to LPS documentation for the DRE and the 11 VVPRS that includes recommended procedures to 12 enable the election officials to return a voting machine to workable status after the machine has 13 14 malfunctioned, the printer needs to be replaced 15 or a voter has used it incompletely or 16 incorrectly. Once again, that is 17 MR. SMITH: part of the troubleshooting in the operating 18 19 manual. 2.0 MR. WOODBRIDGE: One, these 2.1 procedures shall not cause discrepancy between 22 the tallies of the electronic and paper records 23 it. 24 MR. SMITH: None of our procedures 25 call for involvement with the electronic paper

1 records and counting. 2. MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, the LPS 3 shall be responsible for disseminating this information to the county commissioners of 4 5 registration. 6 L, the vendor documentation shall 7 include procedures for investigating and 8 resolving printer malfunctions including, but 9 not limited to printer operations, misreporting 10 of votes, unreadable paper records and process 11 failures. 12 MR. SMITH: Once again, we sent it 13 to the Attorney General's Office in the trouble 14 shooting quide and included in that added to our 15 standard offering of that manual convincing 16 evidence that procedures are around printer 17 operations. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: If the machine 19 malfunctions or becomes inoperable, voters will 2.0 be entitled to vote by emergency ballot. 2.1 We historically required that 22 emergency paper ballot box be placed inside of 23 voting machines. I don't know whether they 24 still do it. What do you do with respect to

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emergency ballots?

1	MR. SMITH: Paper ballots?
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Yes.
3	MR. SMITH: That is really a
4	jurisdictional issue. I don't believe
5	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I believe the DRE
6	testing data require there been a box on the
7	side of the machine that included a pencil and
8	paper ballots. That may still be a valid
9	requirement.
10	It doesn't say so here explicitly,
11	but that is always been required by the State.
12	This criteria isn't as explicit as the gold
13	criteria was with respect to provided, for
14	example, emergency paper ballots so that is
15	something that will resolve itself. If you were
16	required to place a box on the side of the
17	machine would that be any problem?
18	MR. SMITH: Well, the Advantage
19	base unit that you see over there has been
20	certified since 1994 so if there is a
21	requirement that the machine
22	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Probably for
23	general certification.
24	MR. ROMEI: I'm Adolph Romei with
25	Sequoia. The machines that you are looking at

1 right here don't have a ballot box attached, but 2. at least one machine in every voting district in 3 machine has emergency ballot box. It is a sealed ballot box itself attached by State law 4 5 to the machine so it is available already so 6 that is in the prior certification. 7 MR. WOODBRIDGE: That would be 8 including with these machines here, is that 9 correct? 10 Absolutely, there is MR. SMITH: 11 no change in that certification. 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think my 13 recollection I think every machine is supposed 14 to have those on there whether the county 15 enforces that or not, I don't know. Everyone 16 should have on the side of it a place to put a 17 paper with thirty ballots. 18 Move to page eleven some of the 19 criteria coming past that point really aren't 2.0 directly relevant to the vendors. 2.1 So I am going to skip 22 certification Section 6A, B and C and skip down 23 to C1 and C2. The vendor shall provide to the 24 State, electronically and in hard copy, all use 25 and technical specifications and documentation

1	relating to the function of the VVPRS.
2	MR. SMITH: Yes, I believe we
3	comply with that.
4	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Two, the vendor
5	shall submit a certification that the VVPRS
6	satisfies the State's criteria.
7	MR. SMITH: We provided it.
8	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You provided it,
9	is that correct?
10	MR. SMITH: Yes.
11	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The next section
12	actually we dealt with at the very beginning on
13	our checklist, but I will read it anyhow. D, a
14	VVPRS shall not at any time contain or use
15	undisclosed hardware or software. The only
16	components that may be used in the system are
17	components that have been tested and certified
18	for use in the State.
19	MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, we are
20	complying with that.
21	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The vendor will
22	be required to provide the source code for the
23	DRE and the VVPRS to the State and/or to place
24	such source code in escrow to allow for
25	independent testing by the State at its

discretion. Upon request, the State will enter 1 2. into a nondisclosure agreement with the vendor. 3 MR. SMITH: We are negotiating 4 that now and we will comply with that. 5 MR. WOODBRIDGE: You're 6 negotiating? 7 MR. SMITH: We're negotiating 8 that. 9 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Do you keep your 10 escrow? 11 MR. SMITH: Yes, through the State 12 requires. 13 MR. WOODBRIDGE: How far along are 14 you with the certification with the State of New 15 Jersey? 16 MR. SMITH: We have a substantial 17 draft. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: The draft of the 19 Attorney General's Office. MR. SMITH: I believe it is in at 2.0 2.1 this time. 22 MR. ROMEI: We do indeed have a 23 draft. 24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We believe 25 the draft is final subject to a remaining

1 comment by the Attorney General's office and 2. that agreement expressly addresses the source 3 code. 4 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, the vendor 5 will be responsible for the cost of any testing 6 of the VVPRS that the State deems necessary to 7 achieve certification. 8 G, vendor documentation shall 9 include printer reliability specifications 10 including Mean Time between failure estimates 11 and shall include recommendations for 12 appropriate quantities of backup printers and 13 supplies. 14 MR. SMITH: We have supplied that 15 to the Attorney General's office. MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mean Time between 16 17 failures. Section seven, pre-election 18 procedures and post-election procedures were on 19 the checklist. 2.0 A, a VVPRS's components shall be 2.1 integrated into the existing local logic testing 22 procedures performed by county election 23 officials which are performed in preparation for 24 an election.

MR. SMITH: Our response to that

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1 is our equipment is certainly able to perform 2. tests the other machines past. 3 MR. WOODBRIDGE: In fairness we 4 asked this from the checklist. 5 I am going to skip over sections 8A, B and C because they are not relevant to 6 7 this hearing. Go to 8D, in case the machine 8 9 cartridge becomes unreadable or is damaged for 10 an audit or recount, the county commissioner of 11 registration shall produce the ballot image 12 audit log from the machine. The vendor shall 13 provide to LPS documentation regarding the 14 production of such audit log. 15 MR. SMITH: Yes, that is in the 16 operations manuals and various other manuals we 17 provided to the attorney. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Similarly, 8E, 19 the paper record shall be created such that its contents are machine readable for purposes of 2.0 2.1 any recount, audit or initial tallying of an 22 election in the event that the machine cartridge 23 containing the electronic record is not usable. 24 MR. SMITH: It is. 25 MR. WOODBRIDGE: This may be

1 The paper record shall contain error redundant. 2. correcting codes for the purpose of detecting 3 read errors. This may be done by barcode. 4 MR. SMITH: As we discussed, it 5 is. 6 MR. WOODBRIDGE: G, the vendor 7 shall provide to LPS written procedures to 8 identify and resolve any discrepancy between an 9 electronic record and its corresponding paper 10 record. LPS shall be responsible for 11 disseminating this information to the county 12 commissioners of registration. 13 MR. SMITH: Yes. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: H, the vendor 15 shall provide written procedures for determining 16 what constitutes clear evidence that a paper 17 record is inaccurate, incomplete or unreadable. 18 LPS shall be responsible for disseminating this 19 information to the county commissioners of 2.0 registration. Now, the vendor shall provide 2.1 written procedures for determining what 22 constitutes clear evidence that a paper record 23 is inaccurate, incomplete or unreadable. 24 MR. SMITH: Yes, we have provided 25 that as part of the machine.

1	MR. WOODBRIDGE: It would seem to
2	me if a paper record was unreadable, it is not
3	readable.
4	We walked through the different
5	sections of the statutes we do have a few more
6	questions. Do we have copies of certification
7	from other states? This accommodation with the
8	printer.
9	MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, it is.
10	MR. WOODBRIDGE: The DRE has been
11	approved by other states, is that correct?
12	MR. SMITH: Yes, statewide
13	implementation in Louisiana.
14	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other states?
15	MR. SMITH: Yes, sir, Colorado. I
16	really need someone in sales at this point, but
17	we can find that list. I just can't recall off
18	the top of my head.
19	MR. WOODBRIDGE: You will provide
20	copies of documentation.
21	MR. SMITH: The Advantage has
22	always gone through Wyle Labs.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Any other ITA
2.4	documentation?
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took the management and procedure end to end
qualification, but all of the hardware in the
Advantage and other offerings all was Wyle Labs
or Assist Labs.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we get to

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MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we get to the public input is David Millstein here? Would you come here for a second.

We have a gentleman here who wants to address the issue of the disability and in order to fairly wrap this up. Mr. Millstein, thank you for coming here today. We have just been through a fairly long and somewhat tedious piece by piece review of the equipment that is in front of us.

The only remaining component before we could take public input is to get your input with regard to the functionality of the machine with regard to people who are visually or audibly impaired and I understand your prepared to comment on that.

MR. MILLSTEIN: I am, yes. Good afternoon, my name is David Millstein. I am a State ADA administrator, the Americans With Disabilities Act. Yesterday afternoon we did a review of the machines to my left and also to my

1 The machines to my left do have the right. 2. proper clearance that we are looking for for a 3 wheelchair user to roll directly under to be 4 able to utilize the machine for voting. clearances we have are twenty-nine inches for 5 6 underneath. We have a twelve-inch spread to 7 allow for the wheelchair to go fully under with 8 a person doing a forward reach. The reach 9 itself as the clearance from side to side is 10 anywhere from thirty-six to forty-eight inches 11 for clearance. 12 We also had a person from the 13 department of human services who is visually 14 impaired, blind, to actually do a test and do a 15 voting ballot. We used audio for that. 16 hooked up speakers instead of the actual 17 headphones for us to here as well as herself. 18 The way the machines operated for her was that 19 the instructions were very well read, very well 2.0 heard. 2.1 When it came to the actual ballot

When it came to the actual ballot for voting the voice synthesizer was usable hearable, but was not the best. The key pad which is a small hand held type remote was very well addressed with brail for each of the

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1 buttons explaining what button is being used for 2. and there was no problems with her using the 3 machine to vote. 4 We did certify what she did put 5 into the machine for her requests did come out 6 on the paper for what was inputted by her. 7 machines to my right. 8 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we go 9 ahead you said machines to your left which 10 machine are you referring to, is that referring 11 to the Sequoia Advantage machine. 12 MR. MILLSTEIN: That would be the 13 large machines over here. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: On the front 15 left? 16 MR. MILLSTEIN: Yes. 17 MR. WOODBRIDGE: I want to make 18 sure for the record we understand what machines 19 you are pointing to with regard to comments. 2.0 MR. MILLSTEIN: The machines to my 2.1 right. Those also are usable machines by both a 22 wheelchair user as well as someone who has a 23 visual impairment. The machines do rise up and 24 down. 25 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Millstein,

1 those machines on the right-hand side are the 2. Advante machines, not these ones. The ones we 3 are concerned with are just those ones over 4 here. 5 MR. MILLSTEIN: So I quess in closing -- so we are only going to be speaking 6 7 the machines to the my left. Those machines are 8 usable for both a person who is a wheelchair 9 user a person who would have a visual impairment 10 being youth rise the machine. The machine is 11 workable readable has voice activation for both 12 the voice synthesizer as well as the 13 instructions. 14 Everything that was inputted by 15 the user did certify by paper trail so at this 16 point I would say yes, this would be a certified 17 machine to someone with a disability. 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very 19 much for your input. 2.0 Why don't we take a five-minute 2.1 break and then we will come back we will take 22 public comment. I would suggest that we have 23 six people signed up for comments. 24 Now, if you do want to speak don't 25 forget to sign up so we will reconvene in five

1	minutes and take the public comment in the order
2	signed up.
3	Thank you.
4	(Whereupon, a short recess was
5	taken.)
6	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Before we go into
7	public session and get public comment,
8	Mr. Fleming and Mr. Mahoney have one or two
9	questions to ask so while everyone getting ready
10	I will ask Mr. Mahoney to go first.
11	MR. MAHONEY: The question I have
12	during the prelogic and accuracy test when the
13	technicians are setting up the machine if the
14	VVPRS also tested at that time? .
15	MR. SMITH: Yes, it is the
16	procedures that we have given in the
17	jurisdictions, for instance, the Edge with VVPAT
18	call for the same testing that you do today with
19	VVPAT, however, we take the secondary step the
20	taking the VVPAT record matches the script
21	whether its simulation whether it be by manual.
22	MR. MAHONEY: Thank you.
23	MR. WOODBRIDGE: Mr. Fleming.
24	MR. FLEMING: A lot of questions
25	we have had have been based on fixed in the

1 firmware and you said the firmware is being 2. tested by the federal government? 3 MR. SMITH: Yes. 4 MR. FLEMING: Is there any reason 5 why NJIT couldn't get and test at the same time 6 and answer all the questions? 7 MR. SMITH: There is two aspects 8 to that one. I believe it is clear that it 9 needs to be certified and gone through the 10 testing. Second, the timing of the regulations 11 prohibited that. 12 MR. WOODBRIDGE: We are going to 13 head into the public comment part of the area. 14 This is the last part and I appreciate your 15 patience especially those who want to speak. 16 Again, just to refresh our collective memories, 17 if you have questions comments please address 18 them to me. 19 You will do us a large favor if 2.0 you keep comments directed towards the issue the 2.1 committee has to deal with, namely, whether or 22 not this particular piece of equipment meets the 23 State quidelines. 24 Having said that we have a sign-up 25 sheet and I am delighted to ask those who have

signed up to come in order and I will start out
with Penny Venetis from the public advocates
office.

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MS. VENETIS: I just want to make one minor correction before I speak. My name is Penny Venetis, that is true, but I actually am a law professor at Rutgers Law School. I am not with the public advocates office.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: My apologies.

MS. VENETIS: In my capacity as a clinical professor at Rutgers Law School, I'm also lead counsel in a lawsuit called Gusciora, versus Corzine which many people in the room might be familiar with and that lawsuit challenges on constitutional grounds the -- I'm going to continue the lawsuit Gusciora, versus, Corzine was filed in 2004 and challenges on constitutional grounds the use of electronic voting machines in the State that do not produce a voter verified paper ballot.

I would like the record to reflect my strong belief that this committee should not certificate the AVC Advantage printer that has been demonstrated today and that AVC Advantage should be replaced with optical scanners that

1 scan paper ballots. Since the Help America Vote 2. Act was passed by Congress in 2001 and states 3 began spending money on audible electronic voting machines, computer scientists have 4 5 offered study after study that electronic voting 6 machines can be tampered with to manipulate the 7 election. That vulnerability is the thrust of 8 the Gusciora lawsuit. Because of the 9 vulnerability pose for our most fundamental 10 right to vote by electronic voting machines our 11 own State legislature now requires that every 12 voting machine in the use in the State produce a 13 voter verified paper ballot by January 1st, 14 2008, which is a short five months from now. 15 As I have maintained since the 16 Gusciora lawsuit filed in 2004, New Jersey's 17 electronic voting machines cannot be trusted 18 with the right to vote. The Sequoia AVC 19 Advantage, which is most commonly used 2.0 throughout the State could be manipulated fairly 2.1 easily. In deed Professor Andrew Apel of 22 Princeton University was able to break into 23 control panel and remove the ROM chip of AVC 24 Advantage which contains valuable information on 25 how votes are cast and stored and tallied in a

matter of seconds. Professor Apel made front page news when he purchased five AVC Advantage series for less than seventeen dollars each from an Internet clearing house called govdeals.com.

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This purchase made clear that anyone can buy the very same electronic voting machines used by the majority of the voters in the State and that anyone can tinker with them and learn how to manipulate them to throw an election.

Unfortunately, despite evidence of its many vulnerabilities, the software of the AVC Advantage has still not been tested. NJIT contract that we spoke of for many hours today did not require testing of the software. It only requested testing of the hardware to see whether or not the hardware performs. This new testing of not only hardware and software I believe is mandated by Title 19 given that we have heard repeatedly today that new software was introduced to operate the voter verified paper ballot printers and that new software wear has been introduced to make the machine compliant with the legislature's January 1st requirements.

So I request that this committee not only examine the firmware, but also examine the software because it is new and Title 19 requires that when modifications are made to voting machines, regardless of whether they are electronic or nonelectronic, that the entire system has to be recertified and that does not appear to have been done or to even have been discussed today.

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Without such certification, these machines cannot be used given that they have been modified so substantially.

Additionally, Cyber Labs which Sequoia has used to certify its software has been permanently decertified by the federal government.

Now, Mr. Woodbridge, you asked some follow up questions about the certification and the Sequoia representative very definitely refused to truthfully give you information. He said that there are some software that is being tested or some hardware being tested by Wily Labs, but the firmware my understanding is has been used in the past was tested by Cyber. In July of 2006, Cyber was decertified by the

1 federal government and only a few weeks ago was 2 permanently decertified by the federal 3 government. The reason Cyber lost its certification was that it is was not applying 4 its own standards in testing the voting machines 5 6 and the government felt that any reports that 7 were issued by Cyber were not -- indeed did not 8 reflect whether or not the voting machine did 9 indeed meet safety and security guidelines and 10 federal qualifications. So I ask that you follow up with 11 12 some questions about what portions of this 13 machine that has been demonstrated today was 14 tested by Cyber Labs. 15 The NJIT team outlined twelve 16 critical problems that arose during the testing 17 of the printers and should give this committee 18 pause and cause it to reject the printers. 19 will not go into detail on those twelve

What I do want to point out though is that those twelve exceptions and the answers given by the Sequoia representative makes very, very clear that these machines are not ready for

exceptions because we have spend the entire day

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discussing them.

State certifications. These machines and the printers that have been demonstrated do not meet the new guidelines that were promulgated by the New Jersey Attorney General's Office and I won't go into the specifics or problems with what I believe exist in the guidelines. I have done that in written comments and that is not the subject of today's hearings, but based on the guidelines that actually exist there are serious problems and reasons why this committee should recommend that the voting machines should not be certified.

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Now, members of the Sequoia team have told the State several things they said that certain parts exist to make the machine tamper proof, but those parts were not provided to the NJIT team until after the testing had been done. We will only have the NJIT's team results to go by. We don't know whether or not those tamper proof seals exist or not and until further testing is done we really won't know whether or not that very critical security issue that was raised by the NJIT team can even be resolved.

Secondly, there have been several

1 mentions made the software that is in the 2. process of being developed that we have heard 3 will be made available to the NJIT team that might remedy some of the problems that the NJIT 4 5 team recognize with the printers. Well, again, 6 first of all, the software won't be made available for another two to three months. 7 That. 8 is what was estimated. That brings us 9 dangerously close to the January 1st, 2008 10 deadline. 11 Secondly, again, we don't know 12 whether or not the software will indeed solve problems that was raised by the NJIT team and we 13 14 have absolutely no way of verifying that until 15

it is provided to the State and that software is tested to see whether or not it addresses the NJIT team concerns.

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Third, again, since this is a modification of software that we are talking about when this software if and when it is produced, it will require a complete and total recertification of the entire voting mechanism. Not just a test of the hardware to see how many votes it processes, but an entire testing of the software.

Finally, the NJIT team tested a very small number of voting machines. Computer scientists have made very clear that each voting machine contains software that can be manipulated and altered in very specific and unique ways. Therefore, each voting machine has to be certified and the software has to be certified.

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I also asked the committee to ask further questions about the barcode issues that had been raised. I am not a computer scientist, but I have been working very, very closely with computer scientists who looked at NJIT reports an also had serious questions about the barcode issue and whether or not you could actually match a barcode with a specific machine.

Barcodes can be very, very easily manipulated and I will provide the commission with a certification that was drafted by one of my expert witnesses, Andrew Apel of Princeton University who took issue with the barcodes that exist.

I also want to say that according to the contract between the State and NJIT, there was no testing of the barcode required to

1 make sure that there was an encrypted barcode
2 that was secure.

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So I would recommend that the State if the State goes interested in that pursuing that issue further that the contract be expanded so that the NJIT team can really determine with certainty how secure the barcode is. That is particularly important because if you are going to have -- if you are going to count the voter verified paper ballots which is the official ballots using a barcode scanner then the barcode has to be secure plus the scanner has to be tested to make sure the scanner hasn't been manipulated. So I wanted to raise that issue for the committee.

As mentioned earlier the problems that were identified by the NJIT team alone warrant the rejection of the entire system that has been presented to the committee today and that is the subject of these hearings. The AVC Advantage printer reveals itself to be unsecure unreliable and explicitly and specifically fails to meet the State mandates.

Surely this is not the system that the legislature contemplated when it mandated

all electronic voting machines produce voter
verified paper ballots to instill voter
confidence. It would be a tremendous waste of
taxpayer dollars at this point to spend any
funds, in particular, dozens of millions of

dollars to purchase this faulty system.

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So, again, I urge the committee to reject the system that's been presented. I am planning and have spoken to the chair of the committee about submitting written comments and elaborate further on the comments that I have made today. I also in addition to asking the committee to ask the members of the Sequoia team about the Cyber Certification Group and also about the barcode.

I also ask the committee in making its determination as to whether or not to certify these machines to take into account Sequoia Corporation as a whole and whether or not it is a credible corporation whether or not it is an honest corporation. There have been several representations made today that are simply not true. One representation is that Sequoia is a U.S. corporation. It is not, it is a Venezuelan corporation that was under federal

1 investigation and the Venezuelan Government, 2. rather than complying with various federal 3 investigations, said it was selling off Sequoia so that it wouldn't have to respond to 4 5 governmental questions concerning holdings of 6 the corporation by the Venezuelan Government. 7 In addition, there is ongoing federal 8 investigation on fraud. Charges against the 9 corporation that is independent from the 10 investigation into whether or not elections 11 should be run by a foreign owned corporations. 12 The other issue representation 13 that have been made deal with the usage of the 14 AVC Advantage. Yes, it has been used in several 15 states as has been the Edge, but it also has 16 been decertified by several counties and states. 17 Louisiana is selling off its Advantage machines. 18 It doesn't want them anymore and that is indeed 19 how Professor Apel got the machine off the 2.0 Internet because it was being sold off and 2.1 disregarded by the State of Louisiana. 22 have been multiple problems with the Sequoia 23 machines. In Chicago is another place that was 24 mention. Front page New York Times and other 25 newspaper headlines when Cook County was using

1 the Sequoia machines for the first time they 2. were breaking down and there were findings that 3 misrepresentations had been made during the purchase phase. In Mercer County alone 4 5 misrepresentations were made about when certain products, the voter verified paper ballot 6 counter would be available. It was promised 7 8 five years ago.

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Again, this should all go into the picture of the committee in determining whether or not it should spend good taxpayer dollars on these machines that do not on their face meet State certifications requirements and, again, I am going to supplement these comments with my written comments and I thank the members of the committee for their kind attention.

MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very much. I understand that the written comments will be provided within the week, is that right? Thank you very good comments.

In the interest of moving things along, I think it is smart that get everybody's input. If there is any reaction to the response by Sequoia representative or committee that will be the best time to do it so they have their

1 chance to say their peace.

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residents.

2 Is Flavio Kowver here.

MR. KOWVER: Mr. Woodbridge and
members of the committee, good afternoon. My
name is Flavio Kowver, deputy public advocate.
The mission of the Department of the Public
Advocate is to make government more accountable
and responsive to the needs of New Jersey

The public advocate's mission is to act as a voice of the people on a range of critical issues and that vigorously impact the public. The public advocate appears in these proceedings pursuant N.J.S.A. 57:27W59, which among other things, authorizes the Department to protect the public interest by participating and intervening in administrative proceedings. We also appear pursuant to our rights as a member of the public.

In furtherance of public advocates mission, the public advocate is undertaking the voting rights campaign. On the issue of voting machines specifically for months the public advocate has consistently taken the position that it is necessary to have rigorous State

1 level certification of our voting machines.

2 | That includes specific standards define what

3 | that rigorous testing is, that the complete

4 | machine be tested and the test simulate election

5 day conditions.

machine.

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The department in some is working to create a system in which all voters can justify being confident and we present these comments today to address the questions of whether the use of the Advantage machines and, in fact, creates a situation in which voters can justify the confidence of their election

My colleague, Alex Glad, sitting to my left here will bring up to you a number of exhibits that we have prepared numbers one through sixty-seven. We will not be using thirty-eight, thirty-nine, fifty or sixty. We will provide exhibit sixty tomorrow.

This list of exhibits with the exception of last five was communicated to the Attorney General on the morning of Thursday,
July 19, in fact, I might add before the NJIT report was, in fact, issued and I would simply make reference to that as well as to our prior

letter to the Attorney General of July 16 as

part of the record of this case. We, of course,

reserve the right to introduce additional

exhibits or testimony as further evidence maybe

induced in the course of these hearings.

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Mr. Chairman, in this age of electronic voting, the thorough and scientific testing and certification of voting machines can make a difference between a fair election and an unfair one. The right to vote is the hallmark of citizenship, the foundation of democracy and it is too important to be left on machines that may malfunction, printers that may jam or to hackers who may seek to alter election results.

As I mentioned before, the public advocate has for many months been urging the Attorney General in the State chief election official to ensure adequate testing and certification of voting systems that we all use in upcoming elections. This mandate is especially present as the State prepares to the comply with the statute that takes affect in January 1, 2008 requiring paper records of some sort in all voting machines whether through DRE or through different systems where the voter

marks a paper ballot such as an optical scan.

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systems.

In any events, the State must

purchase and install more than ten thousand

voting machine printers or similar paper based

While the Attorney General has
taken the step of seeking independent testing of
the printers under consideration, the public
advocate continues to have serious concerns
about both the standards under which the testing

took place and the results of this test.

The committee is now receiving evidence to determine whether those printers proposed for the three voting machines used in New Jersey have been thoroughly tested. The this committee will then make a determination to the Attorney General. As a result, the questions before the voting machine examination committee is, therefore, whether Sequoia has met its burden by proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the Advantage in this case which has been proposed for use in New Jersey by January 1st, 2008 meets all the statutory criteria applicable for the voter verified paper record system. In particular,

our focus is on five of these criteria.

Number one, the machines have been

3 thoroughly tested.

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Number two, that the machines are found to be reliable.

Number three, that they are found to guarantee secrecy to all voters in the act of voting.

Four, will correctly register and record and accurately count all votes cast and, five, that each voting machine shall produce an individual permanent paper record for each vote cast which shall be made available for inspection, verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast. Based on the record presented, Mr. Chairman, Sequoia has not met those elements.

The need to completely and thoroughly test voting machines and their printers prior to election day is clear when one considers the history of these devices. In records we have submitted, we have demonstrated various recent elections where printers in particular as well as other components of voting machines have failed, sometimes on a massive

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2. While it's true not all these 3 examples represent products of Sequoia or represent products of the Advantage, we 4 5 nevertheless have an instance in the 2006 6 primary election held in Ohio lost ten percent 7 of the paper ballots and in the November 2006 election, a county in North Carolina experienced 8 9 problems in about nine percent of printers 10 there.

Again, while not Sequoia printers, the fact that manufacturers who are supposedly enjoy the benefit the federal testing have their printers fail demonstrate the thorough State testing is appropriate to determine whether similar debacles would occur here in New Jersey. The lesson to be learned from this, therefore, is readily apparent. Because voting machines and printers present risk of malfunctioning and breaking, proper rigorous an scientific standards and proper rigorous and scientific testing are required.

The current record fails to establish the printers confirm to State law and, therefore, the public advocate recommends that

1 on the record as it now exists these printers 2. not be approved. The criteria the State 3 promulgated for evaluating the reliability and accuracy of these printers is really a problem 4 5 in the process of evaluating printers. These 6 criteria do not establish any definition of failure or failure rate. Therefore, testers 7 8 cannot know what malfunctions or other problems 9 count as failures or when the number of such 10 problems amounts to a failure of the system. In our April 16, 2007 comments on 11 12 this issue which are in the record, we make 13 clear that this represented a violation of legal 14 requirements of the State that machines be 15 thoroughly tested. You might consider this as 16 sort of an analogy. A professor is giving 17 somebody a test, he should let people know what 18 the passing grade for that test is and the 19 State's criteria don't say if a machine fails X

both to the manufacturers as well as the public

number of times in Y number of hours of testing,

the machine is a failure. It is unfair I think

23 to issue this test without stipulating the

24 passing grade.

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In contrast to the New Jersey

1 standards, credible national organizations have 2. recommended standards for voting machine 3 certification. We address these in our comments, but the Federal Election Assistance 4 5 Commission, for example, in its 2005 voluntary 6 voting systems guidelines and its 2002 voting 7 systems standards says that a voting system 8 should not be certified if a part of that system 9 malfunctions more than once after one hundred 10 sixty-three hours of voting and those standards 11 are reproduced in the record. 12 The National Institute of 13 Standards in Technology, in fact, goes even

The National Institute of
Standards in Technology, in fact, goes even
further and they say a system should not be
certified if a device within that system
malfunctions more than once for every ten
thousand voters.

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The State did not adopt these kind of standards or meet any kind of standards for determining the failure rate, nor did the State follow the recommendations of these credible national organizations on how to perform testing to verify compliance criteria. 2005 volunteer systems guidelines, for example, makes clear and this is also in the 2002 -- I'm sorry voluntary

voters system guidelines makes clear that in order to verify clients with this requirement machines ought to be tested for at least one hundred sixty-nine hours.

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Another example of rigorous testing methods is from the State of California where they look a hundred machines for six hours and have voters manually cast one hundred ten ballots on each machine. If one percent of the machine fails to count the vote properly or three percent of the machines have failure such as powering off of the machine or paper jam that the operating system of the machine cannot greatly manage the machine fails. The criteria for voting machines adopted by this State in which NJIT did not use this kind of modern scientifically accepted methodology for testing.

What the State did instead was to pick and choose from selected portions, not very detailed and rigorous ones of the 2005 federal guidelines and to ask NJIT to test to those ill defined and nonrigorous standards. We did not test for one hundred sixty-nine hours. As best we can tell from this report, there was a twelve hundred vote test somewhere on the order of

eight or nine hours and fourteen hour test took

2 | fourteen hours for a total somewhere between

3 | twenty and twenty-five hours of testing or so.

4 Not withstanding the claims of thousands of

5 hours have been devoted to testing. What I can

6 | see from the NJIT reports is those were the two

7 | tests, the two volume tests at issue which were

8 performed.

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In fact, if these kinds of standards had been in place, what you have seen with the Sequoia machines is that they would likely not have passed. While I respect NJIT's views that the printer jam might not have resulted in the loss of fifty-six votes, I will accept for the sake of argument that representation. Nevertheless, after in the twenty-five or so hours of volume testing that were done the machine jammed once. Jamming after nine hundred twenty-two votes in a twelve hundred vote test. So if the federal standard one in one hundred sixty-three hours had been in place or in the NIST standard of ten thousand voters had been placed or even if the physical standard of one percent and three percent of the machine had been in place, that would have

resulted in a failure and it is unfortunate that the State did not list and test to those particular standards. Those standards being scientifically accepted, modern, appropriate for printer testing.

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mentioned this before. I want to add to this as well. Given the testing appears to have focused on the printers alone rather than the system as a whole, this is somewhat problematic. Under State law any change to a voting system that impairs the efficiency of the voting system means the entire system has to be retested and I would refer you to both the 2005 guidelines as well as Exhibit 36 and, frankly, what doctor -- it was a Sequoia representative that mentioned the addition of the VVPAT additional work to the voter.

So what you have is the addition of the printer requires you to recertify the entire system before it can be used again in the State. Again, there is no evidence in the record of the meaningful review of this machine software or source code. I understand there is representations that some kind of examination is

underway, but it has not been completed as of yet. Which would suggest to me that thorough testing in this record has not occurred.

Let me just address some of the

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exceptions that NJIT noted in its report. First of all, it was said I think without conviction that once the voter recess the button to cast their third ballot, the ballot cycles through the machine without stopping and it cycles through in a manner that the voter does not have sufficient time as doctor she stated before. The voter does not have sufficient time to look at and confirm whether those votes were accurately cast. Again, the N.J.S.A. 1948 VVPAT and what they are supposed to do that presence a real problem with the statute as well as the testing as performed by NJIT.

It was also stated before that voting machines do not always display the proper diagnosis of a problem. There is really know evidence to contradict that. The evidence I think is that a update of that software is in testing, but as it stands right now it does not meet that criteria.

I would also speak briefly about

exception twelve. I mentioned this before about the paper jam. Even if you accept that the jam would not have resulted in a loss of fifty-six votes in a real election if you accept that there was still a jam and it occurred in less than time frame prescribed for failure by the DSS, the voter verified system guidelines as well as NIST standards.

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In sum, Mr. Chairman, voters deserve reasonable assurances that the machines and printer are reliable accurate private and Statute requiring a paper record has secure. been replaced since July 2005. We are very late in that process. I also want to raise the concern that the NJIT reports were replaced late on any after noon in the public and here we are on a Tuesday morning. That presence a serious issues as to whether the public and advocates had enough time to road those reports, prepare to respond and it causes me great concern that these hearings move forward so precipitously and so soon after the reports were published. previously articulated that to the committees counsel so I am not going to repeat that again today, but suffice it to say that three reports

1 have more than a hundred twenty pages each is a 2. little bit to digest in the course of one 3 business day. 4 For the reasons I have stated for 5 the reasons in the documents presented Sequoia 6 has not met its burden of establishing their 7 system has been thoroughly tested found to be reliable or correctly registers to report all 8 9 votes cast and applied to the mandate every 10 voter to register their vote. On the present 11 record the certification should be denied 12 without prejudice to return when it confirming 13 system is presented. 14 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you for 15 your comments. The timing is not good for 16 anybody. 17 Theresa Engel. Mike Van Pelt. 18 Ann Reu. 19 MS. REU: I'd like to thank the 2.0 committee for allowing me to speak. My name is 2.1 Ann Reu and I've come from Montclair, New Jersey 22 I am a member of Blue Wave New Jersey, a grass

We have been concerned that any voting system be secure, accurate and reliable.

roots political organization.

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In short we want every vote accurately counted and in such a manner that the electorate will have total confidence in the results of all elections.

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To this end, we have attended meetings of our county Freeholder Board. We have contacted our local election officials. We have reviewed the purchase contracts between Essex County and Sequoia. We have repeatedly requested an opportunity to view and test the proposed printer which is the subject of this hearing. Despite these requests, no access to the printer was given until today July 24, 2007 when the hearing is taking place.

Additionally, the report of NJIT which tested the printer was not available until the end of last week. We wish to express our great concern and dismay that the procedure. Instead of transparency and openness we feel that there is only the illusion of a fair process. That being said and with the understanding we object to the framework of this hearing, we would like to note the following egregious shortcomings in this system which are obvious even with the limited opportunity

afforded to observe the machine and prepare for this hearing.

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No real world testing has been done. Instead of having a large number of machines tested by average voters operated by regular poll workers under conditions approximating an actual election, three probably brand new machines were tested under laboratory conditions. We have no way of calculating the probable failure rates based on these tests. The underlying machine has not been properly certified.

Additionally, even the inadequate certification of the machine previously done is no longer valid due to the modifications made to accommodate the printer. The entire value of the printed record is that it be voter verified. The fact that there is no opportunity for the voter verification of the third ballot after two have been rejected suggests clearly fatal to any possibility of accepting this machine.

This was the criteria set by the Attorney General and despite of all the time given to the manufacturer, they have not yet met this minimal standard. A voter verified ballot

1 requires to the voter can see his actual final 2. ballot in the substantial number of instances 3 where the voter rejects his first two ballots. 4 There is no verification as of now. 5 be corrected before the next election. 6 The failure to demonstrate seals 7 and locking mechanisms at this late date is 8 another cause for concern. A follow up 9 demonstration should be in order to see the 10 promised changes. 11 As noted, there was insufficient 12 opportunity to review the report and observe the 13 devices to bring an exhaustive disposition of 14 their deficiencies, however, it is clear that 15 the machines not only have not been properly 16 tested, but even the tests done have 17 demonstrated fatal and egregious flaws. 18 proposed purchase of these machines should not 19 go forward. 2.0 The voting machines have not been 21 modified to confirm with the minimal 22 requirements necessary to safeguard the 23 electoral process. For far less expenditure of

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public monies, we can use a paper ballot with

optical scan counters and avoid the possibility

1 of fraud and manipulation inherent in the 2. proposed system. We must do as was done in 3 Florida, Maryland and other jurisdictions and put the security of the vote first. 4 5 We strongly urge the proposed 6 devices be rejected. Thank you. 7 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very 8 much for your comments. 9 Mary Ellen Marino. 10 MS. MARINO: Thank you. Thank you 11 very much. Mary Ellen Marino, M-a-r-i-n-o. 12 have to thank the other public testifiers 13 because they have worked long and hard and have 14 given me a lot of information that I didn't have 15 before, but I must admit that I was appalled to walk in here at 9:00 o'clock and find out 16 17 immediately from the Attorney General that the 18 machines had already been decided on that they 19 were already okay and then by a few minutes 2.0 before 3:00 after spending three-quarters of the 2.1 a day I learned that that wasn't the case. 22 Not only were we only supposed to 23 talk about the printers and the paper trail, in 24 fact, it hadn't still been decided by the 25 Attorney General whether these machines were

1 | acceptable or still in negotiation.

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want to do is just to submit an alternate. This is unfortunately national numbers of voting districts and cost, but to submit some cost information on hand counting the ballots and/or optical scanning the ballots because clearly if what we want is the integrity of the vote and we have been hearing more and more and more about vote stealing, vote fraud and election fraud and abuse that we must do what we can and that is to have a public control of the elections publicly counted and not hidden in some unverifiable code.

I happened to work in the State of New Jersey when we brought in computers twenty-five years ago and we brought the Wang. The Wang doesn't even exist anymore and it is kind of the example of what we are doing now. We are buying with big dollars machines that haven't been tried and tested and true. If this machine as I learned 3:00 o'clock was tested and approved by the State in 1994 and they continually and at this very moment is making more changes. Then we haven't really tested and

- 1 approved the machines that you are talking about
  2 having us use this year.
- So I am just going to submit this documentation and I thank you very much for listening to me.
- MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you for
  your very nice well targeted comments. Thank
  you very much.
- Ellen Sleeter and before we begin,
  there were two people who signed up whose names
  appear here, but don't appear to be present so
  if there is anybody that we overlooked, please
  let me know.
- MS. SLEETER: Hi, my name is Ellen
  Sleeter. Battery failure, does that ever
  happen. My name is Ellen Sleeter. I am from
  Maplewood, New Jersey. I am active and an
  organizer of Essex County Democracy for America.
  We and Blue Wave comprised of voter task force
  in Essex County to try to assert more
- 21 involvement in the acquisition of the voting 22 machines there.
- I have one question which you can
  answer at your leisure because I am the last
  speaker, but, boy, I want to hear the answer and

1 then three comments and I will start with a 2. question. 3 MR. WOODBRIDGE: All questions to 4 the Chair. 5 MS. SLEETER: The question is 6 about digital signatures. Now, I heard -- I 7 read very clearly what I understood in NJIT's 8 response to their testing which was that the 9 individual ballot record did not contain a 10 digital signature. I heard in clarification 11 comments twice from Sequoia that yes, that was a 12 true observation that there was a digital 13 signature for the aggregate for that machine, 14 but later in this course on the same topic I 15 heard from another person in Sequoia that yes, 16 there was a digital signature at the barcode 17 level and, therefore, the barcode level 18 represented the individual ballot so that seems 19 to me to be in contradiction. 2.0 So I would like to be clear about 2.1 whether this did pass the test of having the 22 digital signatures at the ballot level currently 23 not in firmware that will be available in two to 24 three months. So that is the question. 25 Comments. I looked at the Sequoia

1 Advantage when I was first demonstrated at 2. Turtle Back Zoo in Essex County that was some 3 years ago and tested immediately. I have an IT background. I worked in IT since the seventies. 4 I know about the Internet since many of you were 5 6 I tried to write in mechanism and was born. 7 appalled at the inability once having stated a write-in that I couldn't somehow recall it. 8 9 couldn't neither change it nor could I even see 10 what I had written in. 11 Now, in this demonstration day. 12 The good news is that you can on the paper 13 ballot see what you have written in. The bad 14 news is that it was very difficult from a user 15 interface standpoint and that is something I 16 know something about to know how to make that I rejected the ballot, I saw it. 17 change. can't recall -- I couldn't figure out how to get 18 19 myself into a reset mode on the write-in itself. 2.0 I finally did get myself into 2.1 reset mode and I am not sure how I did. That I 22 might have just changed the buttons and then it 23 gave me -- in the little panel it gave me these 24 arrows where I could accept it or reject it.

These arrows were pointing to something that was

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unclear to me. So rejection was on the left
which is good for DFA and I pressed some buttons
and ultimately rejected the write-in and got a
chance to write it again. This is very hard. I
am a computer geek. You don't see my propeller
head, but it is there. That is a problem.

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Three strikes I must register my utter dismay at the inability to verify as presented the third attempt at the ballot. We understand that the legislation says you can't change it, but the absolute assurety that Sequoia presented about the fact that because it says you can't change it, you don't need to verify it because it is a done deal. That is not okay. That is not good business.

The section 6C2 quote I heard the vendor shall submit a certification that the VVPRS satisfies the State criteria and Sequoia said yes, they have submitted that. But how can you submit a certification that you satisfy the criteria when the NJIT report says that clearly you have not. So maybe I don't understand that process. I don't perhaps understand the process.

Lastly, I urge you to reconsider

1 the Sequoia Advantage processor itself because 2. it is certainly changed and it has been not we 3 think credibly certified as a voting machine itself. We think this is a great opportunity to 4 5 save the money that you would have spent on 6 retrofitting the Advantages with this printer 7 and go to paper ballots that are counted using 8 optical scanners. 9 Thank you. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Thank you very 11 much. Do we have any other input from the 12 public? 13 Okay, seeing no input I ask the 14 vendors in they have any comments they would 15 like to make in response. Why they are 16 caucusing, I am going to ask the committee if 17 they have any questions to ask. 18 MR. CHAGARIS: May I ask the -- my 19 name is Arthur Chagaris on behalf of Sequoia. 2.0 I'd like to request that whatever 2.1 documentation has been submitted to the 22 commission today by the public advocate or would 23 be submitted apparently by Ms. Venetis and the 24 other witness that we also get a copy of that 25 information so we may have an opportunity to

1	review it if that is appropriate.
2	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I'm going to ask
3	the public advocate, are their copies that can
4	be provided to the vendor?
5	MR. KOWVER: They are not copies
6	of publication if they are requesting the
7	exhibits in as something we can provide probably
8	tomorrow.
9	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I think that is
10	what he is requesting and also in fairness to
11	the public advocate provided us with a list of
12	what these documents were going to be I presume
13	that is the same list as consistent with the
14	documents that we have.
15	MR. KOWVER: Yes, sir, I think the
16	list was one through sixty-seven.
17	MR. WOODBRIDGE: So maybe if you
18	could provide the list sooner rather than later
19	and get the follow up documents to them in the
20	day or two.
21	MR. CHAGARIS: Also, with respect
22	to the other two witnesses that they had follow
23	up statements, we'd like to get those statements
24	as well.
25	MR. WOODBRIDGE: I understand that

1 the professor is going to get us comments by the 2. end of the week, is that right, and Mary just 3 gave us your's, correct, so I think the answer 4 to that question is could you arrange to get a 5 copy to the attorney over here. 6 MR. CHAGARIS: As to the other 7 comments that were made at this time, I'd like 8 to present Mr. Adolph Romei as to sort of legal 9 issues and thereafter the other representative 10 from Sequoia would present some technical 11 issues. 12 MR. ROMEI: Adolph Romei on behalf 13 of Sequoia. There is a few misinformation that 14 seemed to keep circulating. One is that Sequoia 15 is not a U.S. company. Sequoia is a Delaware 16 corporation with headquarters currently in Oakland, California. 17 18 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Get closer to the 19 microphone. 2.0 MR. ROMEI: Sequoia is a Delaware 2.1 corporation. The management is American. It is 22 based in Oakland, California at the current 23 time. It is not a foreign corporation. 24 Second item that seems to keep

coming up is federal investigations.

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1 knowledge as outside counsel Sequoia is not the 2. target of any federal investigation. 3 Third, the issue of foreign 4 ownership. Sequoia voluntarily or I should say 5 its parents voluntarily filed a application it 6 is my understanding that that application has 7 been resolved there is no ongoing investigation. 8 If there is any further questions 9 the committee has. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: You said there 11 are some technical comments. 12 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, just a 13 few comments. There have been some significant 14 comments. The question to be said about on page 15 six of the October 2006 federal certification 16 letter regarding it clearly indicates on page 17 six this is given to the Attorney General that 18 Wyle Laboratories did an assessment on the 19 Advantage firmware. That is clearly obviously 2.0 what you heard earlier, but it is here on page 21 six. 22 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Which firmware 23 are you talking about that Wyle did that testing 24 on? 25 MR. SMITH: About the Advantage.

1 MR. WOODBRIDGE: On this machine 2. here? 3 MR. SMITH: On that machine so 4 that is contradictory to what we heard. 5 There was some discussion on barcode encryption. Barcode encryption is not 6 7 in the regulations. It is not required anywhere 8 so I am not sure why that is brought up as an 9 issue. 10 The question that was asked, the 11 short summary version is that if the electronic 12 records and when the polls are closed have to be 13 signed. The barcode of each individual which is 14 what is on the paper and not in the units have a 15 authorization for every cast vote record. 16 those two are not contradictory because the 17 records are in different places. If you still 18 puzzled, I will be happy to speak to you about 19 it. I think that is all I have for the 2.0 2.1 technical issues. In terms of just a short 22 summary of my remarks going back to the very 23 beginning of the day with NJIT and the testing 24 that they did was thorough and it was indeed 25 rigorous and the public advocates to state that

1 trying to disclaim that they are not. 2. machines tabulate accurately and that they are 3 able to tie in in four places where the voters intent is recorded in the machine and the paper 4 5 record which by the way, it is viewed by the 6 voter and it is thus independent of the software 7 and the machine which is more modern. 8 The fact is paper record and voter 9 10

gets to see it and it can be recounted and it is protected with both physical and procedural security and electronic security so that we know that we can trust.

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MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, is there a short comment? Okay, we have got to wrap up because we have got two more days.

MS. VENETIS: Yes, thank you very much and this is just a follow up comment. is Penny Venetis from Rutgers Law School. issues. The federal investigation there is still an ongoing federal investigation on bribery charges. The Miami Herold has documented this guite well and continues to document it.

Sequoia is a holding of a Venezuelan corporation. That is why it was the subject of a second federal investigation. The company, the holding company said that it would sell off Sequoia rather than continue to comply with a request from the federal government. To my knowledge, that sale has not yet occurred so it is still a holding of a Venezuelan corporation.

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I would ask this committee to specifically ask members of Sequoia whether or not Cyber has tested any of the software in this machine perhaps maybe Wyle did test a component, but my understanding is from letters sent to Judge Feinberg by the Attorney General's Office that Cyber was indeed the laboratory that was testing this components.

So it is a very simple question and perhaps maybe Wyle did test some of the components, but my understanding is that Cyber also tested components and did indeed test the bulk of the components and that information came directly from the Attorney General's office.

Thank you.

MR. CHAGARIS: Just a short reply as far as the investigation is concerned. I don't know how there is disclosure of any kind

1 of federal investigation because it is my 2. understanding federal investigations are 3 supposed to be confidential, but we have not been indicted for anything and as far as I know 4 5 we are not going to be indicted for anything. 6 So you can throw out loosely in terms of federal 7 investigation without any evidence that there is 8 such an investigation that we are a target or 9 anything, but it is just not the case. 10 MR. WOODBRIDGE: Okay, it is 11 getting towards the end. Make sure people 12 understand that this is not an easy 13 gratification exercise. We are to make some 14 sense out of this and then give to the office as 15 soon as possible some kind of recommendation. 16 Again, I want to stress that these 17 criteria are longer better or worse, but they 18 are longer than we have had to deal with before 19 and this is a new aspect of what we had to do so 2.0 I request your patience as we try to sort 2.1 through this and make some sense of it. 22 I do want to thank again NJIT for 23 sitting back there patiently in the hottest part 24 of the room and enduring this and helping us.

It's been extremely valuable and I am sure you

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1	will have us who are here including the audience
2	appreciate. This goes beyond the call I ask
3	Tony, the court reporter, a question how soon is
4	it likely we can got the transcript.
5	I just want is to remind people
6	that the second day hearing start tomorrow. I
7	assume it will be at the same time so we will
8	see you here at 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning.
9	At that time we will review the pros and cons of
10	the Sequoia Edge machine which is the other
11	machine over there in the corner and look
12	forward to seeing you there.
13	Thank you very much for your
14	patience and thank you for attending.
15	
16	(Whereupon, the proceedings were
17	concluded at 4:20 p.m.)
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1	CERTIFICATE
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3	I, ANTHONY HOFMANN, a Certified Shorthand
4	Reporter, and Notary Public within and for the State
5	of New Jersey, certify that the foregoing is a true
6	and accurate transcript of the stenographic notes of
7	said witness(es)who were first duly sworn by me, on
8	the date and place hereinbefore set forth.
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13	ANTHONY HOFMANN, C.S.R. LICENSE NO. XIO1854
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